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Ábrahám Kovács 
and 
Jaeshik Shin
The initiative of starting a Hungarian (Hun) and Korean (Han) theological 
platform arises from the realisation of common concerns, issues and interest 
that both societies face in spite of the fact that they are geographically apart. 
Several leading theologians from the two nations such as Jooseop Keum, Jaeshik 
Shin and Yoon-Jae Chang on the Korean side as well as Ábrahám Kovács, István 
Pásztori-Kupán and Gusztáv Bölcskei on the Hungarian side decided and agreed 
upon to initiate the HHTF, that is Hun Han Theological Forum, with a view to learn 
from each other and to contribute to the formulation of world Christianity. It has 
been intentionally set up like that so as to avoid the dominance of European 
centric theology especially, what is often Western European theology. The idea of 
establishing such a network was originally articulated in Edinburgh by two of the 
aforementioned persons who studied at the Centre for the Study of Christianity 
in the Non-Western World. 
Both Hungarians and Koreans encountered the dismantling of their nations 
in the twentieth century despite of their will and were victims of the struggle 
of international superpowers. Thus the issue of patriotism/nationalism and 
division of their nation is a deep concern for both countries. In addition, they 
also have minorities in the surrounding countries as well as significant diasporas 
across the world, which raises questions for Reformed theology in need of an 
answer. Secondly, communism also made an indelible impact on the Korean 
and Hungarian nations, presenting issues such as reconciliation, forgiveness or 
the challenge to relate to an openly atheist state as a theist, Christ’s disciples. 
Moreover, there is the ever-recurrent theme of the persecution of Christians. 
Editors’ Preface
Encounters between Asia and Europe: 
Korean and Hungarian Reformed 
Theologies Meet in the Agora of the 
Secular World
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Thirdly, secularisation is also a crucial issue for Hungarians who had faced a new 
world after the collapse of communism since 1989. At the same time Koreans 
also experienced an unparalleled and swift change since the 1990s. The newly 
emerging well-to-do society challenged the traditional forms of how to organise 
a society in which religion, including Protestant faith, placed a significant part.
In 2015 we celebrated the 25th anniversary of the first free elections in Hungary 
after the collapse of Communism. Therefore, at the first meeting scholars coming 
from various theological disciplines were invited to offer papers on any aspect 
of the challenge that a European and an Asian form of Communism presented 
to the respective Reformed Christian communities. Papers were encouraged to 
address one of the following themes: reconciliation, unification of the nation and/
or Christian churches, the issue of repentance of the collaborators, analyse the 
theological justifications of collaboration with Communism, uncover and write 
the stories of the forgotten Christian witnesses amongst lay people, theologians, 
and ministers during the persecution. The intention of the Forum has been to 
create a platform and a core group of scholars who wish to collaborate with each 
other in one of the proposed research areas and develop research topics that are 
relevant to the need of Hungarian and Korean Presbyterian churches in their own 
context and also learn from each other’s similar as well as diverging experience.
The first volume is the result of the lectures and lively discussions when 
scholars learnt from each other. It is entitled “Church and State: Theological 
Reflections in the Hungarian Reformed Churches and in the Korean Protestant 
Churches”. The book is divided into two larger thematic groups such as ‘Historical 
Overview and Theological Perspective on the Context’ and ‘Critical Theological 
Thinking about Communism, Colonization and Totalitarianism’. Our hope is that 
these texts will stir further debates and new theological thinking is stimulated 
on both sides, in Hungary and Korea. Any book is best used if students read it, 
therefore, this volume hopefully will be used as a textbook for students who 
wish to study in a comparative manner topics that are evergreen for theologians, 
scholars of religion and historian. It is believed that the contributions made here 
will excite, provoke and initiate critical theological reflections that may be useful 
not only to the respective two nations but to the churches across the world with 
similar concern in Asia, Africa, the Americas, Australia and Europe. 
Debrecen- Gwangju
8 May, 2019
Part I
Historical Overview and 
Theological Perspective on 
the Context

Byung-Joon Chung 
Introduction 
The church-state relation is a social, theological, legal issue, which has 
continued to be raised in human history. Jesus gave the basic theological 
principle to this issue, by declaring “Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to 
God what is God’s.”(Matthew 22.21). The rule of God cannot identify with the 
secular one. The church as a community of believers belongs to God, but is 
not the kingdom of God in itself and may not be completely separated from 
the state. So the church-state relation is the subject that always requires a 
new interpretation. 
This study is to analyze the church-state relation, appeared in the Korea 
history from 1784 to 1945 and how the Protestantism (including mission and the 
church) affected the relation and was affected by it. It includes two periods of the 
late Joseon dynasty (1784-1910) and the Japanese colonialism (1910-45). Over the 
time, various groups of Christians responded to the power of state in a variety of 
ways, such as resistance, compliance, cooperation, and submission.
Previous studies in this area have mainly focused on the after the Korea 
liberation of 1945. Their research methods were also mainly around religious 
sociology. This paper is a new effort to research the church-state relation before 
the liberation in the perspective of church history and missiology.
For this study a historical approach and a way of typology will be used. 
Typology is at risk of too much simplification, but must be a useful tool in order 
The Structural Changes of 
the Church-State Relation 
in Korea, 1784-1945
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to compare with different patterns each other. There appear five types of church-
state relation in terms of the Western Christian history.
1. Catacombs type: church being persecuted by a pagan country. 
2. Religious state type: state being controlled by a religion 
3. State religion type: state manipulating religious matters 
4. Radical separation type: church’s exclusive rejection against state 
intervention in church affair. 
5. Separation type: friendly cooperation between church and state. Also 
there is an unfavorable separation type: such as in a socialist state and 
under a dictatorship.1
These types are not sufficient to describe the experience of the Korean church 
which conflicted with neo-Confucian state and Japanese Shintoism. Therefore, 
this paper also uses four kinds of state-religion relation which N. Jay Demerath 
classified as (1) religious states with religious politics, (2) secular states with 
secular politics, (3) religious states with secular politics, and (4)secular states with 
religious politics.2
The Roman Catholic Church-State Relation in the 
Joseon Dynasty (1784-1873)
During a century, after the year of 1784, Joseon dynasty and the Roman Catholic 
Church suffered an extreme confrontation and conflicts. Joseon kingdom was 
a neo-Confucian state that exquisitely integrated their political philosophy and 
ethics. The government persecuted the Catholic Church as a Western evil teaching 
without loyalty to the king and filial piety to father, because the Catholics rejected 
to hold their ancestor memorial ceremony and had their own secret meetings, in 
which they taught the equality of all people in front of God. Also the ruling party 
often used the persecutions to purge their political opponents.
The Catholics responded to the persecutions largely in two ways. The first 
response was to appeal help to the foreign Christian power. In 1801, Confucian 
scholar, Hwang Sa-young wrote a secret letter on a small piece of silk to the 
Pope for the purpose of calling Western armed fleets into the country, but failed. 
Mr. Hwang said, “Even if this country may collapse, there must remain the holy 
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teachings.”3 As a result it brought more brutal persecution. He misunderstood 
the Western world as a “nation of the Pope” and thought foreign powers too 
easy.4 
The second one was to appeal mercy to the king and the people. During the 
great persecution in 1839, Jeong Ha-sang, a son of martyr, wrote a public letter 
to the king to explain the basic doctrines of the Church and to appeal that the 
Catholics were also “the children of the king.”5 Mr. Jeong confessed “although 
we can commit sins to the Confucian gentry, but cannot get a sin to God.” At the 
time, the Catholics learned from the Chinese translations of Catholic books that 
the Catholic Church and its faith were superior to the country. By the way, the 
Catholic Church’s methods of responding to the persecutions grew more mature 
over time.
The relation between the early Roman Catholic Church and Joseon dynasty 
belongs to the catacomb type. Joseon was a Confucian state with religious 
politics in which the Church suffered the persecutions and martyrdom. Several 
thousands of the Catholics were killed by the government. 
The Church-State Relation in the End of the Joseon 
Dynasty (1884-1910)
In the end of the Joseon dynasty, the type of “religious state with religion 
politics” had collapsed by the invasions of foreign forces. The King Gojong 
and the Reformist Party recognized the Protestant Christianity as the means 
of modernization. In 1884, the first Protestant missionary Dr. Horace Allen was 
allowed to come into the Korea. The following Protestant missionaries tried 
to show the Protestantism as a loyal and patriotic religion. After some time, 
two types of belief were embodied in the Korean Protestant Church: one was 
the otherworldly-oriented personal salvation style; the other was the social 
commitment style for the rescue of the nation. The table below shows how the 
two Protestant beliefs maintained their own state-religion relations.
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1884-1900 1901-1910
Personal  
Salvation  
style • Loyal/
patriotic religion
• Favorable 
relation b/w 
the church-the 
dynasty
• Apolitical Manifesto: 
church-state 
separation (1901)
• Favorable relation
b/w the missionaries-
the dynasty
• Great Revival 
Movement (1907),
• Million Souls for 
Christ Movement 
(1909)
• Favorable relation
b/w the missionaries-
Japan
Social  
Commitment 
Style
• Independent 
club movement 
(1896-88)
• Tension b/w 
the church-the 
dynasty
• New People’s  
Association
(1907)
• Persecution and  
Resist b/w the 
Korean Church-Japan
The Protestant Church and Modernization
The Port opening of Korea (1876) took a significant change in foreign policy and 
religious policy in Korea. Huang Zunxian, a Chinese diplomat in Japan, proposed 
a diplomatic way, Joseon Strategy for Korea in 1880. “Religious teachings of the 
American Protestantism are not involved in politics at all, and there are many 
innocent and good-natured congregations.6
It was China’s diplomatic strategy to bring the United States to the Korean 
Peninsula and check Japan and Russia. However it had a significant impact on the 
King Gojong and the Reformist Party to have a favorable position for the US and 
the Protestantism. The government signed a Korea-US Patron Treaty in 1882. In 
1883 the King allowed the school and hospital to the American Missions. Korean 
Reformist intellectuals also wanted to introduce the Western civilization into the 
country. They thought that the Christianity was a way of modernization.
The Separation between Politics and Religion as a Mission Policy
The Missionary periodical, Foreign Missionary reads, “nothing could be more 
uncalled for, or more injurious to our real missionary work, than for us to seem 
to take any part in the political factions of Korea.”7 In the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, political non-interference in the mission field was one of the most 
important mission policies. The reason is as follows:
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1. The missionaries took for granted a culture of favorable separation of 
church-state according to the US Constitution.
2. They worried that their actions may unintentionally be involved in the 
political issues and it could also give adverse effects on the mission.
3. The US State Department didn’t want the missionaries to be involved in 
a political maelstrom of the Far East. Their principle on Korea was that of 
“friendly neutrality” and “non-interference diplomacy.” So they gave to the 
missionaries the ongoing attention through US diplomats.8
4. The missionaries remembered that there were ruthless persecutions 
against the Catholics until 1873. So they entered into friendly relations with 
the government.
From a Loyal and Patriotic Religion to Social Involvement (1884-1900)
(1) Independent Club and the political involvement of the church 
The Protestantism started as a religion of loyalty and patriotism. On Sunday 
Christians hung a national flag on the church. They celebrated the birth day of 
the King and the Crown Prince. 
Yet the Christian faith was linked to the political action such as political reform, 
national independence, and modernization in connection with Independent 
Club Movement (1896-1898). The Club tried to establish a “constitutional 
monarchy” and “parliamentary system.” When it was dissolved by the pro-Russian 
government, the leaders were imprisoned and converted to Christianity there. In 
that time, the relation between the church and the dynasty was in high tension.
(2) The Early native Christians’ faith
The Christian leaders of the Independent Club and the prison converters did not 
separate their faith from their national concerns. Their faith was a little different 
from the missionaries’ one. Almost all of the prison converters joined the YMCA 
movement in 1904, soon after their release from jail. Later, they stood for their 
faith in the heart of the political and social movements for Korean independence 
from the Japanese colonialism. 
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The first ordained Methodist Deacon, Choe Byeong-heon gave a speech under 
the title of “the relation of religion and politics” at the Seoul YMCA in 1906. He 
saw the relationship between politics and religion as complementary as “outside 
and inside,” “cart and wheel,” “lips and teeth.”9 He was critical to the missionaries 
when they tried to separate the church from the national concerns and make the 
native church apolitical. 
For him, the religious doctrine and political ideology were not separated from 
each other but completed each other. So he thought that “the relation of religion 
and politics is like that of the heart and behavior”. He said “the right politics came 
from the right religion.”
Apolitical Policy of the Missionaries (1901-10)
Apolitical Manifesto of the Presbyterian Mission Council (1901)
The Presbyterian Mission Council made “Apolitical Manifesto of the Church,” 
in September 1901 and announced it to the churches all over the nation. It 
suggested the biblical sources for the separation between politics and religion: 
Romans 13: 1~7; I Timothy 2: 1~2; I Peter 2: 13-17; Matthew 22: 15~21; Matthew 17: 
24-27; John 18:36. And it reads,  
1. It is not the duty of foreign missionaries to interfere with the state affairs.
2. The affairs of the Church and those of the State belong to entirely different 
spheres and native Christians are instructed that it is not the function of 
the Church to rule in political matters.
3. We teach native Christians without being in violation of the word of God, 
serve the Emperor with loyalty, and obey rulers, and keep the law of the 
country.
4. The Church does not recommend nor forbid that individual Christians 
participate in the political affair or a political party.
5. The Church is a sacred institution. The building cannot be used for the 
promotion of its interests and group of people cannot be allowed for the 
purpose of engaging in political discussion10
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This Manifesto was made to protect the church from possible political involvement 
and following oppression, to prevent the church from political pollution, and 
keep the church purity. However, the missionaries announced the insufficient 
information for the Korean church about what was the true meaning of “church-
state separation.” The US segregation policy between church and state was to 
prevent the intervention of the state in church affairs, not to prohibit political 
involvement of the church.11
This manifesto prescribed that the church cannot meddle in politics, but did 
not mention of the freedom of religion. As a result, even today Koreans think that 
the separation of politics and religion is to prohibit religion from their political 
involvement, but they do not know that religions affairs have to be preserved 
from political interference.
Different ways of the Missionaries and the Christian Nationalists
Japan won the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) and became the winner of the Northeast. 
The United States tolerated the domination of Japan over Korea by signing the Taft-
Katsura Memorandum (1905). After the Protection Treaty with Japan in 1905, the real 
political partner with the missionaries became Japan. The first nationalist movement 
of the Korean Christians was prayer for national salvation. On 9 May 1905, all of the 
Presbyterian Church from all over the country prayed to rescue the country for seven 
days. The Methodist Youth organizations, Sangdong and Epwit, also organized a 
prayer meeting, in which thousands of people gathered.
The church became a birth place for the national movement. Japanese tried to 
control the Korean church by using the missionaries. In the end of 1905, Japanese 
Residency-General Ito Hirobumi invited Rev. M. C. Harris, Bishop of the American 
Methodist Mission in Japan, and told him “From now on, entrust all the political 
affairs to me, and the missionaries take the responsibility of enlightenment and 
spiritual aspects of the Church for the future Koreans.”12
In 1907 the Korean Protestant Christianity was divided into two lines: the 
religious movement and the national movement. The Righteous Army uprising 
took place in 1907 to resist the Japanese. The missionaries dismissed the nationalist 
evangelists and teachers from the congregation. They also examined strictly the 
church members who had strong political tendencies.13 The Methodist Mission 
dismissed the Epwit Youth Association. 
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In the religious movement line, the Great Revival Movement took place. 
The Korean church had a rapid growth. The Presbyterian Church organized the 
Independent Presbytery, where the first seven Korean pastors were ordained. 
The missionaries emphasized the “spiritual characters” and “eternal Kingdom.” 
In 1907, some of Christians in the national movement line set up the secret 
Sinminhoe (New People’s Association). They tried to achieve national independence 
by raising the national power through promoting education and increasing 
economic power. They provided the principle that independent Korea should be a 
Republic, not a monarch. However Christian nationalism in the both lines of Korean 
Christianity burst out in the March First Independent Movement in 1919. 
The Church and State Relation under the Japanese 
Colonial Rule (1910-1945)
In order to understand the church-state relations under the Japanese colonial 
rule, we need to review the state religious policy of the Japanese Imperial 
system, the changes of the relationship between Japanese and the missionaries, 
the relationship between Japanese and Christian nationalist movement. 
The ways of the Japanese to deal with the missionaries were both cooperation 
and control. The missionaries were a good tool to control the gritty Korean church. 
Their friendly relation kept until the early 1930s when the US-Japanese relations 
deteriorated. On the other hand, Japan harshly suppressed Christian national 
movement, and worked hard to convert national leaders to pro-Japanese supporters. 
“The social commitment style” and “the apolitical personal salvation style” 
lasted to the year of 1938, when the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church 
of Korea finally surrendered to the Shinto shrine worship. Since then no Christian 
national movement remained in the country. Only a few group of Christians 
lonely struggled against the Shinto worship in prison.
Japanese understanding of Church-State Relation
Since the Maiji Reformation in 1868, “the Japanese government promoted the 
policy to adopt Shintoism as the state religion in order to establish a governing 
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body of the emperor.”14 The Japanese government abolished the ban on 
Christianity in February 1873 in order to amend the Treaties with Western powers. 
Then Japan began to use Shintoism as an emperor ideology. 
In February 1882, Japan’s Constitution article 28 stipulated the “freedom of 
religion” clause. However, the article 3 of the Constitution prescribed the clause 
of “sacrosanct of the Emperor.” So the “freedom of religion” was meaningless.15 
In 1907 it added the clause of “lese-majesty for the Shrine.” The Japanese 
Constitution established the Imperial religious state with a secular government.
Japanese Government and the Missionaries
After the Korea annexation in 1910, Japan maintained preferential treatments such 
as extra-territoriality to the missionaries and gave a promise of cooperation for their 
mission work. It was to control over the Korean church. The missionaries also wanted 
to keep a favorable relationship with the Japanese for the missionary enterprise.
On the other hand, the missionaries believed that the Japan’s role in the civilization 
of Korea helped their role in its evangelization. Rev. Arthur J. Brown, the Secretary of 
the Foreign Mission of the PCUSA lettered to a Japanese government official. 
 What is the attitude of the missionaries toward the Japanese? There are four 
possible attitudes: First, opposition; second, aloofness; third, cooperation; 
fourth, loyal recognition. . . . [T]he fourth, loyal recognition, is I believe, the sound 
position. It is an accord with the example of Christ, who loyally submitted himself 
and advised His apostles to submit themselves to a far worse government than the 
Japanese and it is in line with the teaching of Paul in Roman xiiii.16
But a handful of missionaries played an important role in the report of inhumane 
acts of Japan to the Western world. Especially they did so in 1911 when Japanese 
fabricated the “105-men Incident” by torture for the purpose of eliminating the 
Christian nationalist movement and in the events of the March First Independence 
Movement in 1919. The Japanese government accused the Korea missionaries of 
interfering in politics through pro - Japanese media. The missionaries defended 
that they did not intervene politically.17 In fact, it was Japan’s plan to separate 
the church from the national movement. However, there were always inevitable 
tensions between Japan and the missionaries because of the following reasons.
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(1) The Japanese interfered with educational mission and religious activities 
through the enactment of various statutes and decrees. ⑵ After the global Great 
Depression in 1929, Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 as a way to overcome the 
crisis. In 1937 A military coup caused the collapse of the civil administration in 
Japan and the military invaded China. Therefore the US-Japan relations were 
worse and the Japanese government was also hostile to the missionaries. ⑶ the 
relationship between the two were even worse due to the enforcement of the 
Shrine worship to the Christian schools.
Christian National Movement under the Japanese Colonial Rule 
The Christian nationalist movement was powerless after the demolition of 
Sinminhoe by the 105-men incident (1911) but it revived as a social-political force 
through the March First Independence Movement (1919). In particular, the local 
organizations of the YMCA and YWCA set up the important foundation for the 
national movement. The Christian nationalist movement faced with the Japanese 
policy of “cultural governance”, economic deterioration, and socialists’ attacks in 
1920s.
During 1920s the Christian nationalists focused on the campaign for Rural 
Enlightenment. In particular the Presbyterian Church and the Methodist Church 
set up their respective rural department in their General Assembly in 1928 after 
participating in the Jerusalem International Missionary Conference. The Christian 
nationalists and the Socialists founded together the Singanhoe (New Branch 
Association) in 1927. It is a national front against the Japanese rule.
In 1938 the Japanese police arrested the leaders of the two major Christian 
national organizations, Suyang Dongwuhoe (Friends for Discipline) and 
Heungeob Guragbu (Club for Business Encouragement). It was a multi-purpose 
stance to prepare for the war with the United States, which was closely related to 
these Christian intellectuals, while eliminating social unrest in order to carry out 
war with China. Japan enforced the Christian leaders to convert pro-Japanese 
collaborators.
The Christian nationalist forces took a role of social responsibility and made 
a great contribution to awaken the sense of nation when the official churches 
depended on the otherworldly conservative individual salvation.
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Church-State Relation in the Enforcement of the Shinto Shrine Worship 
In the 1930s, Japan strengthened the Japanisation of Koreans to maximize the 
exploitation of the land and people, while reshaping the Korean peninsula as 
a logistical base for a war of aggression. The Shinto shrine worship was a way 
to assimilate the Koreans into the Japanese policy. It was the emperor ideology 
which reigned over all religions and thoughts. Japan intended to divide the 
Korean church by using the church-state dichotomy. They argued, “The Shinto is 
a national ritual not a religion.”
In the typology of state and religion, Japanese type was a secular politics 
with a religious ideology. It required total submission of other religions to the 
emperor ideology. The Korean church suffered the drastic persecution under the 
Shintoism as a state ideology. However there remained “catacombs type” at the 
end of the Japanese colonialism. Some of Christians didn’t obey the Japanese 
paganism even in martyrdom and prison.
Conclusion
This study is to examine the wide structural changes of the church-state relation 
before the Korean Liberation in 1945 and to investigate how the Protestantism 
influenced the relation and vice versa.
In the end of the 18th century, the Joseon dynasty was a neo-Confucius state 
with religious politics. The oppressed Roman Catholic Church appealed help 
to the France power or mercy of the King in order to acquire the freedom of 
religion. However they produced a lot of victims. It is a catacomb type of church-
state relation. 
The Protestant mission enterprise was comparatively easy as the type of “the 
religious state with religious politics” was collapsed. The King and the Reformist 
intellectuals recognized the Protestantism as the means of modernization. . The 
Protestant church revealed its self-image as a loyal and patriotic religion. So the 
church-state relation was in favor. 
However, when the Korean Protestant Church combined the Independence 
Club’s motion, aiming at a political reform and national independence, the pro-
Russian government began to change its favorable attitude toward the church. 
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At this historical junction, the missionaries tried to make the church apolitical by 
declaring “Apolitical Manifesto.”
Even though it was to protect the church and keep the religious purity, the 
declaration exercised a great deal of negative influence on the understanding 
of the church-state relation hereafter. The missionaries prohibited the Korean 
Church from participating in the national movement. In this period, two types of 
religious belief were embodied in the Korean church: one was the otherworldly-
oriented personal-salvation style; the other was the social commitment style for 
the rescue of the nation.
After the Meiji Reformation in 1868, as an Emperor religious state with secular 
politics, the Japanese religious policy was to subordinate all the religions to the 
emperor ideology. From 1905 to the early 1930s Japan and the missionaries 
maintained the friendly relationship in Korea. But Japanese government severely 
oppressed Christian national movement. At the end of 1930s Japan and the 
missionaries became hostile due to the Japanese invasion in China and the 
enforcement of the Shinto-shrine worship.
After the Presbyterian Church surrendered the Shinto shrine worship in 1938, 
the majority of the Christian leaders walked on the way of a religious compromise 
and then pro-Japanese. Only small groups of Christians witnessed their faith at 
the cost of their life. It was another Catacomb type of church-state relation. Due 
to the Korean church’s experience such as pro-Japan, apostasy and no freedom of 
faith, they became excessively adhesive to the conservative and anti-communist 
politics after the Liberation.
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SZILVESZTER FÜSTI-MOLNÁR 
On the theme of the state and church relationship the political changes of 
1989/90 opened new possibilities for the Hungarian Reformed  Church in many 
ways which also contoured the challenges as well. That is well pictured in the 
great number of publications (from the first decades after the changes) which 
gave reflection on a wide scale of possible levels regarding the new situation 
of the church. Real debate did not often happen for various reasons, but in 
some cases, for example in conference materials and articles, an attempt was 
made for public discussions, whereby the themes of “diagnosis and therapy”1 
clearly provided the framework. The lack of facts, as well as the often false 
diagnosis of the current situation in relation to past, present and future – 
meanwhile coloured with emotions, temper and unrealistic or not rightly 
placed expectations – all of these real difficulties are clearly detectable in the 
background of the theological elaborations, which are also now recognized in 
the evaluations of the evaluation.2
Next, as we continue to describe the ecclesiological situation of the Reformed 
Church of Hungary, we shall: 1) introduce the changes and challenges of the 
relationship of the church and state from the viewpoint of the state; 2) describe 
the search of the Reformed Church of Hungary for its identity and its role in 
the socio-political and cultural transitions; 3) sum up evaluations related to the 
The Infulence of the 
Changes of 1989/90 
on the Reformed Church 
of Hungary and Its 
Relationship to the State
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image of the church and our theme, and how the Reformed Church of Hungary 
made attempts to face the first decade after the changes – especially between 
1990-2000.
State Politics Towards the Church after the Changes of 
1989/903
In 1989, the church was freed from the pressure and control of the state which had 
almost completely paralyzed its work. A new time had started. István Bogardi 
Szabó differentiates three models which well characterise the relationship of 
the state and the church since the changes of 1989. These models reflect the 
different governments’ politics towards the church. The first model takes place 
between 1990 and 1994, and its main feature was the rehabilitation of the 
church. The second model made an attempt to restrict the church between 
1994 and 1998. The third model can be viewed as a cooperation between the 
state and the church from 1998-2002.4 We can add that from the year 2002 
until  2007 the model of restriction has been playing a determinative part in the 
state’s politics regarding the church.
Rehabilitation Model between 1994 and 1998
 The political climate around the changes of 1989/90, we can acknowledge that 
the winner of the first free election of the Hungarian Republic was the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF). The MDF which stood on a conservative value system 
held many similarities with the Christian values, therefore the acknowledgement 
of the historical churches’ role in society was obvious. The MDF also made a 
notable effort to build a new relationship and cooperation with the churches. 
Their willingness was mainly restricted by their financial possibilities, and in some 
cases the theoretical basis of jurisdiction was not well prepared or well reasoned. 
The Hungarian Parliament prepared a compensation for the church for their 
lost in the previous Communist System on a juridical level. The first step was the 
framing of the Act of freedom of conscience and the law of religious freedom. 
The preamble to the Act of 1990 on the churches, makes a special recognition 
of the importance of the church’s role in maintaining the values in societies, 
building communities, their role in culture and education, and their important 
activity in public health care and maintaining the national self-consciousness.5 
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The agreements in 1990 guaranteed in the Constitution on the highest juridical 
level that the forty years were truly over. In Hungary the state’s connection 
with the churches relates to the constitutional law as determined by Section 
60 of the same Act, paragraph 3 in the Constitution and its interpretation of 
the Constitutional Court. According to this the state and the churches function 
separately from each other. As understood by the Constitutional Court, the 
relation of these two entities should be formed by the neutrality of the state. The 
following facts emerge from the principle of disestablishment in accordance 
with decision No.4/1993 (II.12.) of the Constitutional Court: a) the state may not 
join itself to a religious alliance, nor to any one of the churches separately; b) the 
state does not subscribe to any of the churches’ teaching; c) the state does not 
interfere in the churches’ internal affairs; d) it especially should not take sides 
in issues relating to faith; e) the state must treat the churches as being equal.6
The invalidation of the Agreement of 1948 between the state and church was 
the next step, which was followed by the commitment to the recompense for 
the losses of the church.7 The recompense happened basically on two levels: 1) 
on the level of material goods which meant the rebuilding of church institutions 
and the theoretical working out of public financing; 2) the reestablishment and 
support on the level of the public duties of the church. 
The attempt for the process of recompense happened in the context of 
the foundation of new religious communities, which was assured by the 
Constitution and created a paradox situation for the so called historical churches 
(denominations) in Hungary. By declaring neutrality from the time of 1990 
the Constitution creates a crux for the rehabilitation of the so called historical 
church. The Constitution prescribes that every religious community should 
have the equal benefit from the ideological neutrality of the state, nevertheless 
the historical churches’ expectation in the rehabilitation process was that they 
would yet receive special advantages. A tension between the newly founded 
religious communities and the traditional churches was unavoidable. The new 
formations of religious communities felt discriminated. The tension was also 
kindled by the political propaganda. 
The purpose with the introduction of the ‘American’ model, whereby 
the church and state are completely separated, served the tendencies of 
laicism. In that model the state guaranties to not interfere with the churches, 
therefore preferring the American model – and this would mean neglecting 
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the recognition of the heritage of the historical churches. The application of 
the Constitution to church related matters could (or some may say should) 
result in an understanding wherein the historical churches are to be seen as no 
different from the plethora of newly founded churches. The guarantees which 
were assured by the laws of recompense and recognition of churches’ social 
role (preamble Act, 1990), became very ambivalent in the interpretation and 
application, which depends on the actual political climate. The nature of this 
paradox of interpretation is evident from the next two models, the models of 
restriction and cooperation.
The Restriction Model which Played a Role between 1994 and 1998
At the election of 1994, the winner was the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in 
coalition with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). It became clear that the 
Hungarian population gave a priority to materialistic values in their vote. The socio-
economic difficulties which occurred with the changes of the system, the effect of 
the Communist brainwashing and the nostalgic feelings that “everything was better 
in the old system,” contributed notably to the political and ideological socialist 
restoration. The result of the election also testified that the church had lost its 
basis in the Hungarian society. The new historical circumstance did not allow open 
persecution of the churches but the MSZP could vindicate and develop its time-
tested methods learned from Communism, but now applied in the new setting 
- and that was enough to slow down the process of rehabilitation. The secret of 
their success lays in the fact that they maintained a whole net of economic interest 
independent from the law. The national culture and education were led by a left-
wing liberal intelligentsia. The conjunction of these two processes continuously 
weakened the condition of the historical churches’ role in society. In the Hungarian 
society the majority became economic victims of the transition, and the result of 
this was that people became more exposed and defenseless, and therefore the 
political propaganda often could easily reach its goals. 
The Model of Cooperation between 1998 and 2002 
The political climate radically changed after the election of the Young Democrats’ 
Alliance (FIDESZ). The winning by the right wing was simply the result of the fact 
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that the Socialists could hardly fulfill any of their promises listed in their programs. 
Materialistic values played a major role in the election again. 
With the winning of FIDESZ, Hungary was governed by a new political 
generation, who were freed from the troublesome earlier political inheritance. 
Their new understanding of the nation, church and state pushed the party to 
represent civil-national and conservative views. The recognition of the need 
for refreshed political insights and the readiness for change made FIDESZ a 
relevant political entity.
After 1998, the church found itself in a new situation. The new government’s 
prime minister was Viktor Orbán, an active member of the Reformed Church who 
held his religious belief to be of importance. FIDESZ announced a completely 
different value system which circled around ethical and axiological basic notions 
such as honour, good and evil, truth and falsity, the protection of family life, 
patriotism and the cleansing of public life of corruption and propaganda, and 
so forth. FIDESZ not only recognized and acknowledged the importance of 
the historical heritage of the Reformed Church of Hungary but also urged the 
importance of the future mission of the churches in the life of the Hungarian 
nation. Working out the model of cooperation was a tangible reality, which 
was realized in a number of arrangements. The process of rehabilitation was 
accelerated and a new system of financial order was introduced which extended 
care to the role of church in public life. The support of the importance for the 
church to be present in culture and public welfare clearly meant a continuance 
and development of the rehabilitation model. It became clear that neither the 
model based on a complete separation of the state and church, nor the model of 
the restriction of the church, are suitable in the Hungarian context.
Behind the three models and most of their possible variants there are two 
major intellectual tendencies which predominate. One is based on a utopian 
fiction in which the church, the sovereignty of the state, and the individual 
are each other’s opponents. In this tendency the inclination is more dominant 
in the direction of a complete separation and restriction. The other tendency 
acknowledges the reality of public life as an organic process, while also seeing 
the historical necessity of the separation of state and church to a certain extent, 
but the model of cooperation becomes determinative.8
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The Comprehension of the Reformed Church of Hungary 
about the State’s Relationship with the Church after 
1989/90.9
A short analysis on this theme in light of some of the evident actions of the Reformed 
Church of Hungary gains importance for the following reasons: 1) it can indicate 
if any changes have occurred in the understanding of the Reformed Church of 
Hungary about the state in comparison to its earlier view during Socialism; 2) it will 
also show how the notion of the state is nuanced or distinguished in the Reformed 
Church’s understanding, in relation to the other elements of society; 3) we shall 
also see the effects on the understanding of the own immediate and long term 
duties and tasks of the Refomed Church of Hungary. 
The Reformed Church of Hungary also had to face (like other churches as 
well) the run down infrastructure and its atrophied institutional structures which 
seemed hopeless, especially considering the relationship with its members. 
The organizations and associations of the common church membership did not 
function well any more. In many cases, their former motivators got old or died. 
A notable amount of the energy of the church was engaged with the restarting 
of its institutions and obtaining financial resources. One of the high priorities of 
the restart was the recognition of the importance of the Reformed Church’s 
teaching task in the unity of church and school. In the midst of the compensations 
by the state to the church, the priority was the reclaiming and reestablishment 
of the lost ‘nationalized’ church schools, on all levels of education. The mission 
task concentrated on the young generation, with the hope that in the context 
of the aged and empty local churches the church would be renewed by the 
younger generation, who were now receiving their education in the reopened 
church schools. In the year two thousand, the Reformed Church of Hungary 
maintained the same number of schools it had between the two World Wars. 
The success in quantities is not in direct proportion with the qualities but notable 
results had been achieved in church education. The substitution of experts is a 
longer process than a decade. With the reestablishment of the relatively great 
number of church schools, the church did not reflect clearly on its ideas about 
how it will settle accounts with rapidly decreasing demography, and how it will 
try to keep other areas of mission in proper balance, whose importance became 
obvious after a decade. The attempts related to the church’s understanding of 
           [ 23 ]The Influence of the Changes
its duties in correspondence to the society or the state was clear. The church 
mainly focused on the integration of the newly forming civil society. 
After the changes of the political system, the first government started 
a partnership with the church, therefore the church almost without any 
conditions endeavoured to fulfil its field of activity in that connection, which 
basically bore the sign of a folk-church or state-church setting. The (re)building 
of the structure of the state and the church did not differ from each other 
as we have noted earlier. One of the principles was to continue where it had 
been stopped before the time of Communism, in order to find the way toward 
legitimacy and continuity.10 Hence, the relationship of the church and the state 
was pictured according to the motives of the old ‘fashion’. The observation by 
the sociology of religion that the church institution takes over the characteristic 
features of the political and social structures of its context became very evident 
in the Hungarian situation. The edge between the two sides, the integration of 
the church into society and the religious sphere engaging in politics, was very 
vague.11 One of the most characteristic phenomena in the Reformed Church of 
Hungary after the changes circled around the following question: Should local 
pastors take part in party politics? It is also important to pay attention to the fact 
that the issue of repentance and the confession of sin shrank into insignificance 
beside the issue of the local pastors’ participation in party politics. A great 
number of articles gave evidence to that in the official weekly newspaper of the 
Reformed Church in 1990.
The Hungarian Reformed Synod arrived at a decision on the issue and 
advised all pastors to not address any party political questions from the pulpit, 
nor to hold any positions in political parties, nor to be a candidate in electoral 
campaigns for membership in the Parliament. The Synod’s advice was based 
on the plea that the vocation for being a pastor requires openness to all 
people, regardless of the political identity of the members of the congregation. 
Any office in party politics interferes with the pastoral work and can lead to 
a division in the congregation. Moreover, the Synod declared that if the local 
pastor accepts a mandate or political function, he or she is obliged to resign 
from his/her pastor’s office for the time being.12
The aftermath history of the question proves the complexity of the problem. 
Basically two circles were formed around the pro- and contra arguments. On 
the one hand, the pastor who is active in daily politics falls into a trap easily 
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whereby the aim of (pastoral) completeness (pléroma) can be harmed by 
service of a party (pars).13 On the other hand, the danger of ignoring daily life 
activities such as politics would restrict the church’s mission to become a salt 
and leaven in society.14 Rózsai’s suggestion gives the heart of the problem 
when he calls attention to the following distinctions. The pastor has to be 
distinguished from other church members, as does church life from the profane 
political life. Rózsai added a special remark that both areas can be practiced as 
the worship of God.15  The Synod of the Reformed Church of Hungary changed 
its earlier position and all the questions related to the issue were forwarded to 
the decision of the local congregation’s presbytery, with a special note saying if 
there is a contested point in the local congregation, a higher church authority 
will settle the question.16
Isépy’s evaluation on the practice of pastors taking upon themselves a role 
in political parties describes the tendencies as early as the spring of 1990:
Pastors who entered the political arena can draw a lesson from the election: They 
were measured and most of them “found lacking…” They were lacking suitability, 
eloquence, a competitive program, but most of all in finding their own identity…
they wanted to uphold their lambkins unauthorized by the Lamb of God. 17
 
The church’s participation in the life of party politics did not end with these 
incidents. By the end of the nineties, the theme of church pulpit and politics 
became more influenced by party politics. The church slowly became a factor in 
politics while it was not prepared at all for the new possibilities and challenges, 
and therefore the representatives of the church were characterized by one of the 
extremities of party politics or being apolitical. A shifting of accent was present 
which threatened the theology of the church with ideologization again and 
became a real danger during the next decade. 
During 1990-94 the Reformed Church backed the government of MDF which 
acknowledged the historical churches’ role. The church did not begin any 
dialogue with the other political parties which thought differently. They were 
mainly seen as a monolithic enemy. Shortly after the changes it became obvious 
that after an impetuous start in the outward life of the church, more difficulties 
occurred as a result of the slowing down of the transition and development. 
The situation revealed that the church could not find its proper position in 
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regard to politics. The pastors should have pointed out the good moral values 
of the MDF; rather, the pastors were more interested in realizing their personal 
political ambition and finding ways to get individual financial sources to the 
different projects in the church. Kádár’s observation is realistic when he sees the 
situation of the church as ancillary and as a beggar in relation to the state after 
the changes. The question of the financial survival of the church overshadowed 
the mission of the church. The church behaved indifferently toward the civil 
society which was coming to life again. A critical distance from party politics18 
and a relevant presence for public life did not characterize the church.19 
 The mistakes were vivid after 1994 when the constituencies of Hungary gave 
authority to the MSZP. The society made its political decision on materialistic 
values. The only motive that formed the majority’s opinion was determined 
by which party would guarantee a higher living standard. The majority of the 
electorates believed that the changes of the system was complete, therefore 
most of them did not make any considerations on an ideological basis. The 
ideological contrast of morally good or bad, guilty or not guilty, and Christian 
or atheist hardly played any role. The promises of party programs in relation to 
materialistic welfare were determinative. It was evident that the church missed 
its target when it could not fulfil its special duty, the prophetic faithfulness20 
according to the special call which is not from this world.
A prophetic contradiction characterized the church in the time of 1994-1998. 
According to the application of the restriction model, the MSZP made notable 
steps to narrow down the condition of churches’ social services. These four 
years were a time when the church spoke out against the politics of MSZP in 
the matters of: economic stabilization, social and family programs, the issue 
of the unemployed and homeless people, social-provisions21, the situation of 
the demographic decline and surgical abortion,22 the discriminative financing 
program for public education in relation to church-schools, as also against the 
standstill of compensation for the churches,23 and the disrespectful use of the 
name of God in the different media.24 The restrictions by the government were 
not comparable to any open persecutions of the church. The restrictions toward 
the church and its programmes were a consequence of the MSZP’s realisation that 
since they had won the election in 1994, the churches’ voice and social role did not 
count for much. Thus, the MSZP enforced its own individual interest and purposes, 
which became more evident in the unscrupulous capitalism and privatization. 
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Fazakas’s comments have significance, namely that during 1994-98 the 
Reformed Church of Hungary arrived at the point where it could have realize 
that the conditions to fulfil its social role and duties cannot only depend on 
outward circumstances.25 The Reformed Church of Hungary had already faced 
a number of critical points of such realization in its long and short term history. 
In 1936, Karl Barth in his inaugural lecture in Sárospatak made the following 
statement which calls attention to the same problem:
The different options which are given and could be given by the state have to be 
put on a scale by the church. The possibility of the church’s structure as a folk-
church, free-church or confessing-church are all not more than only an option 
which comes and can come only outwardly.26
 
László Ravasz’s statement referred to another similar moment in 1945: “The 
question is: are we going to be a free-church in a free-state, or a second class 
state-church, or are we becoming a confessing-church in a hostile world? All 
this depends on what value the state ascribes to the church.”27
The changes in the outward possibilities drove the church to raise a notable 
protest and confession during the time of 1994-1998. The behaviour and 
actions of the church can be evaluated as a mirroring of the power structures 
of that time. It became obvious that the historical churches were not alone in 
fulfilling a role in politics and society. A number of other tendencies, such as 
secularisation, (post)modernisation, technological revolution, and globalisation 
called attention to the fact that the strategy to continue the organisation of the 
church and all its activities as it was before Communism, was now impossible. 
The ambivalence of continuance can be clearly characterised by the fact that the 
church constitution attempted to be continued where it had stopped in 1948. 
During the constitutional activity that started relatively soon after the changes 
of 1989, the church was seeking its historical traditions. The Reformed Church 
of Hungary sought good examples in the constitutions from the past, however 
it insisted on keeping the strongly centred organisational pattern, which was 
established in the enactment of 1967. It did not consider that the world’s, the 
church’s and the church members’ way of thinking had greatly changed. Thus 
its structure came into conflict with its stated principles.
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Another feature of this time was the vital question of nationhood in 
connection to the concerns of the Gospel. For Hungarian Protestantism this 
question was always a special task because of the difficult historical contexts in 
the life of the Hungarian nation. The Protestant Churches were committed to 
the national independence since the sixteenth century as we introduced earlier. 
In the post-Communist countries, which had suffered under the yoke of the 
interests of greater powers using the flag of internationalism, the intensity of the 
national self-awareness was a natural reaction after the changes of the political 
system. That process is also detectable in case of Hungary where the Reformed 
Church tried to have a notable role. The historical wounds of the Hungarian 
nation, especially “Trianon,” came to a front, although effective answers for 
the historical injustice was straggling behind. Rather, the different political 
parties according to their limited (mis)understanding of the historical and 
political reality gave their different suggestions about how to settle accounts 
with the traumas which were often involved in the political propaganda. These 
tendencies also took place in the Reformed Church. And this led part of the 
church to involve itself in the loyalty to the aims of far right wing political 
parties. In some cases the concept of nation was absolutised and was raised 
to a metaphysical status, often dangerously approaching nationalism as a 
pseudo-religion. The sources of these tendencies are also clear from the socio-
economical and political difficulties which we have already introduced in this 
chapter. The danger for the churches lay in the temptation that the boundaries 
of the national self- awareness and Christian identity would merge into each 
other - for which we have seen a number of frightening examples in recent past 
(church) history.28 The above quoted Ervin Vályi Nagy’s paradigmatic view also 
emphasises and warns against these tendencies related to the church and the 
world. 
The outcome of the election of 1998 was that the FIDESZ - MPP29 could form 
a government and in its politics gave a favourable position to the so called 
historical churches. The contradiction or restriction model between the state 
and church was interrupted, and the model of cooperation started, whose 
causes and consequences we have mentioned above. Beside the number 
of actions by the government which truly saw the churches as partners, the 
churches were not only recognized by financial data in the state budget but 
the service to the society by the church also took on a determinative role. The 
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most evident outcome was an agreement between state and church30 whereby 
the state and the church could set up the principles of a partnership. This was 
a new script in the line of the history of agreement between the state and the 
church. The church declared that the agreement was not carried out by any 
compulsion, rather its motivating source was the critical solidarity with the state 
and society.31 A new dimension was opened in the debate about the church’s 
role in politics, which seemed to be overruling the interest of party politics. The 
visible church in its on understanding could not avoid being a political entity, 
which was directly or indirectly connected to the life of the polis. The agreement 
evaded any possibilities of power struggle for any positions or professions of 
allegiance. According to the mentality of the agreement, the outward church 
politics could not be in contradiction with its inward norms which regulates its 
life and aims. Most evaluations - from the year two thousand32 - rightly ask the 
following question, which is also obvious from the earlier description of the 
history of the Reformed Church of Hungary since the changes: Was the church 
ready for and capable of the task which was set up in the preamble of the 
agreement? Before answering the question we can also ask another question: 
what led to the success of the FIDESZ-MPP winning the election? Gyula Horn33 
bitterly noticed that the MSZP lost the election because the priests and pastors 
of the churches made a campaign against them on the pulpits and other places. 
Unfortunately, Horn’s remark was not true; the church did not have such an 
influential role on its members. Horn’s remark may ease the responsibility of 
the MSZP for the lost election, but in reality the population turned against 
the MSZP since hardly anything had been accomplished from the promises 
of their electoral campaign. The majority of the Hungarian population faced 
serious existential problems on all levels of their life. The trust of the Hungarian 
electorate’s majority in the FIDESZ-MPP was not more than it had been four 
years earlier as trust in the MSZP: the hope for a better life according to the 
measurement of materialistic goods. The same mentality was present in most 
members of the church. That mentality also differed from the mentality of the 
principles of the agreement between the state and the church. In practice, the 
standard of the agreement was measured on the scale of finances: How much 
financial support will be given to the church? The principle of a free-church in 
a free state must be maintained for the church, step by step, to reach spiritual 
and financial self-maintenance. Révész’s clearly phrased the main reason for 
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that in 1946: “Opportunistic aims cannot impede the church in the preaching 
of the Gospel, which is the lifelong task of the church, and the state as social 
or political organism cannot make itself dependent on the church to fulfil its 
duties which come from its nature.”34
Provisionally, it is important to make the following remark: The complete 
separation of the state and the church is impossible; either we see the question 
from the standpoint of the state’s jurisdiction over the church, or we see this 
from the standpoint of the church’s autonomy. The individual, who practises 
his or her rights according to the freedom of religion, could be a member of 
any kind of religious organisation; however, the individual’s right in this matter 
will be transformed to a collective right because he or she is the citizen of the 
state as well.35 
While a clear perspective of the state and church relationship is not actualized, 
the church will be under the pressure to accept the outward possibilities and 
thus its commitment to its context may overrule or even contradict its own 
existential nature. Financial dependence (negative or positive) on the state 
and the mentality which gives priority to materialistic values can easily put 
the church into service of an ideology. One of the sources of the problem is 
that since the changes the Reformed Church of Hungary only concentrated 
on the definition of the state in the perspective of executive authority (actual 
governments). 
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SANGDO CHOI 
Christian identity and Nationalism: Conflict with Colonial 
Power
While Catholicism in Korea was established and developed amid earlier conflicts 
between the Joseon Dynasty government and western powers, Protestantism 
in Korea settled down into the local context during a period of national crisis 
occasioned by an Asian power. Indeed Protestant Christianity appears to have 
functioned as a foundation for overcoming the national collapse especially after 
the Protectorate Treaty in 1905 and the Annexation in 1910 forced by Japan. 
Unlike Catholicism, which was still often regarded not only as an agent of western 
imperialism but also as a heterodox doctrine opposed to the modernising ruling 
principle of the government, Protestantism in Korea was positively and closely 
associated by Koreans with nationalism throughout the Japanese colonial regime. 
In particular, during the early harsh ‘military’ rule from the Annexation in 1910 
to 1919, when any political organization and action was banned by an iron 
fist military policy, Koreans used the Protestant churches and mission schools 
as the largest Korean community at the time for their socio-political activities. 
The organization of Epworth cheongnyeonhoe, the Epworth Youth League at 
Sangdong Methodist Church in 1905 to resist Japanese rule over Korea; the 
Nationalism and 
Martyrdom: Shinto-Shrine 
Controversy during the 
Japanese Colonial 
Regime in Korea
[ 34 ] Sangdo Choi
organization of Shinminhoe, the New People’s Association, in 1907, the strongest 
Korean nationalist organization at that time, whose promoters were Korean 
Christians; Gukche bosang undonghoe, the Association for Redemption of the 
National Debt in 1907, which was spread by most Korean Christians to launch a 
campaign to repay the immense amounts of debt from Japan; the March First 
Movement in 1919, and so on. 
This means that the most vital category of people to be put under the Japanese 
control at that time were nationalist Korean Christians. It is clear that under 
Japanese rule Protestantism in Korea and Korean nationalism were positively and 
closely associated each other. Naturally prominent church leaders such as Kim 
Gu, Seo Jae-Pil, Yun Chi-Ho, and Jeon Deok-Gi, became national leaders, though 
many of them collaborated actively with the Japanese in the last two decades of 
Japanese colonial rule in Korea, an issue which left bitter memories. 
A specific example of the nationalist Protestantism in Korea is shown in 
the March First Movement in 1919. The ‘Dokripdan Tonggomun’ (Notification 
Statement for the Participant) supposed to be distributed especially to the 
Christians during the early stage of the movement prohibited the partakers from 
making “any insult and violence of beating or stoning” of Japanese, and required 
“three-times-prayer everyday, fast on Sunday, and Bible reading provided”.1 
Taking this non-violent peaceful way of the Movement, Protestants took part in 
the demonstrations to restore “freedom bestowed from Christ following God’s 
will”.2 Even Rev Shin Seok-Gu, one of the thirty-three representatives, confessed 
that he had participated in the Movement because he had realised his ‘dual sin’ 
in accepting the “loss of the nation” and in making “no efforts for its restoration,” 
after hearing God’s voice during day-break prayer.3 Given the facts it might be 
said that the PCK’s major motif of participation in any independent movement 
was their religious consciousness. There was little gap between religious identity 
as a Christian and ethnic/national identity as a Korean. Their involvement in 
the independence movement was a way of participation in Christ’ suffering on 
the Cross. Indeed, both in physical socio-political activism and in metaphysical 
spirituality, the PCK played a significant role in national independent movements. 
In the view of the Japanese colonial authority, therefore, the PCK, which 
worked as the well-organized headquarters of national liberation, was the first 
and major obstruction to their rule of Korea. The PCK were “obnoxious” to the 
Japanese government,4 which was therefore harsh with Protestant churches 
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throughout Korea. Of the brutal massacres of the Protestant Christians, 43 
members of Sancheon Church were killed instantly and 20 heavily injured by 
indiscriminate gunshot; some Christians were killed by ‘crucifixion’ in Seoul; 29 
burned (including 6 adherents of Cheondogyo) at Jeamri Church in Suwon; and 
so on. These are just representative cases of slaughter targeting Christians.5 
As emphasised by the Protestant missionaries who witnessed Japanese 
forceful suppression in Korea at that time, the wholesale arrest of pastors, elders, 
other church officers, and lay Christians and beatings were “simply because 
they are Christians”:6 their identity was Christian. This observation brings to 
mind the martyrs’ identification as Christian in front of the interrogators in the 
early Roman period. The Japanese military and police force’s “brutality torture 
inhuman treatment” and massacres towards Christians during the Movement 
were also perceived as “religious persecution”.7 Indeed, ‘Protestantism allied 
with nationalism’ was the core identity of the PCK under Japanese colonial 
rule. Recognizing this identity of the Korean Protestant Christians, the Japanese 
government undertook a variety of suppressions and persecutions to destroy 
the nationalism of Korean Protestant Christians. 
After the March First Movement had politically failed to gain Korea’s total 
independence from Japan, most PCK leaders turned their back on direct political 
involvement opting for ‘pure’ Christianity and an ‘apolitical stance’ bearing in 
despair. However, most PCK leaders’ apolitical stance was challenged by the 
national Shinto issue in the 1930s when the colonial government forced all people 
to worship at Shinto shrines as a patriotic act under the ‘assimilation’ policy.
The Shinto Shrine Controversy in the 1930s onwards8
The 1930s was a period of rising of militarist totalitarianism in Japan. Japanese 
ultra-conservative military political group launched a series of aggressive wars. 
Provoking the Manchurian incident in 1931 and establishing the pro-Japanese 
puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932, the Shanghai invasion in 1932, the Sino-
Japanese war in 1937, and the Pacific war in 1941, the militarists implanted a 
strong ‘assimilation’ policy in their colonial countries propagating the idea of 
‘Pan-Asianism’ or ‘the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’9 on the basis of 
the Emperor-god system, the spiritual and ideological basis of Japan during the 
war time. These ideologies justified Japanese expansionism and entangled the 
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colonised in the war, rhetorically glorifying it as a “holy war”,10 and fortifying 
the common obligations toward the empire under the Kominka, the imperial-
subject-making policy. From 1936 onwards, Minami Jiro, Governor-General of 
Korea, coercively pressed a series of assimilation programs on colonised Korea 
under the Kominka policy such as bowing to the East, reciting ‘the Pledge of the 
Subject of the Empire,’ adopting Japanese names, and using only Japanese in 
public, claiming the discourse of naisen ittai, which means ‘Japan and Korea are 
one body.’11 Among them, the enforcement of Shinto shrine worship marked an 
arguably religious aspect of Japanese imperialism.12
The apolitical stance of the Protestant Church in Korea in the 1920s was, 
therefore, seriously challenged by the Japanese colonial government’s 
incremental pressure to attend rites held at State Shinto shrines as a ‘patriotic’ 
act. This coercion of Shinto Shrine worship especially from 1938 faced Protestant 
Christians in Korea with a “two-fold problem: performance of the rituals would 
be contrary to their own sense of nationalism as Koreans, and idolatrous as 
Christians.”13 It was a conflict not only of beliefs between Protestantism and 
national Shintoism but also two national allegiances held by Japanese and 
Korean. Participation in State Shinto rites was not a religious problem for the 
Japanese Protestant Church which had already been officially persuaded by the 
state in November 193614 to conclude that the rituals were merely memorial rites 
without significant religious content.15 Catholics in both Korea and Japan revised 
their attitude to State Shinto rites through the announcement of the Concordat 
between the Office of the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda and the 
Japanese Government on 26 May 1936,16 the core content of which was that the 
Vatican allowed Catholics to participate in State Shinto rites, accepting them as 
a patriotic duty rather than an idolatrous act.17 As a result the participation in 
Shinto rituals was a problem only for Korean Protestant Christians. However, by 
1938, when the Presbyterian Church of Korea finally conformed, all Protestant 
churches in Korea as a denominational level surrendered to the Japanese colonial 
government admitting the attendance at Shinto rituals as a patriotic duty. 
Though the Church officially surrendered to the coercive pressure, some 
devoted Protestant Christians, most of whom were theologically conservative, 
refused to conform, following literally the first three of the Ten Commandments. 
Accordingly, the Japanese police force arrested over 2,000 Protestants who failed 
to make clear answers to the three questions given to them: “(1) Was Shinto-
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shrine worship a national rite or a religious rite? (2) Which was higher, Amaterasu 
Omikami (Japan’s highest god) or Christ? and (3) Which was more important, 
state or church?”18 The imprisoned had been severely tortured and over 200 
local churches were compulsorily closed for resisting attendance at State Shinto 
rites. Of those Protestant Christians, at least 50 were said to have been killed 
as a direct result of their refusal to do shrine worship during the period 1938 
to 1945.19 However, the exact list of names and number who died for resisting 
shrine worship is not yet clear. Allen D. Clark,20 Samuel H. Moffett,21 and Min 
Kyoung-Bae22 insist the figure is 50 Protestants or more, following Kim Yang-
Seon,23 whereas Bruce F. Hunt24 gives over 30, Kim Seung-Tae25 presents 25, and 
Yi Chan-Yeong26 listed 22 Protestants who choose death for their stance against 
State Shinto shrine worship. 
Because the PCK could not take a unified stance, a significant conflict arising 
between those who resisted the Shinto shrine worship and those participating 
in it. Rallying the refusal in Gyeonsang province in December 1939 in order to 
transform sporadic individual resistance into a systematic one, Rev Han Sang-
Dong, determined some principles for effective refusal. What is interesting is that 
their code of conduct included ‘aggressive separatism’ saying, “destroy the pro-
Shinto worship presbyteries, reorganise new presbytery by the non-attendees, 
do not be baptised by those who participated in the rites, etc”, and in March 1940 
in Manchuria, Rev Lee Gi-Seon declared, “refuse Shinto worship unto death, do 
not send children to the schools compromised on the issue, and do not attend the 
churches acquiescing in the requirement of attendance in Shinto worship.” They 
formed a separate community of resistance.27 Apart from the disunity between 
conformists and opponents on the Shinto shrine issue, the Korean Protestants’ 
internal conflict became a significant obstacle to declaring those who were killed 
amid the Shinto shrine controversy as martyrs. 
Here we touch on the political nature of martyr-making in this, perhaps 
the clearest example of the interweaving of religion and power. The post-
independence polarisation of the PCK increased in large part due to this issue 
of pro- and anti-Japanese behaviour, exacerbating the division of the Church. 
Even under the immediate occupation of the Korean peninsula after liberation 
from Japan in 1945, the North being occupied by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) and South by the United States of America (USA), there could 
be no clear historical resolution of the ‘pro- or anti-Japanese issue’ because it 
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was linked to pro- or anti-communism. This impasse is still the basis of argument 
today in Korean Church, but in order fully to comprehend it, we need to look to 
the start of this political wrangle after the end of the First World War. 
Martyr-Making of the Protestant Church in Korea 
Though Protestant Christians’ death took place through the Korean Conspiracy 
Case in 1911, the March First Movement in 1919 and the result of Shinto Shrine 
controversy during the late 1930s and 1940s, they were not designated as 
Protestant martyrs before independence from Japan because it would have 
been impossible so to designate any opposing Japanese rule during colonialism. 
However, when the nation was liberated, those who died in consequence of the 
Shinto Shrine conflict were immediately designated as Protestant martyrs not in 
whole ecclesiastical level but in personal by local Christian groups or churches. 
They were designated officially as PCK’s martyrs in 1983. 
Given the tensions during the colonial time between resisters against 
and conformists to Japanese rule, Methodists had a more unified response, 
the Presbyterian Church of Korea found greater problems in the aftermath of 
occupation. In 1947, they held a memorial service to commemorate only ‘the 
Presbyterian Christians martyrs’ who died in consequence of the Shinto Shrine 
conflict in Seungdong church in Seoul.28 The tension between conformists and 
resisters led to the division of the Presbyterian Church,29 central power being 
taken over by the group of pro-Japanese Christians during the United States 
Army Military Government in Korea (USAMSiK, American) and Rhee Syng-Man’s 
regime based on the ideology of anticommunism. Accordingly, the martyr-
making recognition of Christians who fought against Shinto Shrine worship, 
suffering from imprisonment and severe torture, and memorial events for them, 
were no longer carried out after 1947 given the dominance of the pro-Japanese 
church authority on the ground of anticommunism in the Presbyterian Church. 
Despite the martyr-making process of the PCK for at least 50 Christians 
killed amid the Shinto shrine controversy though carried out in personal level, 
those Christians killed amid the Conspiracy Case in 1911 and the March First 
Independence Movement in 1919 still remained without religious identification 
or were deliberately excluded from those martyr-making processes even though 
those two situations were clearly perceived by the PCK authority and missionaries 
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as Christian persecutions carried out by Japanese colonial power. Even the 
Japanese colonial authority had acknowledged that their suppression especially 
targeted Christian groups, characterising the PCK’s involvement in national 
patriotism, using a metaphor of Church and State relationship taken in particular 
from the case of Christianity in Roman period and the English Roman Catholics in 
Elizabeth and James I.30 It is, therefore, easy to infer that there might have been 
numerous Christians sacrificed amid the engagement for independence during 
the Japanese colonial regime. Yet the PCK counted only 69 PCK Christians, in 
particular Presbyterian and Methodist Christians, killed by shooting, torturing 
or severe beating31 amid two incidents. The PCK designated just a few martyrs 
among the 69, but other deaths still remained without any investigation or 
attention on the official ecclesiastical level. However, the PCK were swift to pay 
attention to those killed by communists outside Korea, especially in Manchuria 
and Siberia, in the 1920s and 1930s: those killed by Japanese military forces for 
their nationalist activities as Christians within Korea were largely ignored. 
Apolitical Attitude of the PCK in Making Martyrs
Leaving other characteristics of the PCK’s martyr-making work for a while, let us 
look first at the PCK’s apolitical stance, to discern why so few of those deaths 
amid the Korean Conspiracy Case and the March First Independence Movement 
were designated as martyrs by the PCK while those deaths caused by Shinto 
shrine controversy were immediately named as PCK martyrs. 
The PCK’s apolitical attitude towards secular politics was launched after the 
failure of the March First movement in which the PCK was actively involved in 
various types of national independence movement. This attitude was sustained 
until the Shinto shrine controversy in the 1930s, especially in 1938. Ostensibly 
the anti-Shinto shrine movement was perceived as a type of independence 
movement carried out by conservative devotional Christians. However, their 
anti-Shinto shrine worship stance was also based on their view that it challenged 
their Christian identity, forcing idolatry not ethnic national identity as Korean 
Christian: the secular political authority, the colonial power, did not agree. Indeed 
the PCK wished clearly to distinguish the sacred from the secular, yet in actuality 
there could be no way for such a dichotomy, especially while their nation was 
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under colonial regime that the sacred Christian identity was clearly appeared in 
secular nationalism. Whether the PCK perceived it or not, martyrdom is the most 
religious ideology, yet at the same time it is the most political one. Yet the PCK 
still asserts their apolitical attitude even as that relates to interpreting a death as 
martyrdom. Min Kyoung-Bae says that though anti-Shinto shrine worship can be 
represented as a resistance movement based on national identity, it was actually 
fidelity to God to follow his commandments rather than idolatry concluding: 
“martyrdom is loyalty towards God not a resistance act”.32 
This apolitical attitude also contributed to defend the church from secular 
oppression, in particular Japanese colonialism and imperialism, proclaiming that 
martyr-making work is only a sacred matter not a secular one, and they did not 
directly mobilise any Christian into the independence movements. According to 
this reasoning, the PCK honoured those deaths during the colonial periods, 1905-
1945, caused by the Shinto shrine conflict, while other deaths occurring amid the 
Conspiracy case and the March First movement were largely ignored. For the 
PCK, deaths caused by those two incidents concerned secular politics, for which 
the better term for the dead is national patriot rather than martyr, though the 
PCK clearly noted that deaths amid the two cases were caused by the Japanese 
colonial power’s religious persecutions.
Indeed, the PCK’s selection of deaths during the Japanese colonial period, in 
which those deaths caused by the Shinto shrine controversy immediately took 
precedence in making martyrs, whether official or local basis, while others caused 
during the Conspiracy Case and March First Independence movement were 
excluded from the martyr-making process, was a result of the PCK’s apparently 
apolitical but actually anticommunist attitude. On one hand, by placing the Shinto 
issues only on sacred ground by paralleling it with the Roman emperor worship, 
they regarded those killed amid the controversy as true disciples of Christ who 
witnessed unto death as the early period of Christians did. For the PCK, it was, 
therefore, natural to make them martyrs: other deaths based on more nationalist 
causes were identified as deaths not for God but for the secular nation, which were 
patriotic not martyr’s deaths. On the other hand, by placing themselves on the 
ground of the anticommunist ideology supporting the USAMGiK and Methodist 
Elder Rhee’s political group, pro-Japanese churchmen, including conformists on 
the Shinto issue, could maintain their power both in secular and sacred space. 
The result was those killed as Christians during the Japanese colonial regime 
           [ 41 ]Nationalism and Martydom
were not made martyrs. However, PCK’s ‘apolitical’ attitude to the process of 
martyr-making dramatically changed under the entrenched anticommunism in 
South Korea after the Korean War in 1950. 
The sudden division of the Korean peninsula just after Korea’s liberation in 
August 1945 along the 38th Parallel was a result of the hegemonic ideologies of 
western powers in the Cold War. In the process of that division and establishment 
of each government in North and South, the ideologies functioned as “an 
unyielding belief system, which often seemed stronger than their faith”:33 
Churches were inevitably forced into ideological choices. The PCK leaders even 
stood in the frontline of that struggle advocating and supporting the division 
of Korea. The political situation of the Korean peninsula during five years from 
Korea’s liberation on 15 August 1945 to the Korean War on 25 June 1950 saw 
Protestantism in Korea deeply involved in the ideological struggle against 
communism. Thus the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 was a turning point in 
the martyr-making of the PCK. Many Christians who died during the War were 
immediately designated as martyrs of the PCK amid the War, on the basis of an 
anticommunist ideological purpose. 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that those immediate martyr-designations of 
anticommunist martyrs after Korean War show that the PCK’s apolitical tendency 
for making martyrs in the Japanese colonial period had turned into the active 
politicisation of the martyr-making operation of those killed by the communist 
army during the Korean War under the ideology of anticommunism. It suggests 
that the PCK’s collection and exclusion of Christian deaths caused before and 
during the Korean War was carried out to enforce the political anticommunist 
ideology of South Korea, abandoning their ‘apolitical’ stance which had been 
strongly kept after the failure of the March First Independence Movement. Taking 
up the anticommunist nationalism entrenched by Rhee’s political strategy in the 
post-colonial period in South Korea, the martyr-making process of the PCK was 
re-launched in earnest in the 1980s. 
By starting to make anticommunist martyrs, the PCK’s apolitical attitude 
actually became political, yet until now the PCK insists on their apolitical 
attitude towards martyr-making process and secular politics. However, in 
practice, under the ideology of anticommunism they are the most politicised 
group, enthusiastically making anticommunist martyrs and proclaiming those 
designated anticommunist martyrs were killed to secure South Korean society, 
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thus merging the sacred and the secular. In this sense, whether recognised or not, 
the PCK faced a serious dilemma in its making of martyrs: on one hand they still 
maintain an apolitical stance for investigating death-events before 1945 while on 
the other they make their best effort to collect deaths killed by communists after 
the 1920s when communism was introduced to Korean Christians. 
This suggests that the martyr-making work of the PCK is closely involved in 
the construction of the discourse of anticommunism which was internalized 
in the whole of South Korean society and consequently became the ruling 
ideology through and after the Korean War. This also suggests that the PCK’s 
martyr-making functioned as an effective tool not of propagating gospel but 
of making propaganda for the ideology of anticommunism which was deeply 
rooted in the PCK and secular society. From 1983 until now, the driving feature 
of making official martyrs in South Korea has been to make anticommunist 
martyrs. This phenomenon seems to be a result of an intended interpretation 
based on the optional collection of death-events under the ideology of state 
power, anticommunism. In other words, the martyr-making process of the PCK 
was playing its role in the propaganda for anticommunism.
It is clear that the martyr-making process of the PCK was utilised not in inviting 
the believers to the witness or declaration of gospel, but to anticommunism. The 
PCK played a vital role in maintaining and proclaiming anticommunism quite 
apart from the propagation and declaration of gospel. 
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GUSZTÁV BÖLCSKEI
The Hungarian theological thinking has been in an organic interaction with 
the Western type of the Christian teaching since the time of its birth in the 16th 
century. Of the pre-Reformation movements that played an important role in its 
preparation, it was Hussitism that might have had a direct impact on it. A sign of 
this is that the first Hungarian version of the Bible was referred to as the “Hussite 
Bible”. Of the ecclesio- and socio-critical movements within the medieval church, 
the “Observant” branch of the Franciscan order had a powerful influence on it 
(e.g. preaching in the vernacular, puritan lifestyle). Almost all of the important 
figures of the Hungarian Reformation came out of the ranks of the observant 
Franciscans! *
Peregrinatio ( i.e. pursuing studies abroad by Hungarian students of theology) 
was an important point of contact to the Western European universities. As a 
rule, after concluding their studies -at home, Hungarian students spent several 
years at German, Dutch, Swiss or Scottish universities and they returned with 
the most up-to-date theological knowledge. In the beginning, the University 
of Wittenberg was frequented the most. It is important to note that the reason 
for the Reformed students to study in Wittenberg was not that much Luther 
but Melanchton. The three pillars of Melanchton’s theology: pietas, humanitas, 
eruditio, i.e.: the life committed to following Christ, the ideal of the humanistic 
scholarship and cultural education made a powerful impact on the emergence 
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and on the consolidation of the Hungarian Reformation. The controversy on the 
issue of the Holy Communion between the German and the Swiss Reformation (In 
what way is Christ present in the Lord’s Supper?) made the Hungarian students to 
attend Dutch, Swiss and Scottish universities after 1580, instead of German ones.
Among the Swiss Reformers, it was not Calvin, but the Reformers of Zürich: 
Zwingli and Bullinger who had the most influence. The difference in emphasis 
was most apparent in the fact that the Swiss Reformation did not remain solely 
within the boundaries of the church but had an impact on the whole society. 
This answer was more compatible with the Hungarian circumstances of the 
time, as an answer was sought about the will of God, while the country lost its 
independence and the prevailing ecclesiastical and political structures were 
falling apart. These circumstances are important because, in the Hungarian 
Reformation, the question of the freedom of the gospel was closely linked to 
the question of the freedom of denominations and to the national freedom. The 
roots of a theological interpretation of history were found in the Book of Judges. 
According to this, if the people sin against the will of God, God sends a foreign 
rule as a punishment. If the people turn back to God and if they repent from their 
sins, God’s grace sends a liberator under the leadership of whom they regain their 
freedom and independence. A notion of the parallel of the fate of the people of 
Israel and of the Hungarian people appears here very powerfully.
The Hungarian Reformed church adopted her first two fundamental confessions 
in 1567: the Heidelberg Catechism of 1563 and the Second Helvetic Confession 
which was published in 1566. These two confessions, which still have binding 
authority today, show an evident influence of the theology of Calvin. The impact 
of the Reformation was incredibly strong, by the end of the 16th century more than 
90 % of the Hungarian population was Protestant, and predominantly Reformed.
The history of the next centuries is a history of the theoretical and practical 
problem of the denominational freedom and of the national independence. 
The Hungarian Reformed people live between the pressing forces of the 
Turkish and of the Austrian (Habsburg) empires, under political, economic and 
denominational oppression. It is characteristic of this oppression that one of the 
Habsburg ministers of State declared that “Hungary must be made poor, German 
and Catholic”. This shows the substance of the imperial way of thinking. The 
people need to be deprived of its economic, cultural and religious independence 
(autonomy) and they will be obedient subjects.
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The age of bloody and bloodless counter-Reformation (the first denotes 
the open and violent persecution, de latter the intimidation by legal and 
administrative means) ends by the so-called Edict of Tolerance in 1781, which, 
though did not yet provide for a full scale equality of denominations, granted 
more freedom of action for the Protestants in the empire of emperor Joseph II.
The connections [to Western Christianity] were kept alive even under these 
stressed circumstances, mainly by translating theological works (Calvin: The 
Institutes, Heidelberg Catechism). The spiritual literature was flourishing, especially 
influenced by English and Scottish Puritanism. Prayer books and sermons aimed 
at encouraging the reading and understanding of the Bible and the expression 
of the faith in one’s own mother tongue, according to the principle of the 
priesthood of all believers. Of the Dutch theologies, it was the so-called theology 
of the covenant (Cocceius) that became well-known and accepted. According to 
this, God reveals God’s will in a series of covenants throughout the history of 
salvation. The fulfilment of this is the new, universal covenant given in Christ. The 
believers, as the members of this covenant may live their freedom, received in 
Christ, in the communion of the congregation and of the church. This freedom has 
got an order; that is why the question of church discipline becomes so emphatic 
in the Reformed theology and in the practice of life in the congregations. In the 
Calvinist thought the disciplining authority of the community plays an important 
role among the notes of the true church, next to the pure proclamation of the 
Word and the proper administration of the Sacraments. Another important 
emphasis is Iaid on the notion that the consequence of justification is a holy and 
a grateful life. The emphasis on the individual sanctification becomes prevailing 
in the Hungarian Reformed theology and spirituality especially as a result of the 
influence of German Pietism and of English Puritanism. The practice of pious life 
- praxis pietatis - with a focus on the individual believer is a kind of reaction to the 
rationalist and liberal theologies. However, if it becomes exclusive, it necessarily 
leads to a narrowing of the scope which loses the Vision of the universal claim 
of the Christian message and of the reality of Kingdom of God as it is revealed in 
the world.
In the 19th century, the Hungarian Reformed theology had undergone the 
“anthropocentric turn”, too, i.e. the analysis of the religious person, and of the 
religious experience got into the center of the theological thought. According to 
this approach, the worship service is not an act in which God makes an impact on 
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the individual by God’s Word and Spirit, but the worship service is an expression 
of the faith experience of the religious person and community. The sermon is a 
speech with religion as its subject, which provides for an aesthetic experience 
at its best. By this the conviction of the Reformation according to which the 
proclamation of God’s Word is God’s Word, is lost.
The important question of the beginning of the 20th century was how the 
heritage of Calvin can be lived in a changed, modernized environment. The 
different approaches of theology are not separated from each other distinctly, 
no extreme schools of theologies are developed. Categories of academic and 
believing theologies emerge but they never lead to secession within the church. 
The controversy of the historical and ecclesiastical Calvinism was confined to 
the question whether the existing ecclesiastical structures were suitable for 
the renewal or renewal would make new structures necessary. The permanent 
subject of the debate was the institutionalization of the missionary and diaconal 
work of the associations, and this debate is going on even today. Does the church 
sustain its institutions (schools, social care) or the institutions are the sustainers 
of the church. This is the way the question is asked today.
It is an undisputable fact that Karl Barth’s theology made the strongest impact 
on the Hungarian Reformed thought. One of the reasons for this was the fact that 
most of the systematic theologians had been Barth’s students before. Another of 
the reasons was that Barth, a Western theologian of great respect, who was not 
an anti-Communist, suited the strategy of survival of the church leadership in the 
time of a Communist dictatorship quite well. By this we already touch upon the 
following problem: in the Reformed Church in Hungary, in the second half of the 
20th century, the church leadership instrumentalized theology, i.e. theology was 
used in order to serve the objectives of church politics. This so-called “theology 
of the serving church” was to prove that the sole’ fundament of existence of the 
church is that it affirms the new, Socialist social order without any reservations. 
When it was emphasized that that theology has got an ecclesiastical function, 
it was meant that doing theology was a privilege of church functionaries. The 
independence of theology was a recurring subject in the past half century. 
Theology may only be done under the control of the church leadership, according 
to their instructions, this is the only legitimation of her existence. This cantus firmus 
appears again and again in many forms in different declarations. Centralization is 
applied here, too. Topics of training courses forfor ministers were determined by 
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the center, with speakers from the center, with a series of well- choreographed 
and closely controlled responses. The reaction to this was a passive resistance by 
many and this has still got a lasting effect today. So much energy was consumed 
by the denial of inner identification that no desire for change remained in the 
ministers even when the opportunities got open. The church leadership of today 
is not free from the attitűdé of worries about theology either. The humble and 
meek voices claiming independence for theology are usually confronted by 
referring to the looming danger of decadent Western “luxury theologies” which 
are churchless and far removed from the reality of the congregations. The critical 
assessment of the Reformed theological work of the past decades is a task for the 
generation of today. In order to avoid the danger of a mere hunt for scapegoats, 
but to experience this as a cathartic ministry, a real theological work needs to be 
done. Theology can only be measured by theological criteria. Following Barth, 
István Török points to an important theological aspect when he identifies a 
Christological heresy in the theological direction which adds a supplement to 
the ancient creed: “Jesus Christ is Lord”. This supplement, that claimed more and 
more space for itself until it became the determining factor sounded like this: “...
for this reason we say “yes” to Socialism”.
A realistic assessment of the situation on a biblical basis could not lead to 
anything else in a legitimate way - i.e. according to the Word of God - than to 
confession of sins and to repentance. The declaration of confession of sins by the 
Council of the Synod in 1946 testifies, in a way which is equally relevant today, 
that the church “did not fulfil her prophetic office. She did not care sufficiently for 
the purity of the proclamation of the Word, she did not maintain proper discipline 
among the leaders of the church, she got lazy of töve, entered into compromises with 
the powerful and gave room for worldly rules in the church”. The voice of individual 
responsibility is not missing either from this confession: “...We confess on behalf of 
all members of the congregations that we were neither attentive hearers nor faithful 
doers of the Word...Our light was not shining, our salt got tasteless, and our life did not 
give glory to the Heavenly Father.” The motif of confession remains, but its scope 
is narrowing. On the one hand, the meaning of the confession of sins, according 
to the Pietist tradition, is concentrating on the lack of moral integrity in the life 
of the individual, which leads to ignoring the historical dimensions and of the 
reality of the structural evil. On the other hand, the confession of sins becomes 
a suitable slogan in all the cases when the church wishes to express even a mild 
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form of criticism on the distorted, ungodly and inhumane actions in the social 
and political life. Referring to the confession of sin is used to remind the church 
that she had lost the right of influencing and of criticizing because she did not 
practiced her prophetic office consequently in the past. This confession cannot 
be followed by trust in the God’s mercy and in the intercession of
 Jesus Christ, and a hope that renewal and life rises after the true confession. 
According to the above- mentioned interpretation, the sole consequence of the 
confession cannot be anything else than silencing of criticism, making loyalty 
the highest virtue, identifying the new social order with goodness, or sometimes 
even with the Ultimate Good, dutifully renewed declarations of faithfulness, and 
a voluntary retreat from life and from social publicity - caused by the motive of 
accommodation - to within the walls of the church, from where it is only possible 
and allowed to step out when being called. A narrowed and instrumentalized 
concept of the confession of sins became thus one of the important causes of the 
distortion of the image of the church.
Self-criticism - in the form of confession of sins - appears demonstratively at 
great historical turning points and it disappears wholly thereafter. Confession 
of sins has always got a reference in the past, it has thus no legitimacy in the 
presence. There is only one good way: the way we are walking. This is eventually 
nothing else than absolutizing the relative. Who speaks out against this is a 
subversive element.
Neglecting the criterion of “relationality” is shown by the uniformization of 
the differing theological-spiritual streams. The impact of the wave of awakening 
was an important element in the shaping of the image of the church. As the 
associations were dissolved or merged [into the church], a form of ecclesial life 
disappeared which had been an answer to the demand on smaller fellowships. 
This form was officially declared as unwanted. Instead of integrating this element 
into the church, it was suppressed and it made both parties unhealthy and broken. 
There was no healthy dialogue between the marginalized revivalist movement 
that was forced to go illegal and the church leadership. This was characteristic 
of the style of the church leadership in general. A mechanism of “order-report-
control” made the sphere of trust less and less possible. Trust was replaced by 
trustworthy people. A crisis of confidence that surfaced with an elementary 
power in the times of social crises (1956, 1989) was a logical consequence of this 
condition. As the different opinions and different types of spirituality were not in 
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touch with each other on an equal basis, opinions got petrified and extreme, and 
they surfaced as such in the very moment when State apparatus - that had been 
exercising patronage - ceased to guarantee the internal status quo of the church.
Social changes, in the course of which the lifestyle of the peasantry - which 
counted as a social basis of the Reformed church - was destroyed, played a very 
important role in the shaping of the image of the church as well. Declarations that 
presented the Socialistic reorganization of the agriculture as an undisputable 
achievement betray a serious lack of the sense of reality and a missing theological 
reflection. These declarations did not count with the fact that this new economic 
form that ignores the elementary rules of functioning of the economy, can never 
be profitable and it does not meet the criterion of human proportionality. The 
ambivalent process of urbanization made formerly independent congregations 
unable to survive and the church was not able to react properly to the challenges 
of a secularized environment. A consequence of the loss of the social basis the 
marginalization of the laity and a recently emerging “anti-clergy” sentiment. The 
disappearance of the critical laity contributed largely to the low quality of work 
and to the laxity that can be experienced in many areas of the life of the church 
and to the silent acceptance of the consequences of contra-selection.
Our situation today is characterized by a strange contradiction. On the one 
hand, the society, after the changes of 1989, looked upon the church with almost 
messianistic hopes and expected the only true solutions from her. The public 
character of the church has become evidently stronger. The church can only fulfil 
the new tasks offered in a structure of a people’s church (Volkskirche). This would 
be a return [to a previous situation] that does not count with the whole reality of 
today and tomorrow. It is true that the church does not have her source of life in 
this earthly reality, but it is even less possible that she lived by the restoration of 
the systems of institutions of the past. It is not possible to start to work on the 
new or newly offered tasks without an internal clarification of matters.
The need of internal clarification has the following meaning for us: To 
formulate the fundamental questions about the relationship of theology and 
the church, about the legitimate way of doing theology and about how to find 
a distinct Hungarian Reformed theological profile, and to make an attempt 
to give an answer to these questions. The first of all these,  is the rediscovery 
and practice of the dialectic tension between the critical reflection of faith, 
the spiritual forms of the living of the faith, and the governance of the church 
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supporting the undisturbed functioning of the activity of the life of the church. 
Where this tension is abolished, the living organism is replaced by uniformity, to 
be followed as the highest virtue. Whether it is one of the forms of spirituality 
or the government of the church that “instrumentalizes” theology, it harms the 
whole church. Distortion of the image of the church and distortion of theology 
are realities that necessarily and essentially belong together.
It can be encountered again and again in evaluations of the theology of-
service (both by the official church and in official Marxist statements) that the 
socio-ethical propositions of the Hungarian Reformed theology were not 
born out of theoretical analyses but out of “mere obedience”. In practice, this 
sentence means that the theological-theoretical work, the recognition of reality 
and the confrontation with the praxis that had been necessary for these socio-
ethical steps were entirely missing. There are declarative arguments that there 
were biblical notions and a Hungarian Reformed theological tradition in the 
background of practical decisions, but these arguments are not convincing. The 
way between the biblical notion and the practical consequence is simplified and 
shortened too much, and the actual “argument” is that “time will prove that we 
are right”. What Arthur Rich describes when writing about the distinction of real 
and false determinations, came true here. He defines false determinations as the 
one of which critical analysis can discover that they are caused by individual or 
corporate interests. Emphasizing that they cannot be changed serves to maintain 
and legitimize these conditions. “Mere obedience” meant the acceptance of 
things that did not meet the criteria of “factuality” and of “human proportionality”. 
Therefore, this sentence is the expression and indirect confession of a narrowed 
theology. This is not written out of a “frivolous misuse of the charism of being 
born later” but as a warning for today. Politics and representatives of economic 
structures tend to refer to “false determinations” today, too. For instance, it is a 
reference to a “false determination” to say that a Corporation which purchases 
newspapers with different political leanings are driven solely by one aspect 
which is profit. The absolutization of this one - in itself legitimate - aspect makes 
taking other aspects into consideration impossible. Reference to “we knew what 
we should have done, too, and we did what we could” is not convincing, as, at a 
later stage, the reader has got the impression that it was the best possible world 
ever. The theological legitimization of this was not necessary.
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Theological work was eventually subordinated to the church leadership which 
pursued a “strategy of survival”. This had fatal consequences forfor theology, 
because “the difference between an honest theology and the church leadership 
is, that theology is not ready to make compromises”. A “strategy of survival” is not 
suitable to provide a guidance which is in accordance with reality. “Survival” is a 
characteristically apocalyptic term, which focuses solely to help the individual 
and the community through an imminent catastrophe.
A characteristic formulation of the cynicism and of the carelessness, by which 
the actual theological work was measured in the past era, is an - unwritten 
- proverbial definition of the key aspects of the study of theology by a church 
official: “Two things must be cared about: 1. It must not say that God does not 
exist; and 2. It must not say “Long live Miklós Horthy!”. This obviously means, on 
the one hand, that appearances must be kept up, no attention should be drawn, 
our Reformed people must not be scandalized, and, on the other hand, the 
System is holy and must not be harmed, and it is untouchable by any criticism (as 
it is unchangeable, thus it is given an absolute character), and, at most., it can and 
should only be legitimized. Forgetting this, theology will suffer of the condition 
of “tunnel vision”: it may sometimes have to look into the “tunnel” of the barrel of 
a gun pointed at it, but, after a period of time, he keeps having the vision of this 
“tunnel” even when the gun had already disappeared.
Instrumentalized theology is always a selective theology. One of the 
phenomena of the theology instrumentalized by the church leadership which 
„awaits analysis is a selective Barth- interpretation and its effects which go as 
far as to a Docetist understanding of the revelation and of the proclamation of 
the Word. This, on the one hand, made it possible that several new phenomena 
of humán life, of culture and of Science were not addressed (because this was 
declared a forbidden zone for the church by the ideology), and, on the other hand, 
I am convinced, that it contributed to the superficiality and to the low quality of 
the sermons. We can make a long list of examples of selective exegetics, and of 
Bible studies actualized by shifting of emphases.
Instrumentalized and selective theology is always narrow and narrowing. We 
may have been spared of some fashionable and extravagant theological trends 
during the past fifty years, but, let us consider it, whether this sheltered existence 
was not provided on the expense of confrontations with real big questions and 
theological problems. If we just look at an outline of the European history of 
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theology of the last half of a century, it is evident that we - partially or entirely 
- owe answers to unavoidable questions. (Demythologization - ’40s, criticism of 
religion -’50s, secularization - ‘60s, the so-called “post-Christian” era - ‘70s, new 
religiosity-’80s).
This narrowness had an effect in the structure of theological training, too. 
I do not doubt that a great deal of “strategy of survival” contributed to this, 
but it would be a fatal misunderstanding to maintain it without any changes. 
Another form of narrowness was the loss of contact with other areas of science. 
As the present time of conjuncture, when theology and theologians are looked 
upon as curiosities, is going to pass, it will be evident how a new integrative-
interdisciplinary paradigm will be formed on this area.
There are also personal aspects of the narrowness. As in other denominations, 
a generation of “great theologians” was almost swiped away, many of them 
became victims of the interests of church politics, deprived of possibilities to 
teach and to publish. The question of followers is an urgent one and it demands 
serious efforts.
I think that the Hungarian Reformed theology as a whole basically tends to be 
a conservative theology, free from extravagant and extreme theological trends. 
Its task is to help the membership of the church - which is based on a personal 
faith-commitment - to consider their faith in Christ as the most personal public 
cause. To help them to proclaim the gospel of the Kingdom of God in a way that 
its wholeness gets manifest in the individual, confession of faith, in the confession 
of faith in the communion of the congregation and of the church, in the work for 
peace and for justice and in the responsibility carried for the created world.
JOOSEOP KEUM 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of church and state takes us to the heart of mission because the Gospel 
is the good news in every part of human life and society. Throughout the history 
of the Church in Korea, the issues of church and state, religion and society have 
been deeply connected to the development of the Korean churches. Indeed, 
an important factor in Christianity’s success in Korea has been its frequent 
identification with political movements promoting Korean nationalism, 
independence, democracy, and Korean reunification. Especially in Northern 
Korea before the division of the peninsula in 1945, and in North Korea after it,1 
the church-state relationship has been one of the crucial issues determining the 
fate of the churches.         
Before the partition of the Korean peninsula in 1945, the majority of Christians 
in Korea lived in Northern Korea. Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea, 
was referred to as the “Jerusalem of East Asia” by missionaries,2 indicating that 
Northern Korea was the vibrant center of, in particular, Protestant Christianity.3 
In contrast, however, the Protestant church in North Korea was officially closed 
down, and virtually ceased to exist from 1958 to 1972. After the partition in 
1945, the Protestant Christians in North Korea collided with the Communist 
regime in a brief competition for political hegemony.4 This collision resulted in 
the persecution of Christianity in North Korea, and most Christians evacuated 
to South Korea during the Korean War. There were only about 50,000 ‘remnant’ 
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Protestant Christians and about 20 ordained ministers left behind the Iron 
Curtain after the war.5 There is some evidence that these remnant Christians 
in North Korea continued in conflict with the Communist government even in 
the post-war context.6 Because of this conflict, the Communists did not allow 
any religious freedom for the Christians from 1958 to 1972, during which they 
operated a hostile religious policy known as the “Anti-Religious Campaign.”7
In 1972, the North Korean government lifted its ban on Christianity and the 
Protestant church in North Korea started to revive. Instead of entering into 
conflict with the government, the North Korean church now worked within 
its Communist context. Two churches were built, the theological seminary 
reopened for ministry training, and the Bible and hymnbook were again printed. 
Christianity, which had been considered as “anti-revolutionary social opium,”8 
was re-evaluated as “a partner of the reconstruction of socialist fatherland and 
the reunification of Korean peninsula”9 by the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP). This 
change in the state’s understanding of Christianity brought widened religious 
freedom allowing worship, Eucharist, baptism and restricted church planting. 
In spite of this revival of the Protestant church in North Korea, the history 
of Protestant Christianity in North Korea has been little known to the outside 
world. Most historians focused their questions on whether or not the revival of 
Protestant churches in North Korea was a simply matter of political propaganda. 
The church-state relationship, it must be emphasized, is the starting point of the 
criticisms launched by Christians from the South against the North Korean Church. 
It is also a crucial actor in both the disappearance and, later, the revival of the 
Protestant church in North Korea. By focusing on the church-state relationship, 
this article will argue that the revival of Protestant Christianity in North Korea 
was due to sustained efforts by the North Korean Christians to articulate their 
Christian identity within the Communist context. 
Theological Criteria for the Analysis of Church-State 
Relations in North Korea
In this paper, the historical paradigms of church and state relationship will be re-
examined not simply chronologically, but interpretively. Three approaches will be 
used in the analysis of church-state relations. Each approach has its own justification. 
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Firstly, a minjung-centered approach, arising from the liberation of the 
oppressed, will be justified by the historical evidence that Northern Korean 
Protestantism is characteristically the ‘church for the minjung.’10 A minjung 
perspective precludes a privileged focus on elites in writing a history of the 
Korean church. Rather, it pays attention to the struggle of the minjung for the 
transformation of history. Minjung theologians insist that “minjung are the 
subject of social history,”11 and their story is viewed as the center of history in 
minjung theology.
Secondly, a post-Cold War approach will be justified on the basis that Christian 
socialism was an influential movement among Northern Korean Protestants 
during the period of Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. This has not yet 
received an objective assessment due to subsequent Cold War confrontation 
between South and North Korea. There is evidence that most Korean history 
writing, including ecclesiastical history, has served to emphasize the legitimacy 
and superiority of each one side over against the other, promoting one of the 
two systems, or ideologies, and attacking its opposite. Church history written 
from the perspective of South Korea demonstrates a tendency toward anti-
Communism, sometimes resembling McCarthyism.12 This is used to justify the 
division of the Korean peninsula and keep the North Korean Church and South 
Korean Church separate. This thesis will attempt to develop a post-Cold War 
perspective in writing a history of northern Protestantism that strives for the 
reconciliation and reunification of the two Koreas.
Lastly, a post-colonial approach will be adopted in order to overcome the 
academic legacy of Japanese colonialism. For example, Korean mainline churches 
still keep silence on the issue of Shinto shrine worship. It is a responsibility of 
church historians to criticize the mistakes of churches in the past, so that they will 
not be repeated. 
Of these three approaches, the minjung-centered approach is the most 
important filter that will be used to understand church-state relations, as applied to 
Protestant Christianity in North Korea. The struggle of the North Korean Church for 
the minjung in the process of the revival will be clarified. Moreover, it will be shown 
that the minjung-centered approach is a criterion for understanding the proper 
relationship between church and state in each historical context of North Korea. 
This approach links up with the way church-state relations were 
conceptualized as an important ecumenical agenda, as far back as the Oxford 
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Conference on Church, Community, and State in 1937.13 Rather than addressing 
church-state relations on a bilateral axis, the conference “triangulated” the issue 
by re-conceiving it in terms of church-community-state relations.14 Community 
did not mean “national community” as a structural and legal element of the 
nation-state.15 Rather, the conference considered grassroots communities 
in approaching the church-state relations.16 There was a strong intention to 
construct the issue from a grassroots people’s perspective. This thesis will apply 
the same triangular approach to the analysis of the characteristics of the church-
state issue of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, so as to include the minjung 
perspective as a dynamic element of the relationship. 
This unique triangular approach of Oxford was a result of the concern of the 
ecumenical movement for suffering people. It is of interest that the notion of 
“community” was brought into the question of the relationship between church 
and state at the moment when the ecumenical movement was confronted 
with the totalitarian claims of the Nazi Third Reich.17 In this context, the Oxford 
conference deliberately intended to clarify church-state relations for the sake 
of the church’s witness for “people”. Oxford did not restrict its attention to 
traditional legal problems, but concentrated primarily on the witness and service 
of the church in society. The reasoning behind taking church, community and 
state together was clearly that the church’s first concern should be how the 
Christian community can best serve suffering people in the wider community, 
not how it can secure its own institutional rights within the political system. The 
conference called all Christians “to a more passionate and costly concern for the 
outcast, the under-privileged, the persecuted, the despised in the community 
and beyond the community.”18 The Oxford approach therefore refuses to divorce 
the church’s relation to the state from its service to the community and its social 
responsibility. 
The Oxford conference recognized the dual citizenship of Christians to church 
and state and “the dual loyalty to God and Caesar.”19 However, it affirmed, “It 
is God who declares what is Caesar’s. Therefore, whatever the choice may be, 
the Christian must, whether as a member of the church or as a citizen, obey the 
Will of God.”20 The conference understood that Caesar (the state) is “ordained by 
God” as “servant of justice”21 for His people, but still stands under God’s authority 
and judgment:
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We recognize the existing States as historically given realities, each of which in 
the political sphere is the highest authority, but which, as it stands itself under the 
authority and judgment of God, is bound by His Will and has the God-given aim 
of upholding law and order, of ministering to the life of the people united within it 
or the peoples or groups who are so united, and also of making its contribution to 
the common life of all peoples.22
The Oxford Conference acknowledged the authority of the state, but recognized 
it as relative not ultimate, an authority that can only legitimately be for the 
God-given purpose of serving the “welfare” and “life of people.” The Oxford 
Conference declared that the state is not the ultimate source of law, “not the 
lord, but the servant” of the people. In spite of this God-given purpose, the 
conference recognized that in reality, “often the state becomes an instrument of 
evil,”23 which oppresses the people. 
Therefore, the Oxford Conference concluded, “The church in differing historical 
situations may be called to take differing positions either of co-operation, 
criticism, or opposition.”24 It is significant that the Oxford Conference recognized 
all possible relationships between church and state according to socio-historical 
contextuality. However, what was important was that within the triangular 
relationship between the church, the community and the state, the notion of the 
“community of grassroots people” was the crucial criterion determining whether 
the church’s proper relationship to the state was one of cooperation, criticism, or 
opposition.25 If a state acts as the servant of the community of grassroots people, 
a church may cooperate. However, when the tyrannical state oppresses the 
people against the Will of God, the church has to oppose the state. Indeed, this 
triangular approach of Oxford was a remarkable development in the ecumenical 
debate on church-state relations, affirming people-centered or community-
centered criteria over against legal or bureaucratic considerations. 
Applied to the Korean context, the Oxford notion of “community” can be 
replaced with the Korean notion of minjung, which means the community 
of marginalized people in Korean society. Therefore, in this thesis, the Oxford 
approach will be applied to the North Korean context as a triangular filter of 
“Church, Minjung and State”. This triangular relationship of church, minjung and 
state will be used as an analytical tool in order to ascertain what the proper 
relationship between the church and the state ought to be in North Korea 
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Historical Paradigms and Assessments
The Minjung-Centered Oppositional Paradigm 
Protestant Christianity was introduced to the Korean peninsula through the 
‘northern route.’ It arrived in a northern Korean society that suffered from 
economic, social and political discrimination, in relation to Southern Korea, at 
the end of the Joseon Dynasty. Against the traditional caste system of the south-
centered Confucianism, northern Protestantism engaged in the enlightenment 
of social equality among the northern minjung. Northern Protestantism 
developed the idea of social reformation, which emphasized a republican polity, 
emphasizing the role of the people against that of the monarch. Translation of 
the Bible into Hangeul, the language of minjung, gave the minjung a new vision 
of the Kingdom of God, where every human being is equal.  
When Korea was colonized by Japan, the exploitation by the Japanese 
colonial government concentrated on Northern Korea because of its mining 
industry, and in order to prepare the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Under 
these conditions, Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea developed as an 
important focus of the independence movement, in particular through leading 
the March First Independence Movement. Korean nationalism thus became 
an important characteristic of northern Protestantism. When the Japanese 
imposed Shinto shrine worship to suppress the rise of Christian nationalism, the 
northern Christians strongly resisted, on the grounds that it was an issue of status 
confessionis. By leading the independence movement, northern Protestantism 
was recognized as a patriotic religion by the northern minjung.
In summary, therefore, the church-state relationship in Northern Korea before 
independence modelled a paradigm of Christian opposition to the state, aimed 
against both the south-centered Joseon Dynasty and Japanese colonial rule. In 
the development of this oppositional paradigm, the notion of being the church 
of the minjung was important in Northern Korean Christian self-identity. Northern 
Protestantism understood both the Joseon monarchy and the Japanese colonial 
state as tyrannies that oppressed the minjung. Therefore, resistance against the 
state was justified on the grounds of the liberation of the minjung. Protestant 
Christianity in Northern Korea was highly respected by the minjung as a patriotic 
and, indeed, a minjung religion. It can be concluded that this oppositional 
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paradigm of church-state relations was a major cause of Protestant Christianity’s 
original success in Northern Korea.   
The Competitive Oppositional Paradigm 
During Japanese rule, both Protestant Christianity and the Communist 
movement, especially Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese guerrillas, were centers of 
the independence struggle in Northern Korea. With liberation, a new phase 
began. Northern Protestantism and Communism now encountered each other 
as ideological rivals in the task of nation building. The Christian attempt to take 
political hegemony through organizing the first modern political party in Korean 
history was offset by Kim Il-sung and his followers, who established a Communist 
regime with the support of the Soviet Army. Kim Il-sung invited the Christians to 
cooperate in national construction through joining a united front. However, the 
Five Province Joint Presbytery (FPJP) in North Korea rejected this option, and fell 
back on the oppositional paradigm of church and state that had prevailed during 
Japanese rule. The northern Christians argued that Christianity could not co-
exist with atheistic Communism. Therefore, the Christians competed for political 
power through organizing Christian parties and clashed with the Communists 
over several political issues, and most notably that of the boycott of the general 
election. 
In this process of political competition and conflict with the Communists, the 
northern Protestant Christians lost the support of the minjung. One of the main 
reasons behind the competition and conflict was the issue of land reform. The 
northern Christians rejected the Communist land reform in order to maintain 
their recently upgraded social status, in which they had risen out of the minjung to 
become part of the elite. As a consequence, the northern minjung welcomed the 
Communist policy of social reform, but did not favor of the northern Christians’ 
attempt to gain political power. Because of the Communist suppression and the 
disapproval of the minjung, the political initiatives of the FPJP finally collapsed. 
With the outbreak of the Korean War, the majority of northern Protestant 
Christians evacuated to the South to avoid the discrimination and persecution 
they expected to experience under Communist rule.
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The above oppositional paradigm between the church and the Communist 
state succeeded the traditional paradigm of opposition between church and state 
before liberation. However, the position of the church altered after liberation, by 
the fact that it lost the support of the minjung-axis. From this we can conclude 
that in the development of an opposition paradigm against state, the support of 
the minjung is a crucial factor. Without it, Christianity could not succeed in North 
Korea. 
The Diplomatic Cooperative Paradigm 
With the establishment of the North Korean state in 1945, a cooperative paradigm 
developed between the leaders of the North Korea Christian Association (NKCA) 
and the new Communist government emerged. The NKCA recognized that 
the Communist social reform was necessary in North Korea. Therefore, they 
supported the Kim Il-sung regime, and participated in the United Front of North 
Korea. The NKCA and the Communist regime thus developed a cooperative 
paradigm of church-state relations. 
Although this Christian group was a minority within the northern churches, 
it held ecclesiastical power with and through Communist support. The NKCA 
leaders introduced a radical renewal program to root northern Protestantism 
in the Communist soil. However, this process of renewal was largely dependent 
on the support they received from the Communist state, and was carried out 
through a top-down method. The theological justification or basis for this 
approach was very weak, and in any case deficient. When the Korean War broke 
out, the NKCA leaders continued their cooperative paradigm by supporting the 
Communist cause against the UN “Police Action,” which carried the support of 
the WCC and western churches. However, their cooperation resulted in failure 
because the majority of northern Christians, including many leaders of NKCA, 
fled to the South during the war. 
Thus, just as the FPJP’s opposition to the Communist government lost the 
support of the northern minjung, so too the cooperation paradigm of the NKCA 
failed to find support among the grassroots Christians in North Korea. Although 
the NKCA supported the land reform, and declared its intention to work for 
the minjung, most of its activities were actually concentrated on securing 
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ecclesiastical power through a bureaucratic approach to the Communist state. 
While the FPJP aimed at obtaining the secular political power through competing 
with the Communists, the NKCA aimed at the same thing through diplomatic 
cooperation with the Communist leaders. Both eventually failed. 
The original intention of the NKCA was to renew the church-state relationship 
through rooting northern Protestantism in the Communist soil. Although the 
NKCA aimed to be a church for the minjung in theory, in practice, its activity was 
focused on diplomatic cooperation with the Communists. The NKCA failed to 
achieve an authentic renewal of the northern churches because it attempted to 
achieve the renewal simply through bureaucratic changes. 
 Although by 1949 the NKCA had become the only representative Protestant 
organization in North Korea, it paid the price for its uncritical cooperation with 
the government. The NKCA became a sort of religious spokesman for the Kim 
Il-sung regime. The diplomatic cooperative paradigm of the NKCA resulted in a 
dependency of the church-axis on the state-axis at the expense of the minjung-
axis. Its uncritical cooperation with the secular state also brought about an 
identity crisis in the NKCA in regard to public issues. 
The Paradigm of Catacomb 
After the Korean War, only one fourth of Protestant Christians and a few NKCA 
pastors remained in North Korea. However, they were not able to reconstruct 
their churches because of the social antipathy toward the Christians, the great 
majority of whom had supported the enemy during the war. In this context, the 
remnant Christians (who were not part of the NKCA) again collectively boycotted 
the general election, as an action aimed against the Kim Il-sung regime. This 
boycott brought about a severe “Anti-Religious Campaign” by the Communists. 
The Communist state legalized a policy of social discrimination against the 
Christians. Anti-Communist underground Christian leaders were executed, and 
anti-Christian propaganda and slogans were displayed across North Korea. 
Because of the NKCA’s concentration on a bureaucratic approach, it was not able 
to provide a theological justification for the continued existence of Christianity in 
North Korean Communist society.  
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Consequently, the remnant Christians were in difficulty to openly enjoy religious 
life after 1958. They gathered in underground house groups for secret and simple 
worship from 1958-1972. The state-axis absolutely overwhelmed the church-axis, 
and did not allow any religious freedom. This paradigm of church-state relations 
was similar to the paradigm of the Catacombs in Rome during the Neronian 
persecution. 
The discrimination and persecution practiced against Christians in North Korea 
from 1958-1972 points to the failure of the former church-state relationships, 
developed by the NKCA and the FPJP. Both the competitive oppositional paradigm 
of the FPJP and the diplomatic cooperative paradigm of the NKCA had ignored the 
axis of the minjung. Therefore, when the Communist state introduced its hostile 
ideological attack on northern Protestantism, the remnant Christians were neither 
able to justify their Christian existence in the North Korean Communist society, nor 
able to receive any support and sympathy from the minjung. This taught northern 
Protestantism an important lesson: a diplomatic rapprochement with the state was 
clearly not enough to secure the survival of the church; rather it had to be a church 
“with” and “for” the minjung. Furthermore, it would have to articulate a theological 
understanding of the significance of Christian churches in a Communist society. 
In spite of the terrible climate created by the Anti-Religious Campaign, the 
remnant Christians kept their faith by existing underground. This experience 
trained the remnant Christians so that they could keep the seed of faith, 
withstanding the most severe and trying conditions. 
The Minjung-Centered Cooperative Paradigm
From 1972 onwards, the political situation in North Korea changed, with the 
Communists becoming tolerant towards the remnant Christians because they no 
longer regarded the Christians as a political threat. Moreover, for the Communists 
it was necessary to use the Christians for propaganda purposes, demonstrating 
to the outside world that religious freedom existed in North Korea, during the 
political competition with South Korea. Therefore, the state was willing to permit 
limited religious freedom for the remnant Christians to enjoy free worship 
through the rewriting of the article on religion in the constitution. But this did 
not allow for public evangelism and religious education. 
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However, the subjective efforts of the remnant Christians for promoting a 
revival of Christianity were more important than constitutional change. They 
gathered together and re-established the Korean Christian Federation (KCF) as 
their national ecclesiastical organization in 1972, and reopened house churches. 
The revived KCF established the Platform for cooperation with the state, 
developing leadership institutions for the churches, providing a new translation 
of the Bible and hymnbook, instituting a system of registration, and engaging 
in North and South dialogue with the assistance of the WCC, for the external 
development of the revival. The institutional efforts of the KCF as the vehicle for 
the revival of post-1972 Christianity in North Korea proved successful. However, 
this revival was concentrated on quantitative rather than qualitative growth. 
When the revival was stabilized, northern Protestantism began to search 
for internal qualitative renewal. The institutionally-revived northern churches 
sought to express their theological identity through the Christian-Juchean 
dialogue. One of the distinctive results of this dialogue was an increase of mutual 
understanding between the Christians and the Jucheans. The northern Christians 
accepted that the Juche Idea is not merely an expressing atheistic materialism, 
for it emphasizes that spiritual consciousness in what determines the course of 
history. On the other hand, the Jucheans also recognized that Christianity is not 
simply the opium of the people. Moreover, both found that there is a similarity 
between northern Protestantism and North Korean Communism in that both 
have developed a minjung and a minjok-centered approach. This enabled the 
northern Christians to justify their presence in North Korean Communist society 
theologically (notwithstanding the fact that this theological work still needs to be 
deepened), while at the same time the Jucheans and the new leadership of North 
Korea gradually moved towards a more positive reinterpretation of Christianity. 
While the former cooperation paradigm practiced by the NKCA and the KWP 
had merely been a diplomatic one, the new revived cooperative paradigm was 
based on mutual understanding through theological and ethical dialogue. The 
point of convergence between the two different systems of thought was the 
similarity of their understanding of the minjung as the subject of history. This 
similarity has served as a theological justification of the KCF’s cooperation with 
the Communist state. Consequently, the article of “anti-religious propaganda,” 
which had been the legal foundation of the Communists’ discrimination towards 
the Christians, was deleted from the constitution in 1992.    
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While the Christian-Juchean dialogue motivated the minjung-centered 
theological renewal of northern Protestantism, the development of Social 
Diakonia Mission was the practical renewal of its minjung-centered mission. 
North Korean people have been suffering from famine since 1993. In this context, 
the northern churches became committed to relief works for the suffering 
people with the material support of the South Korean and world churches, and 
through this experience the northern churches developed their diaconal identity. 
Although it is too early to evaluate the Social Diakonia Mission, there can be no 
doubt that it has proven itself as one of the chief characteristics of the revival of 
northern Protestantism. 
The dialogue and diakonia brought about a positive change in the North 
Korean understanding of Christianity. In this meaningful renewal, the minjung-
centered cooperative approach emerged as a new paradigm of church-state 
relations in North Korea. Northern Protestantism introduced the minjung as the 
dynamic element in a revived understanding of church-state relations.
Through the above summary and assessment, we can conclude that northern 
Protestantism has developed diverse historical paradigms of church-state 
relations, and that each paradigm decisively influenced the fate of the northern 
Protestant churches. The issue has not been merely a legal and institutional 
debate on specific issues like religious education, religious tax, state church or 
free church etc. Rather, has been a response to the whole modern history of 
North Korea, with its major themes of colonization, national construction, war, 
famine etc.
Conclusion: The Minjung-Centered Approach in Church-
State Relations
Protestant Christianity in North Korea has experimented with a wide range of 
historical paradigms of church-state relations, from opposition to cooperation, 
and each paradigm influenced Protestant Christianity’s success or failure in North 
Korea in different ways. In this experience of success and failure, the notion of a 
minjung-centered approach was a key issue, which decided the appropriateness 
of each paradigm. 
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Through our examination of the various historical paradigms, we have 
identified that the concept of the minjung has to be included in the bilateral 
relationship between church and state for establishing a proper relationship. 
The Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State had already argued 
in 1937 that the “community of people” remains an essential criterion for proper 
relations between church and state. In the North Korean context, this means 
that the notion of the minjung has to be the criterion for determining whether 
the northern church should oppose the state or cooperate with it. If the state 
developed policies in favor of the minjung, and the minjung support their 
government, the church can cooperate with the state. However, if a government 
is tyrannical and oppresses the minjung, the church cannot allow the legitimacy of 
the government, and must oppose the state. Therefore, the triangular approach 
of church, minjung and state is a highly relevant analytical methodology for the 
northern churches in critically assessing their church-state relations.   
No single answer can be given to the theoretical question of what the best 
relationship between the church and the state in North Korea would be, because 
the socio-political context has always been changing. It all depends on the nature 
of the changes taking place. The northern churches have experimented with 
diverse relationships between church and state, offering different responses to 
different changes occurring in the context. Sometimes their response has been 
appropriate and authentic, at other time not. 
Church-state relations are not simply a matter of defining the differences 
between the two entities in such a way that each can fulfil its task without 
interference from the other.26 Rather, it is possible for the church to accompany 
and assist the state in the spirit of critical solidarity, in order to embrace the 
welfare of God’s creation. In this respect, the current cooperation of the northern 
churches with the state is meaningful because there is remarkable solidarity 
between the church and the state in serving the suffering minjung. 
However, on the other hand, there are also increasing criticisms of the North 
Korean totalitarian state both inside and outside North Korea. As well as the 
increase in the number of economic refugees since the famine, political refugees 
too are dramatically increasing. Here, although the current minjung-centered 
cooperation paradigm has been successful since 1972 for promoting the revival 
and renewal of northern Protestantism, the changes now happening, which may 
be called the signs of the times, need to be read and interpreted carefully when 
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developing the paradigm of cooperation with the state. If the northern Christians 
simply support their Communist state without critical assessment, when the 
political situation is suddenly changed, for instance in the case of the Kim 
Jong-eun regime collapsing, they might lose the support of the minjung again. 
Therefore it is necessary to recognize that the current cooperation paradigm is 
not a permanent one. It is not necessary to be content with the current position 
because the context of the state and minjung is always changing, which is why a 
renewed critical theological assessment of the situation is always required. 
There is a principle of ongoing reformation in the Reformed tradition. The 
northern church, which has generally preserved Korean Reformed tradition, must 
be reminded that ecclesia reformanta semper reformanda est.27 The church that is 
reformed is always in need of being reformed. The origins of this famous slogan 
are obscure. It does not come from Calvin but a later period.28 Nevertheless, it is 
an appropriate slogan for use among the anonymous grassroots participants, 
the minjung in Korean conception, in the struggle for ongoing reformation. As 
church-state relations in North Korea have been developed in diverse paradigms 
due to changes in the socio-historical context, the current paradigm of church-
state relations cannot be regarded as permanent. The only permanent feature 
is that the church must always identify itself with the suffering minjung for the 
ceaseless reformation of itself, and must continually evaluate and reshape its 
relationship with the state accordingly. 
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LÁSZLÓ GONDA
In this paper the Christian models of the separation of church and state are 
demonstrated using four biblical concepts.  In the first part of the paper, five 
models of church-state relations are described in the light of Romans 13,1-6. First, 
the Constantinian concept of the Christian state is presented, both in its Eastern 
(ceasaropapism) and Western (covenant of throne and altar) versions, followed by 
the presentation of two models of the Protestant Reformation: the Lutheran model 
of the ‘two empires” and the Calvinist model of the world as the “theatre of the glory 
of God”.  As a fifth model, the radical separation of church and the secular state is 
described, in the context of the underlying concepts of the Enlightenment and 
Modernism. 
The “Roman 13 model”
In the Christian Holy Scripture no systematic elaboration on church-state relations 
can be found.  The nature of the Scripture is such that certain hermeneutical tools 
need to be applied if we intend to distract any concept on this matter. Traditional 
exegetical and biblical approaches on Christian concepts on Church and state 
relations often refer to two biblical texts, which present us with two very different 
embodiment of the state. In the Epistle to the Romans, in chapter 13, the state ( or 
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‘ἐξουσία, authority, NIV) is described as it should be functioning according to God’s 
will:  “1. Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no 
authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have 
been established by God. 2 Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is 
rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment 
on themselves. 3 For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who 
do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what 
is right and he will commend you. 4 For he is God’s servant to do you good. But if 
you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s 
servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. 5 Therefore, it is 
necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but 
also because of conscience. 6 This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are 
God’s servants, who give their full time to governing. 7 Give everyone what you owe 
him: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; 
if honour, then honour. 8 Let no debt remain outstanding, except the continuing 
debt to love one another, for he who loves his fellowman has fulfilled the law.”1 
In this approach the state is functional: it fulfils tasks by which is qualifies to the 
title of being “God’s servant”. In this case the state functions “for your good”. It will 
commend what is “right” and will punish what is “wrong”.  If the state is functional, 
the Christians are summoned to be obedient to it. It would of course be historically 
wrong to extrapolate an all-encompassing theory on church-state relations from 
this text (e.g. it speaks about the relation of individuals to authorities, and it implies 
obviously that Christian persons are not in any positions of authority themselves, 
thus reflecting the situation of the 1st century, when the Christian church was a 
diaspora in the “heathen” Roman Empire). However, authorities as described in 
this text can be taken as a model of a well-functioning state, to which Christians – 
and the Christian church - relates positively. In the history of Christianity five basic 
versions of the church-state relations were developed in the context of a positive 
perception of the nature of the state (i.e. the “Roman 13 model”). 
Christian Empire
According to the concept of the “Christian Empire” the church and the state are 
largely overlapping and they permeate each other. In the Eastern Roman Empire 
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the emperor was both head of the state and head of the church (ceasaropapism). 
The state and the church exercise authority together, the clergy is seen as an 
official body of the state, and the state backs the church with its full (even military) 
weight. The church, on the other hand, provides religious authority to the state, 
the church “sacralises” the state. The state is looked upon as the “servant of God” 
indeed, but more than that: the emperor represents in this world  the Pantokrator 
Christos, Christ to whom all authority (ἐξουσία) is given on heaven and on earth 
(Mt 28,18). Next to the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, a similar structure 
could be observed in city-state of Edessa or in Armenia after the 4th century.  
The Covenant of Throne and Altar
A similar, but still different structure of church-state relations was developed 
in the West. In the Middle Ages parallel structures of church and state were 
built up and they entered into a close alliance with each other (though not 
without controversies and conflicts from time to time) in order to create 
Christian Kingdoms.  In the case of the “covenant of throne and altar” the two 
entities – church and state – could be well distinguished: they functioned as 
two distinct bodies. Their alliance was not permanent, and they represented 
two separate centres of authority with ever changing patterns of loyalty and 
conflict. Kings and emperors were supported or excommunicated by the 
church, other kings and emperors offered or withdrew their (often military and 
financial) support of popes and counter-popes. The whole European  - and 
later, in the early Modern era, overseas  - society was conceptualized as a “body 
of Christians” (Corpus Christianum, Christendom) where the state exercised 
secular, “worldly” authority while the church exercised spiritual authority over 
“the souls”. In practice, the church was widely involved in “worldly” politics, 
even with its own financial network, management of property and of military 
power. Unfortunately, people with other religious affiliation – Judaism, Islam – 
or with heterodox views on Christian doctrine were practically excluded from 
these societies or even suffered persecution. The church “sacralised” the state 
in this model as well, but church-state relationship was more complex than in 
the Byzantine one. 
[ 74 ] László Gonda
Protestantism: two Empires 
In the context of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, two distinct 
versions of church and state relationships were developed. The Reformation 
did not challenge the concept of Christendom/Corpus Christianum (with the 
important exception of Anabaptism) but a thorough re-conceptualisation of 
church-state relationships took place. 
In the Lutheran tradition, the concept of the “two empires” prevailed. 
According to it, the state has got a God-given mandate to govern in worldly terms 
while the church has got a divine mandate to give spiritual governance (Regime) 
to people. The task of the state is to provide good order of the society, to exercise 
justice and to protect the Christian church.  In a distinctly separate mandate, the 
primary task of the church is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ and to care for 
spiritual life (piety and eternal salvation) of the people. Of course pious, Christian 
princes and kings are the ideal leaders to provide optimal circumstances for 
the ministry of the church. Church and state are separate bodies with clearly 
different mandates and realms of responsibility, but, practically, they are not 
separated. In an “ideal” case, they work closely together for the public good of 
the society as mutually independent structures, but, in the same time, persons 
holding positions of authority are under the spiritual oversight of the church. In 
this model, the church does not understand herself as a “sacraliser” of the state: 
their cooperation is more operational and practical. 
Protestantism: God’s Glory in the World
In the Calvinist approach the whole world is looked upon as the place of 
manifestation of God’s glory (theatrum Dei gloriae). A consequence of this is 
that the mandates of the church and that of the state are not different: both 
are to serve the glory of God, though by their own means.  The authorities (the 
“magistrates”) are “God’s servants” entrusted to govern the community according 
to God’s will. The church is also “God’s servant” entrusted to preach God’s Word 
and to administer the sacraments. In this vision there are areas where the task 
of the church and that of the state meet each other: especially when exercising 
discipline. In this model the separation of church and state is unimaginable: the 
           [ 75 ]The Empty Centre – Separation of  Church and State
two entities are to work together as closely as possible. This is why there were 
places – Geneva or Debrecen – where the city council and the church council 
were identical for a period of time. 
Radical Separation
On Sunday, December 2, 1804 the coronation of Napoleon to be the Emperor of 
the French took place in the Notre Dame in Paris, in the presence of Pope Pius VII. 
During the ceremony, when the Pope was supposed to place the crown upon the 
head of the Emperor, Napoleon grasped the crown and put it on his own head 
with his own hands. This symbolic act heralded a new era in the relationship of 
the church and state. Napoleon expressed that his rule and his authority is not 
derived from divine powers as mediated by the church. In a conspicuous mixture 
of royalist and republican traditions the emperor followed the philosophy of 
the Enlightenment and that of the French Revolution: all powers come from 
the people. The church was still present – but it was more an instrument and a 
provider of the scenery: it gradually lost its influence on the public sphere. In this 
model the state thus does not require any religious legitimacy. The state functions 
according to the constructive agreements of the people consisting of the society. 
Mandate is given to representatives (“deputies”) who are entrusted with the 
responsibility to manage the public issues at different levels: local councils, 
regional bodies, nation states and, eventually, international organizations. 
According to Lesslie Newbigin,2 in modernity facts and values are separated 
radically. This is also reflected in the role of religion (church) in modern societies: 
state and authorities function in the the world of facts.3 The public realm of facts 
is ruled by laws: by natural laws based on empirical observation and by legal rules 
based on agreements of the community. The authorities are to govern people on 
behalf of the community, observing the rules (the “facts”) which are indisputable. 
In this concept, the church functions in the realm of values, which are subjective 
and optional. The church has no privileged role in the public sphere: she is one 
of the many “offers” on the “market of worldviews”. In this concept church and 
state are separated radically: the church relegated to the realm of “civil societies” 
or “non-governmental organizations”. The state pursues a policy of neutrality 
regarding values and world views. However, in this model, it is still possible that 
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the state, according to the assessment of the church does fulfil the criteria set 
by Romans 13 (among others). If this is the case, the church can come to the 
conclusion that the state acts as “God’s servant”, i.e.: it fulfils the duties of a “good 
state”. The church can decide to be obedient to the authorities and to accept the 
rules set by a neutral state. In this case, even a cooperation of the church and 
the state is possible: not based on religious convictions, but in the service of the 
common good: e.g. in helping the needy. While entering into cooperation to the 
state on well-defined areas of life, the church may always reserve to herself the 
right – and evangelical duty – of criticism in cases when the state would deviate 
from providing justice, peace, unity and dignity for all people. Radical political 
separation of the church and the state thus does not necessarily mean a hostile 
relationship of them. Furthermore, this situation is quite similar to that of the 
early Christians in the “pagan” Roman Empire.
However, this leads to an important historical question. It is of course known from 
history that Christianity did develop further after the 1st century and within less than 
a quarter of a millennium it became the dominant religion of the Roman Empire 
(cf. Edict of Milan, 313). Adolf von Harnack4 and others argue that this was a result 
of an organic development of a religion with great transforming potential. If this 
is the case, the modernist radical separation of church and state is an abnormal, 
retrograde condition: the church is truncated of her real dimensions when it is 
confined to function as one of the many civil societies. However, Franz Overbeck5 
and his followers offer another assessment of the same developments: they say 
that the transition of Christianity from a radical spiritual movement of Jesus of 
Nazareth and his followers to a state religion of an empire was a fatal distortion 
and resulted in the loss of the “Christ-quality” of the Christian church. In this latter 
case the radical separation of the church and the state provides the church with 
the chance of getting rid of all “historical ballasts” (power, wealth, influence) and 
return to the radical prophetic religion of its founder.
The “Revelation 13 model”
In the second part, the relations of the church to a dysfunctional state is described, 
in the light of Revelations 13,1-9. Let me cite here a biblical text from Revelation 
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13:1 “And the dragon stood on the shore of the sea. And I saw a beast coming 
out of the sea. He had ten horns and seven heads, with ten crowns on his horns, 
and on each head a blasphemous name. 2 The beast I saw resembled a leopard, 
but had feet like those of a bear and a mouth like that of a lion. The dragon gave 
the beast his power and his throne and great authority. 3 One of the heads of the 
beast seemed to have had a fatal wound, but the fatal wound had been healed. 
The whole world was astonished and followed the beast. 4 Men worshiped the 
dragon because he had given authority to the beast, and they also worshiped the 
beast and asked, “Who is like the beast? Who can make war against him?” 5 The 
beast was given a mouth to utter proud words and blasphemies and to exercise 
his authority for forty-two months. 6 He opened his mouth to blaspheme God, 
and to slander his name and his dwelling place and those who live in heaven. 
7 He was given power to make war against the saints and to conquer them. 
And he was given authority over every tribe, people, language and nation. 8 All 
inhabitants of the earth will worship the beast--all whose names have not been 
written in the book of life belonging to the Lamb that was slain from the creation 
of the world. 9 He who has an ear, let him hear.”6 
This biblical text is often interpreted as an apocalyptic description of the state 
which has released itself from its God-given duties and elevated itself to the status 
of a totalitarian entity, a replacement and mimic of God, claiming authority over 
all realms of life. In this case separation of church and state is not a chosen option 
but it is forced upon the church, either by violent oppression or by theological 
reasons. The case of the Confessing Church in Nazi Germany (Barmen Theses, 
1934), of the churches of South Africa under the apartheid (Belhar Confession, 
1982) and a symbolic action of the “Eastern Circle of Friends” in the Soviet Union 
are examples for this situation.7 
Barmen
Facing the development of a totalitarian state under the Nazi regime and a 
movement in Evangelical Church which made an attempt to compromise with 
these claims of the state, the Synod of the “Confessing” Church in Germany, 
convened in Barmen, issued a theological declaration which addressed the 
question of church and state relations. The Barmer Theologische Erklärung 
[ 78 ] László Gonda
describes the question in the following way:  “Scripture tells us that, in the as 
yet unredeemed world in which the Church also exist the State has by divine 
appointment the task of providing for justice and peace.[…] The Church 
acknowledges the benefit of this divine appointment in gratitude and reverence 
before him. … We reject the false doctrine as though the State, over and beyond 
its special commission, should and could become the single and totalitarian 
order thus fulfilling the Church’s vocation as well. We reject the falls doctrine, 
as though the Church, over and beyond its  special commission, should and 
could appropriate the characteristics, the tasks, and the dignity of the state, thus 
becoming an organ of the State”. (Theological Declaration of Barmen,  1934, V.)8 
 The text of the Barmer Confession thus rejects an even partial identification 
of church and state. The text opts for clear distinction of the tasks and realms of 
responsibilities of the church and of the state. It implies that a well-functioning 
state respects these distinctions and when it is not the case, a state can be deemed 
as theologically dysfunctional. In the historical situation of the Nazi dictatorship, 
the leaders of the Confessing Church saw no option as the radical break with 
the state. They opted for voicing a direct and critical prophetic assessment of 
the situation and chose different ways of active and passive resistance. ( e.g. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer opted for engagement in a political action, participating in 
a conspiracy against Adolf Hitler, Karl Barth chose for emigration to Switzerland). 
In this case a theologically motivated separation of church and state took place. 
Belhar
The same attitude can be discovered in the context of the Belhar Confession 
(1986) of the then Dutch Reformed Mission Church of the Republic of South Africa. 
Although the text does not speaks explicitly about the relation of church and state, 
the whole Confession itself witnesses an approach in which the state -  pursuing 
policies of apartheid in that time RSA – is deemed to have abandoned its duty 
as a provider of justice, peace and unity, therefore it is a dysfunctional state. The 
reaction of the church in this particular case is that of exercising prophetic criticism, 
naming the names of the sins of those in power:  “...in the following of Christ the 
church must witness against all the powerful and privileged who selfishly seek their 
own interests and thus control and harm others.” (Belhar Confession (1986), 4.)9 It 
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is known from history that this church did not stop at raising a prophetic voice but 
many members and leaders of it participated actively in the struggle to dismantle 
the apartheid state. In this way the church separated herself theologically – and 
also practically -  from a state which fell in the “category of  Revelation 13”.
Subcarpathia, 1947  
A third example of an ecclesial reaction to a dysfunctional state is the action 
of so-called “Eastern Circle of Friends” in post-WWII Soviet Union. A group of 
Hungarian Reformed pastors came together regularly to share experiences 
and to encourage each other with prayer and Bible study in the ever worsening 
situation  in the region of Subcarpathia (Transcarpathia), that time a part of the 
Soviet Union, now Ukraine.  They called their informal group “Eastern Circle 
of Friends”. These pastors ministered in a triple minority situation: they were 
serving an ethnic Hungarian minority in the Ukrainian society, they were a 
religious minority in an ideologically atheistic state and they were a confessional 
minority in a predominantly Orthodox context. As they observed the multiple 
manifestations of totalitarianism of the Stalinist state, they felt themselves called 
to raise a prophetic warning. In 1947, a group of young pastors wrote a personal 
letter to Stalin, in which they called him to repentance. Two of the ministers 
volunteered to sign the letter with their own names and they handed it personally 
to the KGB, the all-feared secret service of the Soviet Union. “Great Stalin! God 
broke down German fascism by the blood of sons of the Russian nation and 
of other nations. You vindicated even the glory of the victory to yourself. You 
placed yourself in God’s place in every respect. Along vast fields of wheat large 
signs were posted with the boasting text: ‘Without God, without prayer, but by 
chemicalisation and by tractors”. This is why the Lord will humble you, as God 
did with Nebuchadnezzar. Your own sons will despise you. While you still have 
time, turn into yourself and give glory to the majestic God. This will serve also the 
benefit of your people. Haughty Belshazzar was lost overnight together with his 
empire” This letter was signed by Rev. József Zimányi and Rev. Barna Horkay.10 
The group was arrested in the same year and they were sent to forced labour 
camps. They were released after 8 years. It is noteworthy that all of them survived 
and the signers of the letter both lived beyond the fall of the Soviet Union. 
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In this quite simple, and almost childishly naive letter the same pattern 
of thought can be discovered as in the highly elaborated theological texts of 
Barmen and Belhar: if the state abandons its duty to serve the common good, 
the church has no other choice than to express her dissociation from the state 
and separate herself – both theologically and practically – from a dysfunctional 
state. 
As demonstrated above, the separation of church and state cannot be considered 
historically as a “Christian model”: it must be concluded that in most of the 
history of the Christian church there were geographical areas where church and 
state was not separated. There were times - between the fourth and eighteenth 
centuries, thus for 1400 years - when a relative majority of Christians of the globe 
lived in a situation where church and state was either almost identical or were in 
close alliance with each other. However, it is important to note that in the same 
periods of time parallel models existed elsewhere: autochtonous churches lived 
in minority situations in the Muslim world or in India, or, in the form of Nestorian 
communities, even in emperor’s court in Beijing, in medieval China. In these 
cases the separation of the church and state was not a question of choice but it 
was a necessity, caused by the political and religious environment. The same was 
true for the churches of the non-Western world after the global expansion of the 
Christian religion between the 16th and 19th centuries. It is also important to note 
that that the situation of the minority, mission and diaspora churches were – in 
spite of all historical differences – more similar to situation of early Christianity, 
as it is described in the texts of the New Testament – than the situation where 
the church occupied positions of power.   The question can be raised again in 
the context of the von Harnack-Overbeck debate: When both models – the 
alliance of church and state and the (involuntary) separation of church and state 
existed side by side  on the globe,  which of them represented Christianity more 
authentically: the church which infused and transformed all areas of life and 
created a great Jewish-Christian civilisation with all its beautiful architecture, 
literature, art and music, but, in the same time, made use of the authority and the 
power structures of the  state, or the minority churches, which lived separated 
from the state, in a more humble existence similar to the early Christians, but also 
with limited influence to the whole society.      
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In the third part of this paper some recent developments are analysed which 
might play a role in redefining the concept of the separation of church and state 
today. It is argued that institutional separation of church and state is getting 
less and less relevant in the context of postmodern religiosities and that the 
modernist narrative of separation of religion and the public sphere is getting 
inadequate, too. As religion is on the return in many spheres of life, and in new 
formats (community, cathedral, charismatics), the question is raised whether it is 
going to have consequences to the role religion (including Christianity) is going 
to play in the public, political realm. Attempts of a “re-sacralisation” of politics 
shall be demonstrated using the example of present-day Hungarian politics. 
Our concepts of separation of church and state were very much informed 
by the discourse of modernity. Religion was often looked upon as something 
outdated, old-fashioned, which was on the recess and which had a diminishing 
influence on modern, autonomous, “grown-up” humans. But, surprisingly or 
not, religion has “come back” - political sciences often use the symbolic year of 
1979, when the Islamic revolution in Iran took place, when a society on its way 
to Westernisation has turned “back” to a religious political system. There is an 
ongoing debate about the nature and extent of the “come-back” of religion. But 
there seems to be consensus about the fact that it is not a restoration of pre-
Modern religiosities that can be observed. 
In the post-modern world religion is “coming back” in a different shape: instead 
of reviving of traditional religious institutions (like churches) a religiosity has been 
emerging which is personal, subjective, pragmatic, often fluid, fragmented and 
artistic, but which has a general distrust in institutionalisation. According to the 
term coined by Grace Davey and others it is “believing without belonging”11 which, 
in the case of Christianity, takes shape in forms like “community”, “cathedral” 
and “Charismatics”. As people tend to seek and exercise religion outside of the 
institution of the church, the question can be raised whether the discourse of 
modernity about the separation of church and state is legitimate today.  Is it not 
the case that institutional separation is getting rather irrelevant, if religiosity 
takes place “elsewhere” in the public domain? In the public domain indeed, as 
postmodern religiosity does not function any more according to the dichotomy 
of facts and values. As the border between the empirical and the imaginary is 
getting more fluid and as the very concept of “fact” becomes epistemologically 
dubious, religious convictions, world-views or spiritual talk becomes “normality” 
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(again?) on the public fora.  This raises another question: whether we are about 
to experience a paradigm shift in the way religion, including Christianity would 
play a public role. It seems likely that the emphasis may shift from institutions to 
personal religious convictions of political  actors. All these may result in a new 
phenomenon regarding the problem of separation of church and state: it may 
be described as a post-post-Constantinian religious set-up. More than 1700 years 
after the Edict of Milan attempts of re-sacralisation of the public life might be 
observed. 
The political life of present-day Hungary may serve as an example here. The 
present government – not independently from a publicised personal religious 
conversion of the prime minister – has undertaken a large scale support program 
of churches: church buildings are renovated, a very high amount of formerly public 
schools are handed over to (Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed, Baptist) churches, 
institutions of social care are either transferred to churches or it is encouraged 
and financially supported to establish new church-owned social institutions. In 
one of the most secularised countries of Europe this cannot even be explained 
by an attempt to gain votes. The philosophy behind this is different: the political 
leadership in charge of the government is convinced that the future of the 
country largely depends on the mental condition of the population. Therefore 
the infusion of a deeply secularised society with Christian values belongs to their 
political strategy. According to the rhetoric of the Hungarian government, the 
churches are not expected to do anything else than to fulfil their own mission and 
the state expects that by this the mental condition of the people would improve. 
This intentional “re-sacralisation” of the society does not fit into the pattern of 
the post-Constantinian, modernist concept of the separation of the church and 
state.   It is often argued in Hungary these days that the church and state are 
constitutionally separated but the church and the society should not be.    
The scene is more complicated than this, of course. As Philip Jenkins in 
his brilliant book on the religious trends in Europe12 demonstrates, next to 
postmodern religiosities, the growing presence of Christian churches from non-
Western cultures (because of the phenomenon of global migration) add up to 
this picture as well, just as the much-debated problem of the growth of religious 
fundamentalism. 
In the fourth and final chapter of the paper some remarks are made to the 
question of the separation of the church and state today, in the light of the 
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concept of the ‘citizenship in the heavens”  and of the lack of God’s image in the 
Holy of Holies in the Temple of Jerusalem. 
Citizenship in the Heaven 
In Philippians 3,20 the New Testament refers to the image of a veteran city in the 
Roman Empire, of which Philippi was one. The inhabitants of these veteran cities 
lived in different parts of the empire, but their citizenship was Roman. They lived 
in a city in a far-off province as if they were living in Rome – with the necessary 
adaptations. The letter to the Philippians says that “...our citizenship is in heaven”. 
/ ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει.13   According to this image, the 
centre of belonging, the point of reference and orientation of the Christian 
church is not “here”, it is “elsewhere”.  The authentic model of the presence of the 
Christian church in this world is that of a pilgrim, who belongs to elsewhere and 
who is under way towards a goal which is yet not in her possession. It is ecclesia 
viatorum – the church on its way, or as the new mission statement of the  WCC 
puts it: “church on the move”14. A church with a citizenship in heaven has got no 
fixed centre here on Earth, it is oriented toward something which is “not there”, it 
is in “heaven”. The centre is empty, it is left open, because if anything – a political 
concept, ideology or person -  would fill it, it would occupy and thus substitute 
the Kingdom of God – which is not yet here in its full consummation. 
The Hungarian Reformed systematic theologian Ervin Vályi-Nagy proposed, 
too, that in the light of the “emptiness” of the Holy of Holies of the Temple, the 
church can never bind herself to any political system in order to “sacralise” it. 
“Our relationship to politics, to the public institutions of any time cannot 
suffice in a blind obedience to authorities, as if they were the earthly representatives 
of God. No!  Authorities (at least in modern democracies, thus in “normal cases”) 
are elected and authorised by humans; they are not divine but a very human 
institutions. They can legitimately count on our responsible cooperation for the 
sake of the common good.  However, our political engagement cannot be a fanatic 
commitment to one or other movements or party programs. We are committed to 
God and to people, committed to their eternal salvation, to their earthly well-being, 
in freedom and in relative independence.  We do not wish to and we must not to 
keep pace with politics, neither as a trailer of it nor as a revolutionary avant-garde. 
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We need to fulfil our Christian task, in “unreliable”, not unconditional, temporary 
alliance sometimes with this and sometimes with that movement. We are free and 
we want to keep the space free for the coming of the Kingdom of God, we want to 
prevent it from sacralisation. This is our specific responsibility”.15
 The church is thus always in a temporary alliance with the state, constantly 
analysing its functioning in the light of “models” of Romans 13 and of Relevation 
13 and reserving to herself the right of prophetic criticism on the issues of justice 
and human dignity, with a reference to God as the highest instance, who cannot 
be captured by political or religious concepts. God is always totally different. In 
Christological terms: The incarnational, kenotic way of Christ’s presence in the 
world must be taken into consideration together with the belief that all authority 
is given to Christ on heaven and earth. The church lives in this escathological 
assurance, according to the life of Christ, as pilgrim people towards the fullness 
of Life. That is why the church is always alien to the context of her time, although 
it is present in it with full commitment to service in solidarity. The separation 
of church and state is not a political concept but an ecclesiological necessity in 
Christian theology: it belongs to the nature and mission of the church.  
By way of conclusion let the words of the Lutheran theologian Trutz Rendtorff 
lead us in our further reflections about the future role of Christianity. Rendtorff speaks 
about Europe here but his words may apply to a global context, too: “Christianity 
can contribute to the future of Europe with renewing the truth, which is this: God is 
not represented in strength and power, God is not to be worshipped in ruling and 
in authority, but by recognising humanity, which is based on mutual respect and 
which respects what was the beginning of Christianity in a secular way: that God 
is merciful and that God dwelt among humans as a friend of the people. This is the 
criteria according to which one can measure to what extent Europe is Christian.”16
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Part II
Critical Theological Thinking  
about Communism,  
Colonization and Totalitarianism

Jaeshik Shin
Introduction 
Korean Protestant Church is one of the youngest churches in the history of 
Christianity. Korean Protestant Church, however, with Korean Catholicism, has 
been one of the most dynamic churches during the second half of 20th century. 
Since the introduction of Catholicism in 1784 and of Protestantism in 1884, 
Christianity has grown up continuously and become the largest religion in 
Korea with over eleven million members and about 28 percent of the Korean 
population in a variety of denominations. Considering the comparatively short 
history of Korean Protestantism, the process of its growth could be viewed as a 
unique success in the history of Christianity.
Many discussions and researches have been investigated the factors of the 
growth with its characteristics in Korean Protestantism, from various perspectives. 
There have been some key terms to present the features of Korean Protestantism, 
such as conservatism, anti-communism, pro-America, growth-oriented ministry, 
the Gospel of prosperity, and so on. Some of those terms are related to the 
contexts of Korean Protestantism, and the others reflect its contents. The former 
and the latter could be regarded as the external and the internal factors of Korean 
Protestantism. The aim of this paper is to describe some characteristics of Korean 
Protestantism in relation to the external context of Korean Protestantism. That 
Communism, Capitalism, 
Conservatism and 
Consumerism in the 
Korean Protestantism
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is, some characteristics of Korean Protestantism will be delineated with the pair 
relationship between the external factor and the internal one.
To achieve the goal of this paper, the writer will choose four key words: 
Communism, Capitalism, Conservatism, and Consumerism. Communism and 
Capitalism have powerfully influenced on the formation of Korean Protestantism 
directly and indirectly. These two terms, Communism and Capitalism, represent 
the external factors which have paved the way to growth of Korean Protestantism. 
The other two words, Conservatism and Consumerism are other pair of internal 
factors which connote the features of Korean Protestantism. The writer will 
deal with two pairs for describing the characteristics of Korean Protestantism 
respectively: Communism and Conservatism, and Capitalism and Consumerism. 
The relation between two terms in each pair could be considered as that of 
‘selective affinity’ in a Weberian context.
With these external and internal factors in Korean Protestantism, another term, 
megachurch, is selected to draw the features of Korean Protestantism. During 
the rapid growth of Koran Protestantism, many megachurches have emerged 
and become a symbol of Korean Protestantism. Megachurches in Korea could 
be categorized into two types according to their emerging contexts: a refugee 
megachurch and an urban migrator megachurch. These two types of megachurch 
are consonant to two pairs of external and internal factors, respectively. 
The first type of megachurches was resulted from some established churches 
by refugees from North Korea between 1945 and 1950. In this type of megachurch, 
an ideological anti-communism and theological-political conservatism were 
linked together and enforced to each other. The second type of megachurches 
had emerged during the period of economic development from 1960s to 1990s. 
As the Korean economy has been incorporated into global capitalism, a rapid 
migration from rural to urban area happened on a massive scale. New migrators 
from rural areas contributed to the increase their memberships of new emerging 
megachurches. Those megachurches became a bearer of the spirit of capitalism 
and consumerism, embodying the business-oriented structure and operation, 
and proclaiming the material success and consuming the blessing, so called, the 
gospel of prosperity. Youngnak Church and the Yoido Full Gospel Church are the 
representatives of two types of megachurches, respectively.1
This paper consists of three main sections to describe the some features of 
Korean Protestantism. Following this introduction, the geography of Korean 
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religions is depicted in the second section, in which the transitional status of 
Korean Protestantism is exposed in relation to other religious traditions. The 
section three will deal with the ‘communism and conservatism’ in its formation of 
the first type of megachurches in Korea. The section four, entitled, ‘capitalism and 
consumerism’ examines the features of Korean Protestantism during the period 
of industrialization with a second type of megachurches. Finally, a Summary and 
prospect are described as a conclusion.
The Geography of Korean Protestantism:  
Past and Present
Current Religious Landscape in Korea
Korea has been a religious pluralistic society, which is a mixture of very different 
backgrounds: Shamanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, and other religious 
traditions. Shamanism, as a native religion, has lasted for 5,000 years in Korean 
history. Even Buddhism and Confucianism were both imported religions, they had 
been extremely influential in ancient times as a national religion for 1,000 years and 
500 years respectively. Considering those religions in Korean history, Christianity has 
a rather short history: Catholicism has 230 years and Protestantism 130 years.
 Compare to the Western society in which Christianity once had been a 
dominant religion and is still functioning as a major influential religion, there is no 
major religious group in Korean society. Even though Christianity and Buddhism 
are two major religious groups alongside Confucian morals and Shamanistic 
traditions in Korea, more than half of Koreans have no religious affiliation.
According to 2015 statistics compiled by the Korean government, 56.9 percent 
of Korean has no formal membership in a religious organization. Only 43 percent 
of Korean express that they associated themselves with a certain religion.2 
Within the religious people, there is a dominance of Protestantism, Buddhism, 
and Catholicism. The census shows that 19.7 percent of the population (about 9.7 
millions) belongs to Protestantism, 15.5 percent to Buddhism (7.6 millions), and 
7.9 percent to the Catholic Church (3.9 millions). The rest adheres to various new 
religious movements including Won Buddhism, Cheondoism, and Jeungsando.
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Religion
1950-1962 1985 1995
Number % Number % Number %
Christianity 5-8% 8,352,000 20.7% 11,390,000 26.0%
Protestantism 2-8% 6,487,000 16.1% 8,505,000 19.4%
Catholicism 2.2% 1,865,000 4.6% 2,885,000 6.6%
Buddhism 2.6% 8,059,000 19.9% 10,154,000 23.2%
Other 92.4% 2.1% 1.2%
No Religion 57.3% 49.6%
Religion
Christianity
Protestantism
Catholicism
Buddhism
Other
No Religion
<Table 1>Demographic trends of the main religions in South Korea, per censuses3
The results of 2015 census show a changing landscape of Korean religions. Some 
features of 2015 census could be summarized as follows: with the loss of about 3 
million members Buddhism became a second largest religion in Korea followed 
by Protestantism; Korean Catholicism has lost about 1.1 million members and 
stopped its rapid growth between 1995 and 2005; Korean Protestantism has 
gained about 1.2 million new members after 2005 census. Since the introduction 
of Catholicism in 1784, followed by the arrival of Protestant missionaries in 1884, 
Christianity has proceeded to become the largest religion in Korea.
One of the notable features of 2015 census was against an expected 
anticipation in general: the continuous stagnation of Buddhism, the rapid 
declination of Protestantism, and the rapid growth of Catholicism. Before 2015 
census, Korean government had carried out the census every 5 years. The census 
had showed the shifting of each religion in Korea during the last 20 year (1985-
2005). In particular, the years between 1995 and 2005 turned up the appearance 
2005 2015
Number % Number %
13,461,000 29.2% 13,566,000 27.6%
8,446,000 18.2% 9,676,000 19.7%
5,015,000 10.8% 3,890,000 7.9%
10,588,000 22.8% 7,619,000 15.5%
1%
- 47.1% - 56.1%
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of the changing religious geography in Korea. During the above period, the 
growth of Buddhism is 3.9 percent, while that of Protestantism was -1.6 percent, 
and the number of Catholics increased 74.4 percent. Considering the population 
had increased 5.6 percent, in fact, Buddhism had stagnated, Protestantism had 
declined, and Catholicism had rapidly rushed upward. For Korean Protestantism, 
the crisis was evidently reflected on the 2005 census.
There have been a few different interpretations on the unexpected shift of 
religious demography depicted in 2015 census. Two factors need to be considered 
in relation to 2015 census. The one is a census method. Until 2005 census, every 
census was a complete enumeration. However 2015 census was a partial survey 
in which only 20 percent of population was selected as a sampling household. 
Moreover, 48.6 percent of sampling survey responded via internet. The different 
method of census, which favors to young generation, could cause an unexpected 
result of religious trends in Korea. Even though 2015 census shows the growth 
of Protestantism, Korean Protestant congregations have lost their memberships 
continuously. Many Korean Protestants, considered themselves as Christians, 
have left local congregations and won’t join the regular worship on Sunday. 
A research in 2017 shows that those unchurched Protestants is 19.8 percent of 
Korean Protestantism. The number of unchurched Protestants is about 2 million 
and its percentage has increased from 10.4 percent in a 2012 survey.4
The Changing Landscape of Korean Protestantism: Growth and Stagnation
In 1900, Korean Christians was only one percent of the population.5 As Protestant 
missionaries had played a significant role in the modernization of Korea, they 
had achieved a remarkable success in the growth of its memberships. They 
established schools, universities, hospitals, and orphanages. During the early 
20th century, Christianity, with their wide spectrum of missionary activities and 
programs, was identified with modernization and social reform. Presbyterian 
missionaries were especially successful over the 20th century.6 Another historical 
factor for the growth of Korean Protestantism is that Christianity is not a religion 
of imperialism but that of liberation. In neighboring countries, such as Japan and 
China, which have the smaller numbers of Protestants, Christianity is the religion 
of imperialism and that of enemy.
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Since the early 1960s, when Korean Christians scarcely topped the one million 
mark, the number of Christians, particularly Protestants, has increased faster 
than in any other country, doubling every decade. Korean Protestantism grew 
exponentially in the 1970s and 1980s, and despite slower growth in the 1990s, 
caught up to and then surpassed Buddhism in its number. There are 100,000 
pastors, over 60,000 churches and about 9 million Protestants making the South 
Korean church one of the most vital and dynamic in the world. 
As can be seen from the below table and diagram, the quantitative growth 
of Protestantism continued since the Korean War, greatly increased in the 1960s, 
reached its summit in the late part of 1970s, decreased in the 1980s, and was 
discontinued after the mid-1990s.7
Year Total Population Protestants(rise/fall) Percent to Total 
Population
1950 20,188,641(1949) 500,198*
1960 24,989,241 623,072* 1,524,158(+)
1970 31,435,252 3,192,621*
1980 37,046,815 7,180,627**
1985 40,419,652 6,489,282 16%
1995 44,553,710 8,760,336 (+35%) 19.7%
2005 47,041,434 8,616,438 (-1.6%) 18.3%
<Table 2> The Numerical Change of Korean Protestants (1950-2005)8
During the entire thirty years between 1960 and 1990, the number of Protestant 
churches had increased seven times. The rate of increase by ten-year unit was 
175 percent between 1960 and 1970, 65 percent between 1970 and 1980, and 
about 69 percent between 1980 and 1990.9 During those periods, the increasing 
ratio of Korea Protestants has been greater than that of churches. This implies 
that, during the process of quantitative growth, many Korean Protestants had 
concentrated into some individual congregations in metro-Seoul area. During 
the 1970s and 1980s those large numbers of churches became a group of mega-
churches. In February 1993, Christian World reported that there were five Korean 
Protestant churches within the ten largest churches, and twenty three churches 
belonged to fifty largest churches in the world: Yoido Full Gospel Church is the 
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largest one. South Korea had the third highest percentage of Christians in East 
Asia or Southeast Asia, following the Philippines and East Timor.
Korean Protestantism, however, could not enjoy its palmy days. After 
the mid-1980s, it had grown slowly, and in the 1990s Protestantism in Korea 
stopped its growth. The Protestantism in Korea is heavily dominated by four 
denominations: Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, and Pentecostals. These 
major denominations were not the exception of the stagnation. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, Korean Protestantism had fully mobilized its whole capacity, such as, 
human power, financial resources, and media, for church growth. Even though 
the material resources mobilized by Korean Protestantism for evangelism and 
mission had overwhelmed other competitive religions, mainly Catholicism and 
Buddhism, the growth of Korean Protestantism couldn’t meet its expectation. It 
was 1990s when “the discourse of crisis” was raised both inside and outside of 
Korean Protestantism. 
Then what made Korean Protestantism decline or stagnation? Usually, factors 
contributing to the growth of Korean Protestantism have been presented in two 
aspects: outside and inside factors of church. The former are socio-economic, 
political, and religious context, and the latter are all kinds of movements and 
programs within the Korean Protestantism for church growth. The declination 
and/or stagnation of Korean Protestantism would not be fully explained with 
outside factors of the church, because the other Korean religions had experienced 
the growth or stagnation differently under the same socio-economic and political 
situation during the same period. If the outside factors are not decisive, then the 
authentic factors of Protestant’s decline/stagnation had been laid in the inside 
of Protestantism. From the early 1990s, there have been growing criticisms on 
the Korean Protestantism, especially its credibility and morality, for Protestants’ 
unethical behaviors, aggressive attitudes toward non-Protestants, secularization, 
commercialization, growth-oriented ministry, and so on. Korea Protestantism 
faces harsh criticism that it has lost its spirituality, morality, commitment, and the 
awareness of community. This negative evaluation and the mistrust of Korean 
Protestantism are empirically confirmed by various polls which were carried out 
by the Korean National Association of Christian Pastors, Gallup Korea and the 
Christian Ethics Movement.10 The issue of credibility is the key factor which could 
explain the root of the declination in Korean Protestantism.11
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Communism and Conservatism  
The Refugee Protestants from North Korea
Now we turn into our concern to the detailed contexts and its contents of Korean 
Protestantism in accordance with two stages of its history. Anti-communism 
and conservatism are the most distinctive features of Korean Protestantism. Of 
course, since Korean War, anti-communism has been a key dominant ideology in 
Korea, but the tendency of anti-communism in Korean Protestantism has been 
much more tense and stronger than other areas or groups in Korean society. 
It is generally said that the conservative attitude in Korean Protestantism was 
introduced by the early Western missionaries, especially by the missionaries from 
the US.12 The fusion of religious conservatism and ideological anti-communism 
had happened and reinforced in the context of modern history in Korea, especially 
after the liberation from Japanese occupation. Regarding the anti-communism 
and conservatism of Korean Protestants, two factors need to be considered: 
Protestant refugees from the Northwestern part of Korea, and the Korean War. 
After the World War II, the allied occupied and divided Korea into two parts 
in 1945: the American-occupied South and the Soviet-occupied North. After the 
occupation forces pulled out, in 1948 two governments were established both 
in South and North. In Seoul, Rhee Syngman, an American-educated Methodist, 
became the first president of the Republic of Korea under sponsorship of the 
United Nations. In Pyeongyang, Kim Il Sung, a Soviet-trained military officer, 
took charge of the communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. By 1948, 
Protestants in North Korea had been shattered and major churches and the 
Christian institutions of Pyeongyang had been experienced great difficulties and 
persecution. The communist government had been opposed to the Christianity 
and its links to ‘imperialism.’ Leading Christians in North Korea had been arrested 
and some had been missing. The communist ruling in North Korea led to a mass 
exodus of Protestants to South Korea. This mass exodus has drawn the radical 
shift of the Protestant demography and landscape in Korea. 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Korean Protestant churches 
in the Northwestern part of Korea had grown rapidly and the area became a 
heart of Korean Protestantism.13 Before this massive exodus to South, more 
than half of total Korean Protestants had stayed in the northern half of the 
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Korea. Especially Pyeongyang, the center of Northwestern part of Korea, had 
been called the Jerusalem of Korea. The Presbyterian Seminary, Pyeongyang 
Theological Seminary, was opened in Pyeongyang in 1901. The first meeting 
of the All-National Presbytery was held in Pyeongyang in 1907. Among the first 
seven Korean ordained pastors all but a missionary to Jeju Island, were placed 
in the North-western part in the same year. Also the inaugural meeting of the 
General Assembly was held in Pyeongyang in 1921. The number of Presbyterians 
in Northwestern area was about 40 percent of Korean Presbyterians in 1910.14
When the Protestants from the Northwestern part of Korea came to South 
Korea, they accounted for about one-third of Protestant in South Korea. Due 
to their experience of communism in North Korea, they were already military 
anti-communists, and became a major background and a vanguard of right 
wings after Liberation period in South Korea. The Korean War exacerbated this 
tendency and hardened forever the enmity of Christians for the communist 
regime in North Korea. Many Christians in areas occupied by communist troops 
were often killed and other Christians were captured and taken away forcibly to 
North Korea during the Korean War.15
After the massive Protestant refugees arrived in Seoul,16 they were filled with 
the passion for establishing their churches. There had been about 2,000 newly 
established Protestant churches in South Korea, about 90 percent of which were 
organized by the refugee Protestants from North Korea during the ten years 
after the Korean War. Some churches, founded by refugee ministers with other 
Protestants from North Korea, had become megachurches. The representative 
megachurches established by refugee ministers are Youngnak Church, 
Chunghyeon Presbyterian Church, Somang Church, and Gwangrim Methodist 
Church. Those newly established churches became the core of conservative 
rightwing movement and anti-communism in South Korea. Moreover, this group 
of refugee ministers has formulated and influenced on the conservative tendency 
in Korean Protestantism during the second half of twentieth century in Korea.
The Formation of Conservative Anti-Communism in Korean Protestantism
Those Protestant churches and their memberships from North Korea had 
acquired and monopolized the religious hegemony and power in South Korea 
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with the support, protection and cooperation of United States Army Military 
Government in Korea (USAMGIC, here after the US military government). The 
US military government and the Korean rightwing conservative Protestants 
from North Korea engaged to each other. The US military government preferred 
them, because they were the pro-American Christian elites who studied in the 
US and had the experiences of anti-communist struggles. They were provided 
a lot of privilege from the US military government and from the following Rhee 
Syngman’s government.17
Moreover, the returning missionaries from the USA were paternalistic at times 
and they were important to Protestant churches as supporters and protectors. 
The Korean War further increased the dependence the church on foreign 
assistance. Under the strong patronage of the American Protestant missionaries 
some of whom had served in the US military government in Seoul, the Protestant 
church, especially Presbyterian churches could easily enjoy an exclusive privilege. 
They obtained real estate that had been abandoned by the Japanese for building 
church and were disposed of confiscated Japanese property for establishing 
Protestants institution.
After its occupation, the US military government mobilized extreme rightists, 
especially North Korean refugees. The rightwing extremists interrogated, 
violated, and killed ordinary people under the pretext of a “Red Hund.” Among 
the most notorious rightist groups, which took the lead in campaigns against 
communist, was the Northwest Youth Association (Seobuk Chyungnyunheo), 
named for the area where most of its members hailed from. The association was 
formed in November 1946 and dissolved in December 1948.18 Its membership 
totaled about 300,000. It is noteworthy that the core members of the Northwest 
Youth Association were belongs to Youngnak church.
Youngnak Church is one of the representative Protestant churches in Korea. It 
was the model of the first type of Korean megachurch, of which major members 
were conservative refugees from North Korea, and has been the heart of anti-
communism after its foundation. It started by Han Kyung-chik in 1945 with 27 
refugees, including his old church members from North Korea.19 They became 
the core group of the Youngnak congregation. In 1946 Han got the permission 
of the US military government to use the confiscated property of the Shinto sect 
of Tenrikyo for building his church. The growth of the church membership was 
about 10 percent per year, and despite the continual establishment of subsidiary 
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“daughter’ congregations in metro-Seoul area. In 1965, Youngnak Church 
became the first megachurch in Korea with its 10,000 members and finally 60,000 
members. Han Kyung-chik, an alumnus of Princeton Theological Seminary, had 
been supported by the Presbyterian Church of USA. Han’s leadership within the 
Korean Protestantism had lasted more than three decades.
Youngnak Church and Han Kyung-chik is a typical of Korean conservative 
Protestantism in several ways. Han’s theology is conservative, stressing the 
will and power of God, the sinful state of human, the salvation of individuals 
through grace and redemption through Christ (i.e., being “born again”), and the 
communion of believers. His sermons focused on the Bible and on the Christian 
life as a spiritual state. The major concern of churches was on caring individual 
members and on involving them in network of fellowship and mutual support 
within the church, rather than on involving socio-political issues outside of the 
church.
The refugee Protestants from North Korea has been the most conservative 
group, theologically and politically, in Korea. As they acquired a religious and 
political power after Liberation and the Korean War period, their influence 
on Korean society has been stronger and stronger. The pro-government 
conservative ministers organized the Presidential National Prayer Breakfast in 
1968 for the military dictator, Park Junghee. During 1970s and 1980s, a leading 
refugee ministers organized mega-scale interdenominational crusades, which 
made a great contribution of the growth of Protestantism in Korea, with the wide 
cooperation and strong support of the military government. Anti-communism 
had been one of the key agenda of those mega-scale crusades. Among the 
mega-scale crusades were: the Billy Graham Crusade in 1973; the Explo Crusade 
in 1974; The National Crusade 1977; and the Mission Centenary Crusade in 1984. 
As the membership of conservative churches had increased, the conservative 
Protestants had become the majority of Korean Protestantism.  
As an overwhelming majority, the conservative Protestants had criticized 
the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) which had led the Christian 
democratization movement during the military dictator’s regime. When NCCK 
adopted the “Korean Churches’ Statement on Peace and Reunification of the 
Korean Peninsula” (the so-called 88 Statement) in 198820, the refugee minister 
group, including Han Kyung-chik, organized the Christian Council of Korea (CCK) in 
1989, which became the largest conservative church organization and the center 
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of anti-communism until 2010s. CCK had its primary concern on evangelization 
and on criticizing the human rights and democratization movement of the NCCK. 
Theological and ideological conservatism in Korean Protestantism has a 
strong relationship with anti-communism. Conservatism and anti-communism 
had amalgamated within the special historical trajectory, that is, Liberation from 
Japanese occupation, the division of Korea, and the Korean War. The fusion of 
religion and ideology had been intensified when the conservative refugee 
Protestants from North Korea had a religious power and hegemony in Korea 
Protestantism. Anti-communism and conservatism in Korean Protestantism are 
twinborn in the historical context of modern Korea. 
Capitalism and Consumerism
Urban Migrators from Rural Area 
Capitalism and Consumerism could be other twin characteristics of Korean 
Protestantism. After taking power through a military coup d’etat in 1961, Park 
Junghee’s military government regime powerfully drove an industrialization 
policy. This policy changed the industrial structure, and resulted in decreasing 
the rural and agricultural population and increasing the urban population. While 
the urban population accounted for 28 percent of the total population in 1960s, 
it increased to 74.4 percent in 1990, more than doubling.21 This massive migration 
in turn caused problems and brought about many negative effects. The gap 
between the rich and the poor became more noticeable and social anarchy 
ensued. It also resulted in creating large slum areas around cities. Moreover 
traditional extended family structure had been dissolved and destroyed. Many 
migrators from rural areas felt rootless and longed for intimate communal 
support.
Korean Protestant churches could have gradually speeded up its growth 
with this shifting socio-economic context. The process of the industrialization 
provided a great opportunity for the growth of Protestant churches, because it 
was accompanied by the rapid and massive migration from rural to urban area. 
Korean Protestant churches promoted evangelistic activities and church planting 
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in urban areas, and new suburbs mushroomed around the metro-Seoul area. 
The migrators from rural area were the large numbers of potential congregants 
for local churches. The Protestant churches provided a sense of community for 
urban migrators uprooted from rural hometowns. 
Two notable phenomena could be observed at the core of the rapid growth 
of Korean Protestantism in the period between the 1960s and the 1980s, “the 
period of developmental dictatorship.” The one is the Pentecostal-type of 
worship and preaching, popularized by Cho Yonggi, which had a great vogue 
within Korean Protestantism. The other notable result of church growth in Korea 
is the emergence of many megachurches. In early 21th century, among the fifty 
largest churches in the world, twenty three of them were in Korea. There were 
fifteen mega-churches, each of which has more than then thousands adult 
congregational members. Denominationally, the world’s largest Pentecostal, 
Presbyterian, Methodist, and Baptist churches are all found in Korea.22 Most 
megachurches in Korea had shared the Pentecostal-charismatic tendency in 
worship and preaching. The growth of church up to the megachurch size has 
become the pursuing goal of ministry that most Korean medium or small-sized 
churches have been looking for. 
Those megachurches became a bearer and a subject of capitalism and 
consumerism, embodying the business-oriented structure and operation, and 
proclaiming the material success and consuming the blessing, so called, the 
gospel of prosperity. The Yoido Full Gospel Church is a representative of the 
second type of Korean megachurch. However, it is not just a typical model of 
the second type, but rather a leading engine of capitalistic and materialistic 
Protestant church in Korea.23 The Yoido Full Gospel Church started in a slum in 
Seoul with 5 members in 1958. Its membership grew to 600 in 1961; 3,000 in 1964; 
18,000 in 1973; 100,000 in 1979; 200,000 in 1980; 500,000 in 1985; 700,000 in 1992, 
and 755,000 in 2007.24 The growth had been exponential ever since, and it became 
a largest congregation in the world. What is the worth of notice is that the growth 
rate accelerated after the church moved into Yoido in 1973, where government 
development plan started in 1967. With the massive apartment complexes nearby, 
the Yoido Full Gospel Church became a church for middle-class.
The founding pastor Cho Yonggi appealed to Korean with the promise of 
spiritual salvation, physical healing, material blessings and prosperity in their life 
here and now. The church slogan is from the second verse of the third epistle of 
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John: “Beloved, I pray that all may go well with you and that you may be in health; 
I know that it is well with your soul.” This leads to the “triple-meter faith” in riches 
of the spirit, of the body, and in possessions. Much of the praying focuses on daily 
problems, and daily problems invariably involve money. Indeed, Cho’s message 
is one that stresses God’s material blessings in the present life. His message 
addressed exactly what the urban populace desired during the process of 
economic development. Cho’s preaching, promising God’s blessings in material 
terms, was often criticized that he offered a cheap faith and grace. Even though 
Cho’s message was entangled in the controversy over heresy, his materialized 
gospel offers irresistible attractions for the emerging middle-class Korean. With 
the remarkable growth of the Yoido Full gospel Church, many conservative 
pastors began to take the church’s worship service and its method of ministry 
as a model and accepted Pentecostal theology irrespective of the theological 
tradition of their own denomination. Finally Cho and his church have become a 
paragon in Korean Protestantism. 
The Gospel of Prosperity in Korean Capitalistic Church-ism
Those newly emerged megachurches shares some common characteristics: 
the location of the church in the midst of apartment complexes, an individual 
church system in its structure, and the gospel of prosperity in its message. First 
of all, the second type of megachurch had emerged in those new urban resident 
areas. Most emerging megachurches in the second stage were established in or 
moved into newly constructed resident areas and urban towns. The residence 
of the new town was usually consisted of several apartment complexes, which 
were a new potential market for Korean Protestantism. Being located amidst or 
near a few apartment complexes, the churches easily attracted and absorbed 
the residents of apartment complexes, who were move from rural areas or an old 
resident area in Seoul. 
Most megachurches of the second type, such as The Yoido Full Gospel Church, 
Somang Church, Myungsung Church, Gwangrim Methodist Church and so on, 
were founded within the apartment complexes newly planned resident areas. 
Even some of the first type of megachurches, of which refugees from North 
Korea were the majority, i.e., Chunghyeon Church, moved its church to newly 
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planned apartment complexes. However, some first type megachurches, such as 
Youngnak Church and Seamunan Church, which did not move to a new resident 
area, had stopped its growth, as the church members moved to new resident 
areas. With its stagnation or declination of its membership, the first type of 
megachurch has continuously lost its influence on the Korean Protestantism and 
Korean society. The emerging megachurches within apartment complexes have 
replaced the status of first type of megachurch, and finally became a symbol of 
the Korean Protestantism with Minjung churches.25
Another feature of Korean Protestant church could be described as so-called 
an individual church system. Contrary to an ‘empire-church system’, and a ‘state-
church system’, in an individual church system, each congregation exercises the 
administrative rights in the process of personnel management, financial affairs, 
the formation of organization, and so on. In Korean Protestant church, especially 
in most megachurches, this individual church system has closely related with a 
charismatic leadership of church founder, and the Nevius method for economic 
self-sufficiency. Korean megachurches are resulted from the amalgamation of a 
selective affinity among those three factors.
Most megachurches accompany a strong leader orientation in each 
congregation whose loyalty to the pastor usually exceeds loyalty to the organized 
denomination. Most Korean Protestant churches are, even they are denominational 
churches, are actually congregational rather than denominational, focused on 
local congregational concerns rather than on denomination-wide projects, or 
issues of concern to society as whole. At the heart of an individual church, the 
primary concern is on its membership and its budget.
It is said that this kind of the autonomy of individual church in Korea is partly 
the result of conscious missionary policies, especially the Nevius method. The 
Nevius method is a program to foster self-propagation, self-government and 
self-support.26 Of course, there are some arguments on the role of the Nevius 
method in the growth of Korean Protestantism, the Nevius method is credited for 
one of the main factors in spreading an individual church tendency throughout 
Korea. Ahn indicates this aspect as follows: 
The tendency of the Nevius Method to equate economic self-sufficiency with 
ecclesiological autonomy, or ecclesiastical success, paved the way to a kind of 
plutocracy of the Korean church. On the one hand, church leadership, particularly 
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eldership, gradually became equated with the status of affluence and influence. On 
the other hand, in many cases, the church satisfied itself with the achievement of 
economic independence, showing centripetal tendency, which was disinterested 
in the neighboring society.27
Ahn also adds that early missionaries from the United States had the capitalism-
oriented attitudes, based on the Ryu’s argument.28 He considers that the early 
version of the gospel of prosperity had already appeared in the early years of 
Korean Christianity. These arguments connote that Korean Protestantism already 
faced with the characteristic of capitalism in the pre-Liberation years.
This individual church system inspires an egoistic local church-ism and leads 
the competition among Protestant churches. They tried to build church building 
as large and grand as possible to compete with newly built neighborhoods. 
They also developed bureaucratic system to earn better efficiency, and used 
the best technology to control the spirituality of the people, such as closed-
circuit television service, Internet broadcasting station, satellite service and 
so on. Several megachurches expanded their territories by establishing 
daughter churches, charitable organizations, hospitals, educational institutions, 
newspapers, radio stations, cable channel broadcasting systems, both within 
and outside Korea. This kind of multi-tentacle approach is considered as the 
duplication of the business models of chaebol which is family-run corporate 
and super-national conglomerates in Korea. The prosperity and dynamism of 
megachurches are regard as special gifts to their congregations, and achieved by 
the ability of charismatic founding pastors. Under the individual church system, 
many megachurch pastors had practiced or will carry out heredity like a church 
as a private property. The megachurch pastor is not a pastor of a congregation 
but rather a CEO of business enterprise.
Finally, the Korean Protestantism has been addicted by the gospel of 
prosperity. During the process of industrialization, the military government 
pursued the economic agenda at the expense of the political goal. Even Korean 
Protestantism could not exempt from the tsunami of capitalism. Rather than 
rejecting capitalism, Korean Protestant churches aggressively accepted its spirit 
and system. The majority of the church had been in line with the government’s 
policy of economic growth, focusing on church growth. With the remarkable 
economic growth, the status of capitalism became more rock-solid. 
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After finishing the period of industrialization, Korean Protestantism 
consolidated its characteristic as a middle-class church. As a capitalized middle-
class church, there were some favorite commodities in Korean Protestantism: 
The studies of church growth, positive thinking and the theology of success. 
The studies of church growth, conducted by Donald McGavran at the Fuller 
Theological Seminary were developed further by Peter Wagner. Also Robert 
Schuller’s and Joel Osteen’s positive thinking had been introduced and consumed 
with Korean Protestant pastors. The church became a trendy religious institution, 
and consumerism stole into the church, most notably in megachurches. 
Megachurches, addicted with the message of health and wealth, are capitalistic 
entities covered with religious costumes. The gospel of prosperity was polished 
up into the gospel of blessed affluence. Each megachurch sells the gospel of 
prosperity and its own church as a brand. The size of church is understood as an 
evidence of success and God’s grace. Church members consume the convenience 
and comfort from a megachurch with its brand. In the religious market, “religious 
institutions became consumer commodities.”29 As the Korean economy has 
been absorbed into global capitalism, the Korean Protestant churches become a 
bearer of capitalistic consumerism.
Conclusion
We have some characteristics of Korean Protestantism with three main sections. 
In section two, the growth of Korean Protestantism with a brief description of 
religious landscape in Korea. Even though Korean Protestantism is one of the 
youngest churches in the history of the Christianity, it has grown rapidly during 
the last 130 years, accompanied with growth of its population percentage, the 
emergence of megachurches, and its growing influence on Korean society. 
Considering Korean society is a religious pluralistic society, the growth of Korean 
Protestantism is remarkable. Especially the 1970s and 1980s had provided the 
fertile ground for megachurch cultivation. However, it has been stagnant 
from the 1990s. Until the 1990s, the evaluation on Korean Protestantism has 
been considerably positive. That is, Korean Protestantism has grown within 
amicable surroundings in Korean society. When Korean Protestantism, however, 
has become the most powerful religious group in Korea, it has misused its 
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power, money, and influence within the Korean society where three-forth are 
non-Christians. Those inappropriate behaviors resulted in the loss of its social 
credibility, with the impression of ‘an impolite Protestantism.”
Session three and four had dealt with the characteristics of Korean 
Protestantism with for key terms: Communism and Conservatism, and Capitalism 
and consumerism. Communism and Capitalism have functioned as external 
factors in the growing process of Korean Protestantism. Conservatism and 
Consumerism are adapted to designate internal contents of Korean Protestantism 
as two consonant counterparts to communism and capitalism respectively. Both 
two pairs of ‘Communism and Conservatism’, and ‘Capitalism and Consumerism’ 
are related to two stages of Korean Protestantism. Each stage has its own type of 
an emerging megachurch: Youngnak Church and the Yoido Full Gospel Church 
are the representatives of two types of megachurch. The former was established, 
after Liberation period, by refugee Protestants from North Korea. The first 
type of megachurch has a very conservative tendency both theologically and 
politically with an aggressive anti-communism. The latter type of megachurch 
has emerged during the period of industrialization. The new migrators from rural 
areas become the majority of the new megachurch members. This second type 
of megachurch became a bearer and subject of Americanized capitalism and 
consumerism, proclaiming the material success and consuming the blessing, so 
called, the gospel of prosperity.
With an introductory description of changing demography of Korean religions 
and Protestantism, we have looked over some contexts and contents of Korean 
Protestantism with two pairs of four terms: communism and conservatism, 
and capitalism and consumerism. This paper, however, could not cover various 
aspects of Korean Protestantism, such as historical, structural, cultural, and 
theological aspect. Still it needs many researches in relation to the issues dealt 
with in sections of this paper from other perspective, approaches, or framework. 
Especially critical analysis on the theological discourses in both types of 
megachurches would be a quite meaningful work.
After the second half of twentieth century, Korean Protestantism had grown 
with the refugees from North Korea after Liberation period and migrators from 
rural area during industrialization period. Considering the unfriendly attitude 
to Korean Protestantism within current Korean context, the future of Korean 
Protestantism is not so optimistic, unless Korean Protestant churches radically 
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pursue a radical transformation. The first step for being an authentic Protestantism 
would depend on overcoming conservatism and anti-communism, and on being 
beyond from capitalism and consumerism.
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Gabriella Rácsok
A SOCIAL-ETHICAL PERCEPTION OF THE THEOLOGY 
OF THE SERVANT CHURCH
Between 1948 and 1989, a particular theology achieved a monopoly in the 
Reformed Church of Hungary: the so-called, theology of the servant church. 
This paper presents the servant church theology with special attention to the 
rhetoric used in its social-ethical positions concerning issues such as the ethics of 
property, work, and peace. Attention is focused here because this theology, by 
separating dogmata agendi from dogmata credendi, was based on social-ethical 
principles, focusing on only one issue, namely the role of the church in the new 
society, that is, the legitimizing of the church in the socialist order.
Two Basic Hermeneutic Principles
Two characteristic features can be observed about the theology of the servant 
church. One is its repeated Christological arguments, and the other is its particular 
social-ethical focusing. The ethical literature of the examined period applied two 
basic hermeneutic principles in composing its practical statements and theses. 
A Social-Ethical 
Perception of the 
Theology of the  
Servant Church
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These principles were consistently applied by the leading theologians of the time 
(especially professor bishop Tibor Bartha1 and professor bishop Elemér Kocsis2). 
The Servant Christ
The first principle is in connection with the person and work of redemption of 
Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the sovereign revealer of the Father, though 
being Lord serves according to the divine law of God. Among others it is on the basis 
of Mark 10:45 and Philippians 2:5 that this thesis asserts that Christ’s rule is service 
for the sake of humankind suffering in the captivity of sin and death. Jesus Christ 
draws the Church, His Body, into this service (1 Corinthians 12). This universal 
work of redemption of Christ is the service of reconciliation (2 Corinthians 5:18ff). 
Its ultimate goal is that humankind will gain its ‘peace’, its ‘shalom”, that is, its 
complete balance, salvation, and its material, intellectual, physical, spiritual and 
moral order ordained and worked by God, Creator and Redeemer. That is how 
God’s glory, that is, his love and righteousness will fully be realized.3
The Great Commandment
The other theoretical basis of the ethical positions is the topical interpretation of 
Christ’s commandment of love.4 The great commandment of love (Matthew 22:37-
40; Deuteronomy 6:5; Leviticus 19:18) is the only particular commandment in 
the Scripture valid for all times. Every other instruction is to be understood and 
can be interpreted in the spirit of this commandment. Taking God’s covenant 
with humankind and the covenant of his people with one another as the basis, 
the content of love is faithfulness/loyalty and righteousness. Thus the content 
of love and the form of its act is not arbitrarily determined by the individual 
but, horizontally, by the need of the neighbor. The person living according to 
the commandment of love is open to the problems of humanity in each epoch. 
Such a person knows that it is not people who exist for the law and for moral 
norms, but it is always the law that should serve people, for the preservation and 
development of life in the given historical and social circumstances. There are 
no eternal norms; there is only one eternal commandment, that is, love which 
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is realized in deeds working for the justice of the weak, the humiliated and the 
exploited. It was also said: if the church submits to the most inner laws of the 
Gospel, it must go from a capitalist society to a socialist society.5
Perceptions
According to the “theology of the servant church,” Christ’s commandment of 
love given for humanity was the departure for the following conclusions and 
perceptions of the church:
Church and Social Orders
“Christ’s church is not bound to any one social order. The Christian church must 
fulfill her function in all societies and situations.”6 It was common to quote 
professor Hromadka’s words:7
It must be stated clearly that the Gospel and the Living church of Jesus Christ are 
not dependent upon any external order, that they rise majestically above the ruins 
of the old civilization and social order and give Mankind the courage and all the 
freedom and love of a new socio-political experiment, to make a new beginning.8
In other words, there is no social order that is adequate once for all for Christ’s 
church and for her social-ethical norms. There is no social order in history to which 
the church should ultimately bind herself. The only such order is the kingdom of 
God, which kingdom lies outside historical possibilities.9 This perception applies 
to the fact that the church is not bound by any obsolete and inhuman social 
order. What is more, the church can fulfill the great commandment of neighborly 
love only if she, given her prophetic role, proclaims judgment on these social 
orders.10
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Servant Christ – Servant Church
The analogy of the servant Christ is the servant church – this applies to ethics 
as well. Serving means openhearted willingness to help. The servant church is 
willing to remain outside the structures of power and thus serve the welfare of 
the community and the individual, the nation and the world. To act according to 
the analogy of love means that the church and her members seek and recognize 
God’s actual will and are willing to help the particular person in his or her 
particular historical and social need. In order to give this help it is necessary to 
reconsider the old system of ethical norms and the old morality.11
Dialogue
The new ethical grounding was developed in a struggle against the obsolete social-
ethical norms of the old feudal, capitalist and bourgeois order; and in a dialogue 
with the ideas and moral norms of the new, more just socialist order. The point of 
orientation was the comparison of secular humanism and Christian humanism:
Marxist humanism is first of all a political social praxis. (…) The way of humanizing 
is creating a world worthy of people, creating a classless society, and revolutionary 
praxis by means of class struggle. (…) The ground for Christian humanism is 
nothing else than God’s act, His love for humans – or as Karl Barth has written: 
God’s humanity. – The way of humanizing men, according to Christian conviction, 
cannot be anything else than putting on the real new man, that is, Jesus Christ. 
(…) The humanity of a Christian living from ‘God’s humanism’ is his responsible 
co-existence with others. No one can be ‘humane’ by himself, isolated from others. 
Humanism is a common issue. (…) On the basis of structural likeness and the 
differences in content, the common question of Christian and Marxist humanism 
is: What can we do together for the human – for the sake of a complete real 
‘humanum?’12
The theological definition of this ‘complete real humanum’ was missing. Of 
course, this can be understood. As soon as it had been defined from a theological 
point of view, the church should have acquired a critical position.
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The ‘academic’ dialogue in Hungary between Marxists and Christians started 
formally in 1981 in Debrecen. Dialogue with the ideas and moral norms of the new 
social order did not rise from the conviction that such a dialogue was desirable, 
but rather from necessity. Both sides were aware of the fact that they could 
accomplish their goals only by taking the other side seriously. The purpose of the 
dialogue was to improve the already existing co-operation between Christians 
and Marxists. The Marxist side expected the Christians to acknowledge the fact 
that the church also should contribute to building socialism. This was a condition 
to the dialogue. On behalf of Protestantism, numerous church leaders were 
willing to co-operate in this matter. The representatives of the new order realized 
that there were certain areas they could not manage on their own. Dialogue 
came to their aid. The dialogue was carried out by rigorous restrictions. Only 
those were allowed to participate whom society considered ‘able and reliable’. 
Only the so-called “progressive” Christians could take part. To be a progressive 
Christian and to be reliable in the eyes of society meant not to question the ultimate 
goals of Marxism, that is, its totalitarian demands, nor its everyday practice as far 
as methods and means were concerned. The government in return kept its word 
regarding its attitude of “who is not against us is with us.” The church received 
some allowances but was not allowed to have a word about the direction in which 
the country was heading.13 As far as the Marxist side was concerned, the sole 
purpose of any dialogue between Christians and non-Christians could only be that 
of first weakening and finally abolishing religion. Creating a sophisticated dialogue 
proved to be more effective than any other vulgar expressions of anti-religion 
attacks. This is reflected in the writing of a popular Marxist philosopher of the era:
The objective development of socialism, in itself, without systematic ideological 
influence, would be able to eliminate religious faith only at a very slow pace. The 
ideological criticism of religion, however, can only become really effective in the 
course of joint activities; discussions with believers, without practical cooperation, 
remain a voice in the wilderness, just as the basis of joint activities which attempt 
to strengthen the ideological influence of socialism, become fragile without 
discussion.14
Dialogue was “a means of persuasion and not a collective goal” as the West had 
tended to think of it.15
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On behalf of the Catholic Church there was an official critical position published 
in Hungary about the character of the dialogue. This critique said that the role 
played by the church in society did not receive sufficient acknowledgement. 
Such critique said: we cannot speak of a dialogue as long as the state interferes 
in the life of the church by administrative means, as long as the Christians are 
treated as second class citizens, as long as there is no free teaching of religion at 
schools, and as long as the power of the party, which is nothing else than hunger 
for power, is seen as in the service of the nation.16
Ethical Norms
Historical changes and economic conditions bear great significance on the 
formation of ethical norms. The question and the dilemma of the relation of 
the historic situation and the ethical principles speak about the fact that eternal 
commandments cannot be understood independently of their situations.17
This perception included that the former so-called individual ethics did not 
correspond to God’s current will and the needs of humankind. The importance 
of physical needs and human rights to them are essential aspects for ethics. It is 
vain to appeal to the conscience of the individual if he or she is a captive of social 
and economic circumstances and prejudice. “Love and justice should be sought 
in the social structures so that the individual be freed for proper and timely 
ethical deeds.”18 Conversion to God should go hand in hand with conversion to 
the neighbor - was the popular slogan of the servant church theology.19
Struggle Against Ethical Resignation
Finally, the servant church theology recognized the necessity of the struggle 
against ethical resignation, against ethical dejection. Ethical resignation, applying 
to the sinful nature of humankind, does not see a possibility for changing the old 
social conditions and the bad habits. It considers the struggle for a just society, 
peace and a just world order to be nonsense. Calvin’s teaching on common grace 
received a great emphasis in this perception. Other elements of the Christian 
doctrine which emphasize the goodness of the creation came to the surface as 
well. It was also popular to make warnings against the one-sided or otherworldly 
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interpretation of eschatology just as to call attention to the ethical contents of 
the message of God’s kingdom, that is, the importance of the “penultimate.”20
According to Kocsis’ argument, since the Christian church had failed to fill in 
the time between Christ’s coming and the realization of God’s kingdom with 
social-ethical content, it was necessary for secular ethics to enter this vacuum.21
Particular Social-Ethical Decisions and Their Social 
Projections
The Moral Superiority of the Socialist Order
The theology of the servant church considered its first and most important 
decision to acknowledge the authority of the socialist revolution. The church 
leadership getting to power in 1948 saw three alternatives: i) to maintain the 
notion of a bourgeois society and start a culture-war against the ideas of the 
models of the socialist society; ii) to be quiet and withdraw to inner immigration; 
iii) to confess one’s error as a church and then take sides with the new socialist 
vision of society. The leadership of the Reformed Church of Hungary chose 
the third way. Repentance and conversion proclaimed were a part of this “self-
examination.” The 1967 Synodical Teaching had a chapter on “The Place of Our 
Church in Today’s Hungarian Society”. According to that section one of the 
greatest sins of the church was that she had become a victim of relying on the 
state power during the 25 years of armistice between the two world wars. As a 
result of that, the church did not have a prophetic word that was strong, clear, 
courageous and consistent enough when the Hungarian government committed 
itself to a racist and anti-religious foreign power. At the same time she ignored 
the miserable millions of exploited agricultural and industrial workers.22 The 
Synod Teaching also declared the saving circumstances and binding fact of God’s 
judgmental and merciful shaping of history:
In the dark events of World War II, and in the national and social collapse 
that followed, God’s just judgment reached our church for her disobedience, 
unfaithfulness and her turning away from the Word. According to human 
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standards she should have deserved a more severe punishment. God’s judgment 
was merciful. Therefore there was a rejoicing sigh of relief filling our church after 
liberation. We must thank our God’s mercy that we survived! It was this grateful 
rejoicing which the rebuilding spiritual and physical strength of our church flowed 
from after World War II.23
The old social order, due to the social injustice prevailing in it, fell under God’s just 
judgment. Therefore social changes were not only necessary but were legitimate 
as well – declared the official position. As a second step of this process the church 
acknowledged the socialist society and its moral superiority over other social 
systems.24
A third position followed from the acknowledgement of the moral superiority 
of the socialist society. The Reformed Church of Hungary supported all the 
socialist revolutionary endeavors occurring worldwide and especially in the 
developing countries. The leadership of the Church declared that only these 
revolutionary changes were able to solve the burning questions of humankind, 
such as, putting an end to hunger, misery and cultural backwardness, creating 
lasting peace and stopping the destruction of ecology.25 We can comment 
that this was nothing else than ridiculing the Gospel, justifying revolutionary 
theologies and supporting the endeavors of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy.
Ethics of Property
The next social-ethical position was taken regarding the question of the ethics 
of property. The official church position radically broke with the “medieval notion 
of the sacredness of private property” that had a great influence on Reformed 
ethics until then. The position arose from the ‘perception’ that earthly goods, 
including land as well, are gifts of God. God gives all the earth and everything 
that humankind grows and produces from it to the community most of all, so 
that justly distributing the produced goods, each member of the community 
could live worthily from it.26 Poor attempts were made to justify collectivization 
on biblical grounds. When the Reformed Church of Hungary acknowledged 
the Constitution of the Hungarian People’s Republic, she acknowledged the 
collectivization of industry and capital as well as the socialization of agriculture at 
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the same time. They argued from Romans 13:4 that it was legitimate of the State, 
for the “wellbeing” of its citizens, to take possession of and control all essential 
means of production which form the most important basis for the people’s life.27
“The church gave help by her particular means so that this necessary social 
change would be realized with as little convulsion as possible.”28 One such 
particular means was preaching. There were special articles devoted to the topic of 
how to preach in churches living within collectivized (governmentally centralized) 
economic structures. What was different in these sermons compared to previous 
times? The means of production and the results of production in the co-operatives 
belong to the community. The formation of moral awareness appropriate for this is 
hindered by the sinful and false notion of “mine.” The socialist way of life, thus the 
notion of collective property of the socialist agriculture, does not mean that “it is 
someone else’s and not mine” – but it means that it belongs to all of us, to the whole 
nation. This does not danger what is mine, because the community includes what 
is mine as well – to the degree of my share in the work done. “What is mine gets to 
me not by alienation but by distribution. (…) One of the decisive moral moments 
of the formation of the socialist awareness is the recognition of the fact that ‘mine’ 
is assured in the collective.” It was the church, who in contrast with Scripture, 
invented and preached the idea of the sacredness of private property. Therefore 
she owes special responsibility in this area to preach the Gospel. “We do not preach 
the sacredness of collective property, but its usefulness for the whole nation – and 
that in it the property of the individual is also assured.”29 We can comment on this, 
that to use such arguments violates the balance of the Word of God, which does 
not side totally with either communism or capitalism. It is true that the church has 
often found it difficult to call for economic justice in both capitalist and socialist 
societies, but the above critique by the socialists was one-sided, indeed.
In the Marxist view the end of private property would bring along the 
emancipation of women, actual monogamy. When that is realized there will be no 
need for the commandments forbidding adultery and stealing.30 It was thought 
that just as people would learn not to steal the property or the wages earned by 
others, so people would learn not to covet the wife or husband of another, or to 
desire the honor or anything else due to another. Here we find an interesting irony: 
the key to fulfilling the command of God is not based on personal conversion but 
on a different economic paradigm for society. This brings us to the old questions 
of whether we need to change individuals, or change social structures. While the 
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Bible talks about both, those who think that people will be better when social-
economic structures are better, unfortunately are paying attention to only one 
part of the problem of personal conversion and the improvement of society.
The social-ethics of the servant church theology was right when it asserted 
that everything belongs to God. However it went wrong when it started to speak 
against private property on the basis of Scripture instead of emphasizing that 
humans are only caretakers, cultivators and stewards of God’s creation.
Work Ethics
Teaching on new working morals was an organic consequence of the social-
ethical decision made in connection with the ethics of property. In this teaching, 
work done for the sake of the neighbor was raised to the level of worship. The 
declaration of this was in sharp contrast with the double morality of the Middle 
Ages which put the so-called contemplative lifestyle above work. This new 
social-ethical perception emphasized that decent work as divine ordinance and 
as life forming force applied not only to private property but made sense in the 
property of the community as well. What is more, work as an effort for the sake 
of the community can be redeemed from the harmful effects of societies built on 
egoism throughout history.31
If work is God’s commandment to all human beings, a social-ethical truth should 
follow from that. That social order is most appropriate for the order of creation 
which makes work available for everyone and which makes it impossible that some 
make use of others’ work while they themselves do not work.32 In contrast with 
capitalism it is the socialist social order that represents this “better truth”:33
i) Socialism ends the exploitation of humans by humans. By this it puts 
an end to the notion of work and worker being merchandise, and 
restores the dignity of both work and worker. Work in this society is a 
‘matter of fairness’ – a workless life is impossible.
ii) By means of a centrally planned economy unemployment is overcome, 
the dark clouds of misery and uncertainty no longer hang over the 
heads of the people.
iii) It is neither the capital nor the profit, but the human being is the main 
value. The main goal is a content and rejoicing life for the human 
being rather than continual accumulation of wealth.
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iv) The community forming force of work is effective and it strengthens 
the responsibility felt for the community instead of the egoism of the 
individual.
The Synod Teaching had the following words on work:
The ethics of work has gained new content in our society. The new work ethics 
in its practical consequences does not oppose the requirements of Reformed 
morality. What is more, there is essential conformity in how both value and 
estimate function. […] A Christian by a well accomplished work not only serves 
his own bread and the wellbeing of the community but serves the glory of God 
as well. Working fairly gives us an opportunity for Christian witness and is an 
occasion of doing good where the church is most effective in contributing to 
social development.34
In the meantime the so-called ‘inner unemployment’ gradually increased. 
Working morals became more and more corrupt. “We go on working slowly and 
we go on getting paid slowly.” – was the mentality. Wages were not an issue in 
ethical discussions. As a matter of fact it paid a lot more to be a propagandist, a 
party or a trade union functionary, or simply an informer, than work diligently. 
Hundreds of thousands made their living from weekend ‘black’ jobs. That is, they 
took on extra unregistered work in order to subsidize their meager earnings.
Peace Theology
Analyzing the Reformed theological thinking of the era it can be asserted that the 
question of peace enjoyed a primary place in its social-ethical orientation. A study 
group of the church worked out what they called the ‘pattern for an ethos of the 
ecumenical peace ministry’. “Encountering the new society happened in such a 
tense international situation that was burdened by the cold war and the danger 
accompanying the appearance of atom and hydrogen bombs.” The theological 
precedence of the ecumenical ministry of the church was the recognition of “the 
universal validity of Christ’s kingdom and redemption”:
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For grace does not end where the church ends. As the Fall somehow applies to 
the whole of the cosmos, in the same way salvation somehow bears the fruits 
of righteousness for the universe and the whole of humankind. It is from this 
theological perception that the practical insight arises, that is, the cultivation of 
the ecumenical relations of churches is connected with the service of peace which 
is the greatest issue of today’s generation. That is why our Church welcomed and 
supported by all means the Christian peace movement which was manifested in 
the form of the Christian Peace Conference in the ecumenical life.35
It was June, 1958 when the Christian Peace Conference (CPC) was founded in 
Prague, mainly with the contribution of representatives of Eastern European 
countries, including the Reformed Church of Hungary as well. From the following 
year countries like Great Britain, the Netherlands, the United States and the 
German Federal Republic also had representatives in the movement. More and 
more churches welcomed the initiative of the Prague meeting. In 1961 the first All-
Christian Peace Assembly was held in Prague. Within the theme ‘…and peace on 
earth’ disarmament had the primary place in the discussions. There were particular 
suggestions made concerning the immediate halt of nuclear testing and the 
production of weapons of mass destruction, establishing nuclear free zones, etc. 
The Czech theologian, Professor Josef L. Hromadka was elected the first president 
of the CPC. The following All-Christian Peace Assembly was organized in 1964. 
A great number of African representatives participated at the conference, and as 
a consequence such themes played an important role as the gap between North 
and South endangering world peace, and the consequences of colonialism and 
imperialism for justice and human dignity. The third All-Christian Peace Assembly 
was held in 1968 in Prague. The Assembly declared that the realization of peace 
did not exclude the necessity of the national liberation struggles. The ‘status quo’ 
in Asia, Africa or in Latin America is unacceptable. There are economic powers 
backing up political, military and administrative forces. These powers should 
be put under international control. The Assembly encouraged the churches not 
to isolate themselves from the necessity of the revolutionary processes, but to 
challenge Christians to take part in the struggles for liberation.36
The “Prague Spring” in 1968, just as the “Budapest Fall” in 1956 ended with 
Soviet military intervention. Hromadka wrote a letter to the Soviet ambassador 
in Prague in which he called the Soviet intervention the greatest tragedy of 
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his life and the tragic error of the Soviet Government. Both Hromadka and the 
general secretary of the CPC resigned. Several members withdrew from further 
co-operation with the CPC. In 1971, at the fourth All-Christian Peace Assembly 
the movement went through some reorganization. The following questions 
became current: the consolidation of European security; the ending of the US 
aggression in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos; the overcoming of the tension in the 
Middle East; the struggle against racism in the Republic of South Africa and in 
Rhodesia; questions concerning the development in third-world countries. The 
Assembly exhorted the Christians of the world to participate in anti-imperialist 
solidarity. One of the bishops of the Reformed Church of Hungary, Károly Tóth, a 
rather moderate theologian, became the general secretary of the CPC from that 
year. The following Assembly elected him president. A meeting in 1982 sharply 
judged NATO for the decision to deploy nuclear missiles in Western Europe. 
Western imperialism proved to be the greatest enemy of world peace in the eyes 
of the CPC. The following year, in May, there was a consultation on disarmament 
in Budapest.37 President Tóth wrote the following on that occasion:
Frequently, ideological differences are misused as an apologetic pretence for the 
continued escalation of conflicts. One of the central questions which must be 
asked by the churches and by Christian theology is that concerning the possibility 
of overcoming the ideological barriers in order to cooperate on concrete steps 
towards disarmament. At this point, we would also have to deal with the problem 
of enemy profiles, and the use of ideological positions or anti-positions in order 
to justify the arms race would have to be questioned. Therefore, the aspiration 
towards disarmament should cause Christian theology to modify the importance 
of ideologies, and in those cases where ideologies are useful, it should state 
distinctly and clearly which real needs are expressed through them.38
This ideological and political impartiality received more and more emphasis 
at the following All-Christian Peace Assembly in 1985. These events and 
themes could have made it possible to indeed use ideological impartiality 
as a means to critique and reform the dominant direction of society, but for a 
great part it became obvious that the movement was committed to the ‘East’.
Károly Tóth and Stephan Tunnicliffe of the European Nuclear Disarmament 
Movement were responsible for a Budapest seminar under the title “Towards a 
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Theology of Peace” in 1984. The seminar had a second meeting in 1987, again in 
Budapest.39
Just as the servant church theology of the Reformed Church of Hungary was 
never fully developed, the same is true of the theology of peace as a part of its 
social-ethics. It did not constitute a complete system, only its basics were laid 
down by means of various expressions of its ideas. Let us take a look at some of 
these. In 1972 the Hungarian Committee contributed to the New Delhi Assembly 
with the following:40
i) In our age, world peace has become the basic condition to the survival 
of humankind. This obliges Christian theology to draw conclusions 
from the Biblical message, which conclusions are different from those 
of the former generation. The relation of Christian faith to political 
and social structures should be defined differently than in the last 
centuries.
ii) Peace activity and the theology of peace should influence the self 
assertion of the churches. The renewal of churches is closely bound 
to their peace activities.
iii) As for the ecumenical significance of the CPC, we should keep in sight 
the historically significant fact that today’s ecumenical movement 
received a decisive impulse from those church people who had 
already pursued Christian peace activities before World War I and 
II. – Many references were especially made to Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 
The Weltbund für die Freundschaftsarbeit der Kirchen movement, 
which was associated with his name, was considered the ecumenical 
precursor of the CPC.41 – We can comment that this reference was 
rather one-sided since it did not mention Bonhoeffer’s fight against 
totalitarian systems, nor his martyrdom by such a system.
The Christological grounding for the Christian peace activity lay in the 
presupposition that we not only can learn from Christ that we are able to carry 
out such activity, but that we are obliged to do so. Humankind redeemed by 
Christ, not only Christians, but all human beings receive the ability from God for 
peace, and it is up to them whether they want to practice this ability or not. They 
do not even have to know that is was God who prepared this peace for them. 
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God has other means beside the Christian churches to spread his will for peace 
among men. This other means is undoubtedly a reference to the countries of the 
socialist camp. In the theology of peace a Christ-like image of the human being 
is realized. In other words, it establishes such a Christian anthropology which 
believes in humanity’s ability to achieve world peace.42
The representatives of the Reformed Church of Hungary composed the 
following theological considerations for the 1972 Helsinki meeting:43
i) The lives and witness of the Christian churches stand or fall on their 
“revolutionarily new obedience” to Jesus Christ. CPC is the place, the 
sign and worker of this new theological thinking. Christian theology, 
under the influence of strange philosophies, narrowed down the 
content of the divine message of salvation to the individual. It forgot 
about the fact that human sinfulness, just as salvation, has social 
contexts. Sin cannot be reduced to the area of the individual life, 
since it is such an objective reality that has social forms of expressions, 
what is more, social structures. From this it follows that the message 
of salvation of the Gospel must have social impacts.
ii) It is necessary to create a so-called instrumental ecclesiology. Not the 
question of Christian unity is of priority, but the question of how to 
create the means of our common service in the world.
iii) What are the means of theological service for the Christian peace 
activity in the community of Christians?
a) The Christian community should claim that the peace of God 
and the peace of the world cannot be separated from each 
other. The Cross of Christ expressed this the most particularly.
b) Christians and Christian churches cannot take a waiting stand-
point in connection with the realistic threats endangering hu-
mankind.
c) Awakening and maintaining hope in people, even in the most 
desperate and most hopeless situations, is one of the most 
important peace activities of Christianity.
Although these theological considerations sounded rather appealing they still 
meant to serve the Marxist concept. To create the means of common service was 
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an illusion: common service can be done only on common grounds.
Of course, applying the hermeneutic principle of neighborly love could not 
be left out from the ethics of peace. The great commandment declares that 
we can find God in our brothers and through our brothers. Faith is a dialogue 
between man and God. In this dialogue God asks the question with the emphasis 
on responsibility: “Where is your brother?” (Genesis 4:9) As there is co-operation 
between socialists and Christians (e.g. in the anti-imperialist struggle), it should 
be obvious that in socialism the issue is not to fight against religion and to 
establish atheism. The task of socialism is to take care of humankind. In the same 
way the issue in Christianity is the salvation and peace of humankind. Socialism 
is judgment and hope at the same time. It is judgment on the church that had 
failed to carry out essential tasks; it is hope because the realization of socialism 
reminds the church of her actual tasks. From here it is only one step to justify co-
operation: “Christians and Christian churches should be willing to co-operate by 
means of their whole strength with socialists for peace. By this they should show 
that criticism for the sake of justice and the salvation of humankind are important 
for both sides.”44
While themes like racism in South Africa and in North America, economic 
problems and social conditions in Latin America dominated peace discussions, 
not a single sign of concern was expressed on behalf of the meeting of ecumenical 
church leaders about the Hungarian and the Russian troops marching into Prague 
in 1968. Just as the social problems and injustices of one’s own country were not 
issues for peace theology.
These examples may illustrate well that as far as the social-ethics of the servant 
church theology of the Reformed Church of Hungary was concerned, from a 
Marxist view it could be stated that it was “in harmony with Marxist ethics, except, 
of course, the basic premises and the normative theses of Christian ethics.” The 
difference did “not lie in ideology but in the world view.”45
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Evaluation
The theology of the servant church gave preference to two areas especially, 
namely social-ethics and anthropology. The church government believed that 
despite the opposite starting points in regard to religion and a life-view, it was 
possible to cooperate with atheistic socialism in the area of ethics. 
Hermeneutic Principles
The theology of the servant church saw cooperation with socialism as nothing 
else than “sharing in the saving act of Christ.” This religious rhetoric was 
used within the church to try to make everyone join this cooperation. From a 
theological point of view this idea seems to suggest that Christ’s work of salvation 
is not complete yet, and needs to be continued by humans. Also, Christ’s work is 
almost completely narrowed down to a social-ethical dimension which is clearly 
not what the Bible teaches. Thus the theology of the servant church is a selective 
theology.46 Without noticing it, the use of religious rhetoric only was a veneer 
on a largely humanist-secular approach to society. Rather than coming with the 
Word of God and speaking to the situation, this theology mainly came from the 
situation and tried to make the Bible and the church cooperate with a ready-
made program. 
In the theology of the servant church the Great Commandment was even 
more emphatic than the servant-hood of Christ. However, when the theologians 
of the servant church set the parable of the good Samaritan as a paradigm and 
the Great Commandment as a hermeneutic principle, they forgot that Scripture 
always speaks about the double commandment of love. The love of one’s 
neighbor cannot be possible without the love of God and paying heed to the 
Gospel. The love of God is not less important than the love of one’s neighbor, 
since „the acceptance of the great and first commandment is the reason, the 
definer and the sustaining spirit of one’s love for the neighbor.”47 If the former 
gets cold, the latter also loses its strength. The church serves the world to the 
extent she serves her Lord who is at the same time the saving Lord of the world. 
The universality of this demand is obscured in the theology of the servant church, 
since it emphasizes that love for God can only be expected from the believers and 
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not from the world. With this it virtually denies the missionary task of the church 
and narrows down the social call of the church to the area of humanitarian help 
giving.48 
Social Ethics
The social ethics of the theology of the servant church sought answers to 
important questions of property, work, patriotism, family, peace, etc. However, it 
pronounced only generalities about social problems and their solutions, or it only 
repeated what others had already said before. In its social-ethical “perceptions” 
it borrowed its perspectives from Marxist ethics. It repeated under a religious 
disguise what Marxist ethics had said. It saw social actions as the way in which, 
and the means by which, God’s kingdom is realized in our world. It sacralized 
humanitarian actions and made them the focus of faith. It shared in Marxism’s 
belief in progress and taught that redemption worked through profane history 
by introducing permanent developments in a positive direction; and that there is 
a solution for the problems of human existence, - for all  “the burning questions of 
humanity”, provided there is willingness to solve them and there is unconditional 
commitment in social issues. With this it fell into the mistake of viewing, or at 
least appearing to view, all the problems of human existence solely as being that 
of a social character.49
We can say that social-ethical questions and answers – along with other 
theses of the theology of the servant church – obviously carried false goals in 
this unfinished system, in this “random theology.” The false goals came because 
it pretended to be both good theology and good socialism. It was a “random 
theology,” because it borrowed randomly from the Bible and theological 
terminology, while it systematically was following the demands of the authorities.
Anthropology
Beside social ethics, anthropology played a distinguished role in this “theology”. 
This also shows similarities with the Marxist view of the human being. This 
optimistic view made the human being the center of things. It declared in a loud 
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voice: the human being is the main value. The happiness of people was the point 
of connection between this theology and Marxism. In the name of cooperating 
in human happiness and social progress the theology of the servant church 
became silent about the real dimension of original sin. Instead it taught the 
ability of humans to achieve peace and harmony. Then ‘shalom’ does not come 
from God, from his promises in relation to our obedience, but ‘shalom’ then is 
a human achievement. With this it weakened the preaching of the Gospel, and 
as a matter of fact it reduced preaching to socialist humanism. Sermons said in 
biblical words what Marxist anthropology had to say about the human being.
In emphasizing reconciliation to the neighbor the Marxist view is reflected 
again: the human being is a ‘social entity’, a complex of social relationships. The 
human being is neither more, nor other than the sum of his or her relationships. 
These relationships are of course exclusively limited to social relationships, to the 
roles in the economic process of production. The human being is determined by 
these social relationships. He or she is worth as much as his or her relationships are 
worth. A person becomes himself or herself by creating these social relationships. 
The more these relationships improve the more the individual improves. The 
question remains open: who improves the improvers of these social relationships? 
The Marxist view of the human being limits the human being to his or her social 
roles. Thus the human being is not more than a social whole. This defines his or 
her value. The human being is a living robot. Thinking is just a product of the 
brain just as urine is of the kidneys. This does not mean that the individuals are 
without value but that their value never exceeds their value for the collective. To 
correspond to a social role is to correspond to one’s social significance, that is, 
one’s importance for the collective, the whole. The anthropology of the theology 
of the servant church failed to proclaim that the human being is more than a 
social role, more than a functionary. The Christian faith grants one a relationship, 
a relationship with God, which cannot be alienated and which goes beyond any 
other relationships and gives such an identity that is independent from all social 
and political significance.50 The mystery of the body of Christ was completely lost 
in the teaching of this theology: The parts that we think are less honorable are 
treated with special honor. (1 Corinthians 12:23)
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Dialogue
The main problem was not that the church tried to create a good relationship 
with the state. The church and Christians cannot back out of society. Christians 
and non-Christians live together in the world, thus their responsibility is common. 
But Christians should act as Christians outside the church as well: they should do 
their best to influence culture and society in a Christian way. This attitude, which 
is sometimes difficult for the world to understand, is not the same as despising 
culture, but follows from the biblical obedience in the cultural sphere as well. In 
the theology of the servant church the biblical teaching that the church is for 
the world (for its salvation) was distorted in the direction that the church should 
sacrifice, that is, should liquidate herself, for the sake of the world.
Of course Christian and Marxist ethics can have common questions, but their 
analogies can only be formal. Christian ethics views things from the perspective 
of the kingdom of God, while Marxist ethics makes the human being the measure 
of everything.51 However, a church which repeats like a parrot what has already 
been said by others, and becomes the mouthpiece of the prevailing political and 
social decisions and does what other authorities and institutions do, essentially 
breaks herself in two. If churchgoers see and hear the same in church as in the 
world, they will turn away from the church. People come to church for something 
else, what is more, for Somebody Else.52
In connection with the social-ethical issues it must also be noted that even 
the attribute “servant” is contradictory, since the Reformed Church of Hungary 
was involved in less social services between 1948 and 1989 than its predecessor. 
The old church, labeled as the ‘dominating’ by the socialists, had wide-ranging 
religious instruction, well organized Sunday-school activities and youth work. It 
granted opportunities for the activities of students’ associations, adult education, 
diaconial institutions, foreign missions and published approximately thirty 
different church papers. Congregations survived during the socialist decades 
partly due to the fruit of these pastoral ministries of the past that continued on 
in the lives of the people. 
In contrast to this the so-called “servant” church closed its eyes before the 
practical challenges of the social-ethical questions. It is impossible that it was 
due to the blindness of ignorance. All the injustices of collectivization: the 
nationalization of schools, firms, factories, shops, lands and even larger private 
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houses, the violent and cruel liquidation of certain social classes. It is contradictory 
and more than sad to use phrases like “the content of love is seeking service, 
faithfulness/loyalty and righteousness” in the middle of the terror practiced by 
the Party. The socialist regime with its so-called “high moral values” applied a 
consistent, brutal and violent atheistic attitude which was present from one’s 
cradle to one’s grave, from the early years of kindergarten to promotion at work 
or career possibilities later in life (see Gyula Illyés, One Sentence on Tyranny53).
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Hee-Kuk Lim 
Introduction
The Korean Church, which hosted the 10th Assembly of the World Council of 
Churches (WCC), proposed to put into practice the gospel of peace for the sake 
of the coming peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Given that the 
fate of Korea is deeply influenced by the surrounding great powers, however, 
the current political situations in East Asia – in particular, Japan’s transformation 
into a country with projective military capacity – are intensifying international 
conflicts and tensions surrounding the Peninsula. Even up until recently, 
moreover, South and North Korea have been in military confrontation and 
ideology competition with each other, while the threats of war are still in the 
air due to the North’s development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. 
One of the Korean Church’s tasks in this situation is to dissolve the conflict and 
confrontation between South and North Korea, to realize the reconciliation of 
the divided nation, and to contribute to the peaceful reunification of the Korean 
Peninsula. The gospel of God’s kingdom fulfilled in Jesus Christ is the gospel of 
peace. The Korean Church, however, has thus far failed to practice the gospel of 
peace, of which many Korean Christians today reflects self-critically and repents. 
With this regard, in this paper I study the March 1st Movement  , also known as 
Samil Movement. It was the Korean national movement of independence from 
Japan’s colonial occupation and also a movement for the peace of the world. To 
be more specific, I will investigate the idea of peace as contained in the March 
The March 1st Movement  
and Christianity  
in the Context of Peace
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1stDeclaration of Independence and ask whether and how it corresponds to 
the Christian idea of peace. Also, I will make clear that it was Christian leaders 
who took the initiative in the March 1st Movement  – at least in Seoul. Through a 
historical research on the March 1st Movement  in 1919, finally, I will explore how 
the Korean Church may contribute to the peaceful reunification of the divided 
Korea. 
 
The March 1st Movement  in 1919 
Outline
The March 1st Movement  in 1919 continued for two months – both at home and 
abroad. In the process declarations of independence were released at several 
places,1 including the Independence Declaration by ‘Joseon cheongnyeon 
doglibdan daepyo’ (Joseon Young Adults’ Representatives for Independence) 
consisting of eleven Korean students in Tokyo, Japan, on February 2, the Korean 
Declaration of Independence in Gillim, Manchuria in February, the Declaration of 
Independence by thirty-three national representatives in Seoul on March 1, the 
Announcement of Independence Declaration in Yongjeong, Gando (Jiandao), 
on March 13, the Joseon Declaration of Independence in Vladivostok, Russia, on 
March 17, and the Declaration in Hunchun, Manchuria around that time. 
While Korean participants in the March 1st Movement  led peaceful 
demonstrations from the beginning to the end, the Japanese imperialism 
repressed the ‘Manse’ [Korean word for ‘Hurray’] demonstration with military 
forces.2 Out of about 510,000 participants in the demonstrations of the March 1st 
Movement , according to a statistics, 19,054 were arrested and indicted.3 Pointing 
to the Korean Church as maneuvering behind the Independence Movement, the 
Japanese imperialism ordered police and military forces to destroy chapels and 
arrest congregation members. The loss by fire of Jeamri Chapel near Suwon is 
the most notorious case. In connection with the March 1st Movement , 17 chapels 
were destroyed and 2,190 Christians were arrested by June 30, 1919.4
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The March 1st Movement  in Seoul, Led by Christian Leaders 
The March 1st Movement  in Seoul originated from a gathering at the house of 
Park Seung-Bong (135 Gyedong Bukchon), who was an elder of Andong Church 
(Anguk-dong, Seoul), in early January of 1919.5 After Korea (Joseon) and the 
United States signed a diplomatic treaty in 1882, elder Park was sent to the US 
in 1885 and worked as the first Korean envoy for the following four years. This 
career of his suggests how learned he might have been about international 
affairs. Concerning the March 1st Movement , elder Park consulted Lee Sang-Jae, 
who also had an extensive knowledge of international affairs due to his own 
career as a diplomat in the US for several years. In the middle of January several 
leaders from Christianity, Cheondoism [a Korean indigenous religion founded in 
southern Korea by Choi Je-Woo in 1859], and Buddhism assembled to organize 
the independent movement. 
They assigned historian Choi Nam-Seon to write the first draft of the 
Declaration of Independence, which was then reviewed and revised by Christian 
leaders, including Lee Seung-Hun, Park Seung-Bong, and Lee Sang-Jae. On March 
1, the movement in Seoul began with the ‘Manse’ demonstration of people who 
gathered at the Pagoda Park. 
The Idea of Peace in the March 1st Movement ’s 
Declaration of Independence 
Hope for the Rebuilding of the World
Behind the development of the March 1st Movement  in 1919 there was an 
awareness of the global changes which began during the First World War. The 
March 1st Movement’s Declaration of Independence reveals some knowledge 
of the Russian Revolution, a few small nations’ independence, and American 
President Edward Wilson’s proposal of the principle of self-determination of 
peoples. With this awareness the declaration argued that amidst these global 
changes this was the right time to “rebuild the world” wherein the Korean people 
would regain their lost national sovereignty. 
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By “the age of power” the declaration meant the current period in which 
imperialism dominated the global world according to the law of the jungle. 
Imperialism refers to a policy of extending a country’s power through 
domination, which was led primarily by the Western great powers that had 
succeeded in industrialization from mid-1880s to late-1910s. Imperial powers 
repressed colonized people by political and military means and exploited them 
economically,6 while appealing to the combination of blind nationalism and 
social Darwinism.7 In the age of imperialism dominated by social Darwinism’s 
logic of power, it was an international common sense that the stronger prey 
upon the weaker. Thus, great nations invaded and colonized small nations. 
During this period there were fierce competitions among Western imperial 
nations for colonies (natural resources or market). At first the United Kingdom 
claimed the dominant place, which was later challenged by France and Germany. 
In the process the tension of international conflicts increased and, at last, burst 
out in the First World War in 1914. At the very center of the war, according to 
German Lutheran pastor Christoph Friedrich Blumhardt, was the international 
“competition for interests.” Blumhardt warned against the domination of 
“Mammon” working behind the war.8
The First World War was unprecedented in history in terms of the arms and 
war supplies employed in it. It continued for four years and four months. During 
that period about 0.8 billion people were involved in the stormy war, about 70 
million soldiers were committed, and there were about 30 million causalities. 
The entire Europe was devastated by the enormous firepower released in the 
war. In 1917 the war ended owing to several decisive events, including the US’s 
participation in the war in March and the Russian Revolution in October.  The 
Russian Revolution declared the principle of self-determination of peoples, 
which then had a great impact on colonized peoples of small nations. While the 
principle was targeted primarily at those small nations in Europe and Central 
Asia which had been under the domination of Tsarist Russia, it also influenced 
colonized people in Asia and Africa so that they began to hope for their own 
independence. The declaration of the principle of self-determination of peoples 
in the Russian Revolution preceded Edward Wilson’s declaration of the same 
principle on January 8, 1918.  
When Germany was almost defeated in the war, there was also a revolution 
in the country. On November 3, 1918, sailors broke out in revolt in Kiel. Then, 
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the revolution spread throughout the country, in whose major cities workers’ 
and solders’ councils were constituted. On November 9, the Spartacist League of 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and a group of revolutionary labors occupied 
Berlin and usurped the old regime. Korean poet Han Yong-Woon, one of the 
thirty-three representatives of the March 1st Movement , understood this German 
Revolution as influenced by the Russian Revolution. Han made this point in his 
“An Essay on Joseon’s Independence,” which he wrote in prison just after the 
March 1st Movement .9
The transformation of the world, which began during the First World War, was 
reflected by independence declarations. In particular, it is argued, the German 
Revolution following the Russian Revolution influenced the Tokyo Declaration of 
Independence in February 1919.10 The new era initiated by the German Revolution 
awakened colonized people to envision the future of self-determination. Self-
determination of peoples, however, presupposed restoration of national 
sovereignty and independence in colonized nations. Also, Wilson’s declaration of 
the principle of self-determination of peoples was simply reflecting the desire of 
colonized peoples, but was not meant to bring it to an actual implementation.11 
Peoples’ Self-Determination Based upon the Just and Humane Way
The Declaration of Independence, in correspondence to the global change for 
the rebuilding of the world, announced the Korean people’s self-determination 
before the world. At the same time, the principle of peoples’ self-determination 
was helpful to overcome the logic of social Darwinism which supported the idea 
of ability cultivation. During the era of the Korean Empire (1897-1910) Korean 
intellectuals, called Yurims, accepted Social Darwinism, according to whose 
progressive and developmental view of history weaker and inferior nations are 
dismissed while stronger and superior nations flourish. For instance, Yu Gil-Jun 
learned social Darwinism from Edward Morse while studying at the Denver 
Academy, Massachusetts in the US. Morse applied Charles Darwin’s theory of 
evolution to the social evolution of humanity. Yang Gye-Cho’s Eumbingsilmunjib 
also introduced social Darwinism to Korean intellectuals. 
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Awakened to the power of great nations by the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, 
Korean intellectuals began to embrace social Darwinism. While witnessing the 
world powers’ competition for as well as Japan’s invasion into Korea, they were 
convinced that the only way of Korea’s survival in this context was to enlighten 
the Korean people for the advancement of the Korean society. Meanwhile, prior 
to the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty social Darwinism supported the idea of 
cultivating the Korean people’s ability and strengthening the national power; 
however, after the treaty, ironically, it was used to justify Japan’s invasion of Korea. 
For both the Korean Empire’s deterioration or collapse and Japan’s development 
and invasion of Korea were justified and taken for granted by social Darwinism. 
As a consequent, social Darwinism turned out to be the logic of imperialism. It 
could not pose any criticism or alternative to Japan’s occupation of Korea. After 
the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty in 1910, Korean intellectuals convinced by 
social Darwinism found themselves at a loss without knowing how to develop 
the logic of restoring the lost national sovereignty.12
It is in this historical context that both the Russian and German Revolution 
embarked on rebuilding the world for the liberation of colonized peoples under 
the principle of self-determination of peoples, according to which each nation 
on the Earth has its own right of self-determination. The principle of peoples’ 
self-determination helped Korean intellectuals to overcome social Darwinism. 
Based upon the principle they elaborated the idea that the Korean independence 
belongs to the natural right of the Korean nation. In this vein, Yurim Lee Won-
Young, the leader of the March 1st Movement  at Yean (Andong, Gyeongbuk), 
stood before the court and said, “Every nation of the world should walk along 
its own way of justice and humaneness. This belongs to its natural rights. It is 
natural for me as a member of 10,000,000 Korean people to make efforts for 
national independence.”13 Participants in the March 1st Movement  regarded 
the way of justice and humaneness as the presupposition of Korea’s sovereign 
independence. The self-determination of the Korean nation, furthermore, was 
recognized as the major premise for the peace in East Asia which will save not 
only Japan but also the entire Asia. 
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“Peace in East Asia” and “Peace in the World”
 The conviction that the Korean nation’s self-determination, or independence, 
might contribute to the peace in East Asia and even to the peace of the world 
originated from the idea of three-in-harmony (Samhwa) in the era of the Korean 
Empire. The idea of three-in-harmony referred to the harmony of Korea, China, 
and Japan in East Asia, which was grounded upon people’s harmony (Inhwa). 
Kim Ok-Gyun and Choi Ik-Hyeon advocated this idea respectively.14 During the 
period of the Korean Empire when Western imperialism was threatening Asia, 
the idea of three-in-harmony asked for the attention and caution of the three 
countries in North East Asia regarding Western powers’ advance to Asia. Its main 
argument was that the three nations should join together to defend against the 
Western powers. 
Through the Sino-Japanese War (1894), the Russo-Japanese War (1904), and 
the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty (1910), however, Japan emerged as a great 
empire and then took the advantage of the Western imperialism. In the process 
the idea of peace in East Asia through the Korea-China-Japan solidarity was 
broken down.15 When it was not a great power yet, Japan also argued for the 
idea of peace in East Asia through solidarity of the three North East Asian nations. 
Once it became a great power, however, Japan distorted the idea of peace in 
East Asia in such a way to justify its supremacy over East Asia and its policy of 
imperialistic expansion. When it embarked upon the Russo-Japanese War, Japan 
announced that the war aimed to “preserve the independence of Korea and the 
peace in Far East Asia.”16 Six years later, however, Japan’s occupation of Korea 
through the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty confirmed that the announcement 
was simply a lie and deceit. 
Meanwhile, the peace in East Asia through solidarity of the three North East 
Asian nations, as originally sought by Korea,17 presupposed the relationship of 
“tripodal peace” among Korea, China, and Japan. The relationship of tripodal 
peace means that given the three legs of a tripod the loss of any leg of it would 
break the balance and finally destroy the tripod itself. Hence, all the legs should 
be intact in order for the tripod to preserve its integrity. This is an analogy for 
the desirable relationship among the three countries. This analogy refers to the 
coexistence of Korea, China, and Japan with mutual respect and equal authority, 
and also to the peace sustained by the balance of power and solidarity among 
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them. In the Korean Empire the idea of tripodal peace was developed for the sake 
of the peace and survival of small nations.18 It sought the survival of Korea amidst 
the advancing Western and Japanese imperialism. During the period from the 
Russo-Japanese War through Japan’s occupation of Korea Korean intellectuals 
pursued the peace in East Asia with this idea of tripodal peace. The idea was 
supported by the Confucian critique of state violence and imperialism.19
On the other hand, Japan destroyed the idea of tripodal peace by giving rise 
to the Sino-Japanese War (1894). Ten years later Japan joined the line of western 
imperialistic nations, and around 1910, the year of the Korea-Japan Annexation 
Treaty, jumped on the world order of social Darwinism in which the law of the 
jungle was taken for granted. In the process Japan advocated the peace in East 
Asia, and yet was hiding weapons under the slogan of peace. With this idea of 
military peace Japan pursued the expansion of its own power and relied upon 
its military forces. The peace of Japan was sustained by repressing the weak, 
controlling colonized people with military forces, and thereby silencing the 
society. It disguised the imperialistic domination with the slogan of peace.
Seven years after the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty, meanwhile, the world 
passed through another significant change. As mentioned above, the First World 
War broke out. The war and two revolutions in Russia and Germany replaced 
the old world order by a new world order. Leaders of the March 1st Movement 
were keenly aware of this global change and described the signs of the time by 
saying “The era of power passed away; the new era of righteousness has come.” 
In this vein they argued for peoples’ self-determination by further developing 
the earlier ideas of three-in-harmony and tripodal peace in the Korean Empire. 
Korea’s understanding of national self-determination for the sake of peace in East 
Asia as articulated in the March 1st Movement  contradicted Japan’s understanding 
of peace in East Asia in terms of military peace. The colonized Korea declared its 
right of self-determination, whereas the imperialistic Japan argued for the idea that 
the stronger prey on the weaker. Japan’s forceful repression brought the March 1st 
Movement  to an end. The peace in East Asia advocated by Japanese imperialism 
was one of military peace. Korea’s pursuit of peace in East Asia in terms of tripodal 
peace was frustrated by the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty in 1910, and even the 
March 1st Movement  could not achieve the original goal. In May 1920, one year 
after the March 1st Movement  failed to bring national independence but ended up 
an incomplete “Manse” demonstration, the March 1st Movement’s idea of peace 
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in East Asia came to the fore once again. At that time Korean newspaper Donga-
ilbo published an essay entitled “Kernel of Peace in East Asia,”20 in which peace in 
East Asia referred to peace in the relationship among three nations (Korea, China, 
Japan), and to the peace and development of all three nations (rather than of 
Japan alone). This newspaper insisted that the short cut to peace in East Asia is 
solidarity of the three nations with equal status and genuine freedom.
 
The Idea of Peace in the March 1st Movement  and 
the Christian Idea of Peace
 The Christian Idea of Peace as Witnessed by the Scriptures
Thus far I reviewed the idea of peace in the March 1st Movement ’s Declaration 
of Independence. I now turn to the idea of peace from the Christian perspective. 
According to biblical witnesses, peace is not something that humans can achieve 
for themselves, but a gift from God (“grace and peace,” Rom. 1:7). The peace that 
the birth of Jesus brought to the world corresponded to the glory of the heavenly 
God (Luke 2:14), and the reconciliation through the cross and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ brought it to a completion and also to a new beginning. The resurrected 
Christ gave his disciples “my peace,” which is “not like” the peace of the world 
(John 14:27). The peace of Christ is not like the peace of the Roman Empire (Pax 
Romana) which represses and silences people with its military force. 
Since it is a gift from God when viewed from the Christian perspective, peace 
is given only when we obey God’s will and thereby God is with us. In the Old 
Testament we read that prophet Isaiah urged King Ahas (735 BCE) to trust the 
God of Immanuel – that is, God’s being with us would bring peace by overcoming 
the threat of war. When the king refused to follow the advice, he became a 
victim of the war (Isa. 8:7). This event demonstrates that the presence of God is 
the precondition of peace.21 The peace that the presence of God brings to the 
earth is given to people who are faithful to the divine covenant in the form of 
justice, blessing, and salvation. The fruit of human righteousness is peace (Isa. 
32:17). The Hebrew word for peace, shalom,22 also means righteousness (mishor, 
Mal.2:6), faithfulness (emunah, 2 Sam. 20:19), and truth (emet, Esth. 9:30). In other 
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words, true peace comes to the place where humans live “righteously, faithfully, 
and trustfully” in the covenant with God (Isa. 59:8; Ezra 8:16).23 It is the peace 
accompanying God’s blessings – such as health, safety, joy, and happiness – as 
well as God’s salvation. 
Peace in Isaiah 11 and Peace in East Asia in the Declaration of 
Independence
Isaiah 11:6-9 portrays a peaceful world where righteousness and faithfulness 
prevails (cf. Isa. 65:25):24 
The wolf will live with the lamb, the leopard will lie down with the goat, the calf 
and the lion and the yearling together; and a little child will lead them. The cow 
will feed with the bear, their young will lie down together, and the lion will eat 
straw like the ox. The infant will play near the hole of the cobra, and the young 
child put his hand into the viper’s nest. They will neither harm nor destroy on all 
my holy mountain, for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the LORD as the 
waters cover the sea. 
In other words,25 when the Creator God comes as the Lord of all creatures, the 
food chain marked by the stronger’s preying upon the weaker will be dissolved 
and carnivores will be satisfied with vegetables alone. On the day the world will 
be totally transformed. In the current ‘dangerous’ world the wolf devours the 
lamb, the leopard hunts for the goat, and the lion chases the yearling; in the 
coming ‘safe’ world, however, brutal carnivores and weak herbivores will live 
together. The lion’s physical condition will change so that it can eat vegetables. 
Peace in this passage refers to the transformation of the dangerous world into 
the safe world. The peace between the young child and the viper implies that 
the divine curse on the viper as well as the enmity between the viper’s and the 
woman’s offspring (Gen. 3:14-15) will disappear. This peace becomes reality when 
the first sin of the first man Adam is washed away. (Adam’s sin was his arrogance to 
become like God, or trespassing his boundary.) Then all creatures, strong beasts 
or weak cattle, will enjoy freedom and live peacefully in equal relationship with 
each other. The peace will be realized in God’s holy mountain; and the coming 
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world of peace will be full of the knowledge of the Lord, which will ensure that 
God’s justice be established throughout the world. 
The peaceful world of Isaiah 11 presupposes change in humans’ way of life. 
Up until now humans have sought their own development at the sacrifice of 
other creatures and pursued their own prosperity by conquering neighboring 
nations. In addition, they believed that they could not survive, develop, and 
prosper without treading on and killing other living creatures. Ever since the rise 
of modernism developments in science and technology have been used as the 
means of conquest, whereby great empires colonized and exploited small nations. 
Such a desire for domination still exists, though in different forms. This way of life 
is self-centered and life-destroying. With this regard the biblical passage quoted 
above asks for repentance and transformation. It invites us to seek the peaceful 
world in which all humans and all other creatures enjoy freedom and equality on 
the foundation of justice. 
This biblical idea of peace is consonant with the idea of peace in East Asia 
as proposed in the March 1st Movement ’s Declaration of Independence. If we 
would apply Isaiah’s prophecy to the international affairs around 1910, it may be 
interpreted as proclaiming God’s judgment on the colonization of small nations 
by imperialistic powers and demanding the latter’s repentance. This is exactly 
what the Declaration of Independence meant. Also, the vision of peace in East 
Asia based on the ideas of three-in-harmony and tripodal peace corresponds to 
the peaceful world in which “the wolf will live with the lamb, the leopard will lie 
down with the goat, the calf and the lion and the yearling together” – that is, 
great nations and small nations co-exist peacefully. Hence, “the era of power” in 
which the stronger prey upon the weaker should have passed away and “the era 
of righteousness” in which justice and humaneness prevail should have come; 
the March 1st Movement  should have made Korea an independent nation of self-
determination, and the three nations in North East Asia should have been united 
with equal status and respective freedom. 
To our regret, however, the March 1st Movement ’s dream of peace in East Asia 
did not come true. For the following several decades Korea had suffered from the 
colonial rule by the Japanese imperialism. In fact, the peace proclaimed in Isaiah 
is the eschatological peace in the imminent future, rather than one that is to be 
realized today. Because such peace is a gift from God, the Korean nation hurried 
in waiting for the gift – until August 15, 1945, the day of national liberation.
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Conclusion
 For the first two months in the March 1st Movement  in Seoul, the movement was 
led by Christian leaders including Lee Sang-Jae, Park Seung-Bong, and Lee Seung-
Hun. They assigned Choi Nam-Seon to write the first draft of the Declaration of 
Independence, and then reviewed and revised it. 
These Christian leaders who participated in the writing of the Declaration of 
Independence were well versed in international affairs. Also, they had the idea 
of peace which was well-known among Korean intellectuals of the late 19th 
century. It was the idea of three-in-harmony for peace in East Asia and the idea of 
tripodal peace for peace among Korea, China, and Japan. Thus far I have shown 
that this idea of peace resonates with the biblical idea of peace – especially one 
that is found in Isaiah 11. 
The idea of peace in the Declaration of Independence assumed an awareness 
of the contemporary global change.  Small nations suffering from the colonial 
rule by great powers were awakened by the Russian and German Revolutions 
and embarked on their respective independence movements. In this vein Korea 
too organized the March 1st Movement  for the purpose of contributing to 
national independence and to the peace of the world. Its vision of the rebuilding 
of the world referred to the end of the imperialistic world in which the stronger 
prey on the weaker and the emergence of the peaceful world based on justice 
and humaneness through self-determination of peoples. It was nothing but the 
peace in East Asia grounded upon the ideas of three-in-harmony and tripodal 
peace.
The March 1st Movement  in Korea in 1919, however, failed to bring about 
national independence, and could not change anything in the international 
affairs. Again, this confirms that genuine peace is not something that humans 
can bring for themselves, but something to be given from God. 
In 2015 the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula and the peaceful 
order of the global world are more urgently in need than ever before. Hence, 
while awaiting the eschatological peace coming from heaven, we eagerly long 
for the “just peace” in which all nations and countries are united in solidarity with 
equality and freedom. 
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Ábrahám Kovács
Reformed Theology lives in a very pluralistic context yet the people adhering to 
the Calvinist tradition may encounter similar issues (various forms of oppression, 
marginalisation, persecution) despite living on different continents (Europe 
and Asia). This paper intends to study in a historical perspective how selected 
theologians like István Török and Ahn Byung-Mu dealt with and reacted to 
the challenges of left or right wing totalitarian or dictatorial governments in 
Hungary and Korea in the past. My intention at this stage of research is to bring 
the two theologies into dialogue with one another. I seek to offer a narrative 
and critical reflection on the theologies developed in differing contexts (and 
enunciate selected stories from their lives, analyse theologies  they addressed, 
or developed  and examine how their personal life journey interconnected with 
the theology they pursued in the public square as well as within the church. First, 
I deal with Török’s theological reflections on  the “Theology of the Narrow Road”, 
István Török’s and Ahn 
Byung Mu’s Reformed 
Responses to the 
Challenges Posed 
by Totalitarian and 
Dictatorial Regimes in 
Hungary and South Korea
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which gained currency as an infamous Hungarian theology named Theology 
of Service, a strange combination of Marxism and biblical faith. Hungary was 
a former communist country where one might have expected the emergence 
of a liberation theology but in fact it developed a less  well-known theology “a 
theology of service”. It did so voluntarily articulating a kind of theology moulding 
it into an ‘ecclesiatically worded ideology’, which became a  yoke, and represented 
the of true theological subjugation to atheist ideology. Secondly, I shall address 
the issue of how Ahn Byung-mu arrived at  another kind of indigenous or 
political theology, minjung theology. The paper also throws light on how little 
he talked about the corruptibility of human nature, the core issue of original sin. 
I raise for debate whether the lack of or lesser emphasis on the key theological 
faith-statement (doctrine), that is the reality of original sin, is responsible in both 
cases for the development of a kind of theology that either completely left the 
borders of theology (Hungarian case) and became an ideology or took on a form 
of theology (Korean case) where the core issue of biblical anthrophology stands 
on weak ground.  The first case is a great example of a critique of how church 
leaders abused power in a totalitarian system by creating a theology which is not 
biblical, but fitted their goal of self justification. The Korean case is a fine example 
that you do not necessarily need Marxism in order to stand against injustice and 
fight for the liberation of your own people. Both theologians suffered under 
totalitarian or dictatorial regimes and lost their jobs because they dared to stand 
for what they believed to be right.
István Török’s Critical Public Theology in the Age of 
Totalitarianism. What does the Red Star have to do 
with the Cross?
István Török, a professor of systematic theology was born in 1904 in Hungary. He 
earned his Master of Divinity at Debrecen  in by 1927, and pursued further studies 
for two years in Germany. In Münster he came under the influence of Karl Barth. 
Having returned from abroad, he received  the chair of systematic theology at 
Pápa and later moved to Debrecen where he taught from 1945. After the end of 
WW II., he raised a critical voice against the church leaders who collaborated with 
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the atheist Communist party. Owing to his participation inthe revolution of1956, 
he was dismissed from the Reformed Theological University of Debrecen, and 
his teaching was suspended for a year. Finally, a decade later  he was forcibly 
removed from his chair by Bishop Tibor Bartha in 1968.1 He was  succeeded by 
one of his former students, named Elemér Kocsis who also became a bishop 
during the harsh days of Communism. Török was an independent scholar, who 
like his master Karl Barth, took a stance against totalitarian ideology, in his case 
Communism. The focus of the first part of my paper is a critical reflection onone 
of his articles entitled “ The Theology of Service and the Narrow Road”  written in 
1980 when Communism still seemed to be a powerful and everlasting ideology.2 
At that time, Török articulated his thoughts on how the officials of contemporary 
Hungarian Reformed church leaders corrupted the gospel,  and drew attention to 
the fact that the throne and the altar made a false alliance. Török offered a sharp 
and bold criticism of how cunningly the leaders; theologians and bishops of the 
Hungarian Reformed community distorted the biblical message and developed 
a theology of service as it became known.
The aforementioned article was written at a time, in the 1980s, when any 
kind of criticism was brutally supressed by the totalitarian Communist regime 
in Hungary which presented itself as a country where freedom of speech 
wasrespected. In fact, it violated many aspects of human rights. What sad 
isthat Christian leaders, in particular Calvinist, lent support to this non-biblical, 
atheist often maniac regime that sought to uproot any form of Christian belief 
altogether.3 Taking this into consideration, it is fair to say that the responsibility 
of collaborators is far more than weighty. 
Török began  his critique with a succint observation regarding the name and 
nature of the kind of ‘theology’ articulated by Hungarian theologians who, in 
his view, served the Communist party more than Christ. The theology coined by 
Hungarian theologian, and later bishop Albert Bereckzy was named: theology 
of service  (in Hungarian: ‘a szolgálat teológiája’). At the beginning of his critical 
reflection Török wrote: “We have aligned ourselves to the theologies which use 
possessive forms of expression such as theology OF liberation,  theology of 
black people, that is  for example theology of black people, theology of death 
of God and alike and now we have also added to this list our own theology of 
service.”4 As we shall see Török, as a professor of systematic theology warned 
his readers and raised a  critical voice about how the church, and its theology 
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should not enter  the public sphere. He drew attention to where  the limits (and 
opportunities) of public theology are in a given political situation. To make his 
point understandable for his readers, in his essay he recalled a story from 1957 
when he had asked one of his fellow ministers who embraced Marxism without 
any critical voice “where the boundary of the service of the church is. Then the 
other person replied immediately without any hesitation: ‘Our service has no 
limit or boundaries’.”5 
Török pointed out that the aim of his question was directed towards whether 
what those in the church called service was really service in its true biblical sense. 
(To grasp Török’s point, it is vital to bear in mind that this story took place during 
Communism, only a year after the brutal supression of the 1956 revolution. 
The arrogant and self-assured response of the church official did not leave any 
space for any further questioning. Török observed: “I felt that the grossly general 
statement of the ideologist church leader came rather from an ideological 
conviction than from an endeavour inspired by true theological inquiry”.6 By 
reciting this story, Török set the context and tone of his own theological enquiry 
and at the same time, the Hungarian systematic theologian concluded his 
reflection  on their short encounter: “The person I had asked was a high ranking 
church official who confessed to being the chief  ideologist of the Reformed 
Church with a humourless (I would add grim) determination.”7 
The answer reminded him of another historical situation when the church 
faced another form of totalitarianism. The theologians articulating the six theses 
of the Barmen Confession written in 1934 set the boundary of the church by 
delineating and separating themselves from the majority of Christians who had 
subscribed to the totalitarian regime of Hitler.8 Török continued his reflections 
and compared his situation of Communist totalitarianism to that of the Nazi 
regime: “I am aware of the fact that one cannot say they were exactly the same 
therefore, there is no place for drawing an equal sign between them, because 
the situation of the German (Lutheran) church was different from ours. However, 
in 1957 the consequences of cult of personality (of Communist leaders) were a 
living experience  and reminded me of the fact that in Barmen not only an ad 
hoc statement was made in a given historical situation but a line was drawn, a 
boundary was set with universally valid authority.”9 
  It was Albert Bereczky who ‘prophetically’ developed the term Theology 
of Service around the turmoil of War War II.10 Shortly after the communists 
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gained control of the entire country he was appointed  as bishop withthe strong 
support of the totalitarian Communist party. Bereczky was initially an Evangelical 
Reformed Christian. “He was really aware of the fact that the church does not 
fight for a small piece of land that she possesses in the world but for the mission 
of Christ which he kept repeating as a slogan”.11 By omitting the history of the 
development of the term theology of service,12 it is sufficient here to state that 
Bereczky’s followers arrived at the conclusion as Török articulated it: “we have 
changed from a ruling/reigning church to a serving church”.13 He noticed that 
Bereczky’ successors  had simplified this form of ‘theology’ and sought to instill 
this ‘ideology’ into the theological discourse of the church and the  public 
square.14 It tried to do so by lending it a polemical edge which, of course, pleased 
the Communist party since it directly criticised the Reformed Church as part of 
the old establishment which  had also owned lands and properties, and had 
resources before the World War II, while masses of people15 lived in incredible 
poverty.16 Acknowledging that there is an element of truth in Bereczky’s and his 
followers’ claim, Török stated that we need to draw certain correctives to such a 
statement.
Before we attend to Török’s observation, I must say it was a smart and cunning 
shift in the argumentation by Bereckzy as it looked like a really appealing 
justification for the long awaited change in the church to go back to its original 
roots, the gospel where Christ called his followers to serve. Bereczky’s leftist 
political orientation, his social sensivity and revivalist eschatological pietas 
all together explain why he was critical with the ‘old regime and sympathetic 
toward to the idea of socialism. The political, social and economic position of the 
former feudal-capitalist Church which existed up to 1948 as a physical body, a 
visible entity often murked the spiritual mirror  of what Christ intended  for the 
church, his ecclesiola to be. This view, not surprisingly knowing Bereczky’s politial 
orientation and revivalist stance coincided with the aims and expectations of 
the communists who fanatically sought to establish a “New Kingdom” on earth. 
Similarly, revivalist Christians sought to renew not only the church but also the 
society. However, in their hasty endeavour, they did not see the risk of falling 
into the trap of marrying two entirely different views of the world, a theist, 
evangelical-pietist form of understanding the gospel and an atheist desire to 
establish the ‘eschatological basilea’.
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Claiming that the position of the church changed from a ruling to a serving 
church by the rise to power of communists, Bereczky alluded to the fact that the 
Christian churches were part of the social and cultural old establishment, that 
is the feudal-capitalism which had continued to exist in the Central European 
region. That political and social system  survived even  after the collapse of the 
Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy lasting till the end of World War II. It is a very sad 
moment in Hungarian national history that it was not the Small Holders Party 
which democratically won the elections under the leadership of Rev. Zoltán 
Tildy, a Reformed minister but communism that forced the Hungarians to start 
carrying out the profound restructuring of a society which was not tenable.17 
Permit me to make another crucial remark. I was fascinated and saddened by how 
the Kingdom of God theological perception of staunch believers in Reformed 
evangelicalism embraced the paradise like country envisioned by eschatological 
Marxism that developed into a totalitarian Communism which persecuted their 
own church. It seems contradictory, a bit schizophrenic perhaps. Yet, it seems 
from a phenomenological point of view  that the religious traits of both concepts 
of the ideal place of humanity either that of religion proper (Christianity) ora 
quasi-religion (Marxism) provide a framework which allowed for some of the 
fervent, often prophetic voices to shift and slowly drift from a theist worldview 
to an atheist one.18 The unsolvable and perplexing question is whether they were 
aware of the fact that by doing so they profoundly departed from the tenets of 
the Christian faith. Here comes a serious question: what does the Red Star have 
to do with the Cross paraphrasing Tertullian’s famous sentence what does Athen 
have to do with Jerusalem?.  
Before returning to Török’s three excellent observations about Bereczky’s and 
his followers’ false and distorted theology, let me emphasise that Török was able 
to perceive his church self-critically.19 He agreed with Bereczky’s observation to 
a certain degree. Nonetheless, he made three corrective observations which hit 
the core of the question as to how church and state should and could relate to 
each other in a given historical context, namely totalitarianism. Furthermore, he 
addressed the pressing evergreen question that most notably is this: where the 
boundary between the two kingdoms lies. God’s kingdom on earth and that of 
any political power as it is embodied in the state. Moreover, in his reflection, as 
we shall see, Török drew attention to the pressing issue of where the boundaries 
of proper theology are.
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The first observation about Bereczky’s theological-political slogan which 
is clearly a kind of defence, is really thought provoking. According to Török’s 
critique of  Bereczky’s observation the bishop offered a distorted interpretation 
of history. In fact it was Bereczky, a former revivalist who aided the Communist 
regime in uprooting all mission activities of the church. No wonder that Török 
sharply criticised him and reminded the bishop that  “we should not forget that 
the “ruling church of yesterday”20 had a far more diverse service that the church 
which is serving today.21 Amongst many things it had a well-established Sunday 
School network, youth work, various forms of student associations, Volkschule 
(Folk High School), charity institutes for diaconal work, foreign mission societies, 
thirty ecclesiastical periodicals dealing with various activities, a non-monopolised 
press etc. We may confess that we live on the fruits of the pastoral works of former 
times that had been dismissed”.22 
 This observation calls for some comments and requires some explanation 
for those notfamiliar with the history of the Reformed Church of Hungary. 
Török was bold to criticise openly the ‘Christian theology of Bereckzy’ which 
was deeply permeated by Marxist ideology. He dared to mention the exclusive 
hegemony of a press that did not allow for any other opinion except the one 
censored by the Communist party. Needless to say, he was also right that the 
Communist totalitarian regime sought not only to weaken all voluntary societies 
of the national churches but also wished even more, it sought to eradicate all of 
them. Since the aforementioned Christian societies functioned as associations 
organised by religious civilians of the state sharing a worldview, - in this case namely 
Calvinism -, the very existence of such networks was perceived as a potential 
danger to the regime where opposition could easly form itself into organised 
stuctures. There was the fear that such ‘reactionary’ people may attempt to 
overthrow the Communists who were backed by the Soviet Army. Therefore, the 
totalitarian nature of Communism evoked a brutal inner force from its believers 
to intimidate the church and anybody who was influential in its structure. The 
historical responsibility of the otherwise revivalist, and evangelical Bereckzy lies 
in the fact that he had effectively and readily helped the communists to eradicate 
all voluntary organisations of the Reformed Church of Hungary. In fact he was 
made the presiding bishop of the Reformed Church of Hungary to fulfill this task. 
Moreover, it is a historical fact that he was the first leader of a national Christian 
church in Hungary which signed the forced agreement between the Reformed 
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Church of Hungary and the newly emerging Communist state. It was suicidal. It 
resulted in the confiscation of all the properties of the church and undermined 
the spiritual life of congregations.23
Here It is vital to make another point so as to paint the theological and 
mission context within the Reformed Church of Hungary. Török referred to 
voluntary organisations that were the fruit of neo-orthodoxy and the revivalist 
groups of the nineteenth century Hungarian Reformed faith, or Kuyperian 
confessionalism of the early twentieth century transplanted from Scotland, 
Germany and the Netherlands respectively. It is also vital to note that most of 
such initiatives firmly rested on the traditional tenets of trinitarian biblical faith 
and not liberal, or modernist theology. It was the traditional Christian message 
which stirred a  revival in the church and managed to reach out to the public 
square, and various social layers of society. It is crucial to underline that the new 
orthodoxy and confessionalism had worked hand in hand since 1870s before 
revivalism of any sort emerged on a national scale that may be comparable in 
many ways to the spread of Western Christianity in Korea. The pinnacle of the 
confrontation  between orthodox and liberal theologies was in 1875 when the 
Declaration of Faith was made by the confessors of new orthodoxy in Debrecen 
which preceded the Barmen confession by more than a century.  Although, the 
Debrecen Confessio came into being not because of the issue about the  relation 
of church and state, it provided a biblical, Reformed response to the excesses of 
liberal theology exhibiting a different kind of totalitarian claim. 
What is similar in the stances of Debrecen Declaration of Faith, Barmen 
Confession or Török’s reflections is the attempt to  seek  and try to draw a clear 
boundary of the realm of theology on which later generations could stand. In 
other words, all of these confessions struggled with the question  of from what 
point a proper theology begins to mould into an ideology, a worldview which 
is essentially different in nature and substance from the core of the Christian 
gospel. Suffice it to stay that Török’s stance drew from two wells: the traditional 
Hungarian new orthodoxy which lingered on in various forms from the late 1880s 
till the aftermath of WW I and the fresh impetus of Karl Barth’s theology. The 
clear insistance on to the word of God provided the faith-based expression of 
conviction about the need to  set the realms of  the church and the state clearly 
and Török tried to remind the church in a period when he and his church were 
persecuted not to give in to the enourmous pressure arriving from a Communist 
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totalitarian regime often through the theologians and church leaders like 
Bereczky. He endeavoured to unmask the false theology that served not Christ, 
the head of the Church but the Communist totalitarian regime. 
This was a bold action from Török, and it cost him his carreer. Fortunately 
his life was spared, yet he was held under house arrest for long decades from 
the late sixties. What is remarkable about him is the sober word, and solemnity 
by which he accepted his percecution and he never allowed for any form of 
revenge which was often an overreaction of the persecuted of yesterday rising to 
power right after the breakdown of Communism.24 He lived into his late nineties 
and he offered many sober theological reflections to establish the process of 
reconciliation which unfortunately have not been followed.  
Török’s second observation was articulated as follows: “it is rather problematic 
to shift the responsibility to the ‘church of yesterday’ (alluding to the RCH before 
World War II) because traits of the ruling church were not embodied in the 
Reformed but the Roman Catholic Church.”25 According to Török who critised 
Bereczky’s successor the theologian and later presiding bishop of RCH Tibor 
Bartha, it could be stated that the characteristic of Hungarian Roman  Catholicism 
between the two world wars was restaurative (backwards looking). He added 
to this that the Roman Catholic church intended to protect and strengthen her 
actual social positions and endeavoured to maintain her power to the detriment 
of the Protestant denominations.26 The response of the Protestants to such a 
challange was, at the most, a vague imitation of the Roman Catholic endeavours 
which desired to maintain power. However, even this introduced  foreign, not 
proper elements into the mission and service of the Reformed Church of Hungary 
(between the two wars): it blended into our ministry an inclination (aptitude) to 
rule, and in so  doing, it corrupted the effeciency of our service.” 27
Let me comment on Török’s second observation. It must be stated that there 
were geographical areas where the Reformed Church of Hungary was in fact more 
powerful than the Roman Catholics. This was true in certain areas of the rich and 
fertile area called the Great Plain (Nagy Alföld). Here the RCH was  also a powerful 
landowner which suppressed the agricultural masses. One often wonders why 
it was in this geographical area that  revivalism took place within the RCH,  and 
secondly why it was fromsuch churches that new protestant congregations were 
formed. Was it only spiritual issues that interested the peasants, the masses, or 
behind the spiritual hunger was there also a social tension which contributed 
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indirectly to the restructuring of local societies that created new areas of power 
along religious lines. In other words, one must study revivalism before the 
Wars not only with traditional positivist theological approaches but also using 
sociology or religion, phenomenology and even psychology of religion to 
analyse the social, spiritual and intellectual realities of those times. Needless to 
say,  the lands of the RCH on a national scale were, of course,  almost insignificant 
as compared to  the vast properties of the Roman Catholic Church. Yet, I would 
underline that the national Reformed  church and her local congregations did 
also have possessions such as land and buildings. In local communities the 
propertyof the Reformed Church, legally owned by the current congregation 
but ode facto by the local minister was rented out t the peasants. Jenő Szigeti 
and László Kósa’s studies offer some preliminary insights into these issues.28 
Therefore, the Reformed clergy were also  landowners standing in the top layer 
of local society in rural communities. I would argue that  in certain regions they 
were more powerful than their Catholic counterparts. Why  is it then that new 
Protestant churches came into being such as Baptist, Adventist, Nazarenes and 
alike? Perhaps scholars should also study socio-economic aspect of revivals, and 
social layers as well as the interactions between various layers of society where 
a minister did not really read the Bible with a peasant in his home. There was no 
equality in life in most areas at all. It was unthinkable that even an evangelical 
minister would share  house worship with a peasant. Distances were vast  and 
supported by social protocols.29 
 Finally Török’s third comment was enunciated in his essay: “We should not 
suppress when speaking about our current situation, that quite a lot has stayed 
with us regarding the ruling inclinations brought  from the past. However, we 
cannot realise it in this new situation expect within the church, for instance ,the 
unparallelled extension of the power (tether) of the bishop in our history which 
has exceeded from time to time the lawful order, and exhibited an exercise of 
power disregarding even human rights”.30 He saw it as a ‘odd contradiction’  that 
in our country – taking over an alien political  and non-democratic model – the 
centralised power was extended to the detriment of the rights of congregations 
and pastors precisely during the time of the ‘serving’ church.31 These words 
exhibited a powerful biblical criticism of a totalitarian church regime that really 
collaborated with the atheist power. Török called  for reflection and challenged 
the ideology of  ‘theology of service’ that sought to flatter and please the 
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Communist party. He asked “whether we are right to state that in comparison 
with the church of yesterday we are the serving church”.32 The professor of 
Systematic Theology also observed  “all such attempts to monopolise are taken 
out by the fact that the serving church is not quite a capability but rather it is a 
task. In fact, it is the vocation (function) of the all-time church.”33
Finally, it is worth  taking Török’s warning into consideration even today in the 
21st century when the Church and State are attempting to forge a new alliance 
along the lines of patriotism and cultural identity. It is vital to distinguish between 
service for Christ and a servile attendance to the needs and demands of the state. 
The wrong anthropology of ‘Marxist Christianity’ distorted the message of the 
gospel. Secondly, Török clearly underlined that it is really vital to delineate what 
Christian faith is and what an ideology (he meant Marxism). It is vital to state in 
what sense  the two are different, because church leaders tend to speak  wrongly 
of an ‘ideological difference’ between Christianity and Communism with the 
Christian faith being entirely different to an ideology. “It is not a notion, or idea, 
but an acceptance of the Revelation of a Living God, a participation in a new 
life-renewing process that the Lord of the history of the world has begun and is 
leading towards a happy ending”.34 Török is right to claim that if one sees faith 
as a kind of ideology then one has not known that or has already given it up. In 
sum,  on the one hand it is misleading to emphasize that both Christianity and 
Marxism aim towards the well-being of men and women. On the other hand it is 
a potential danger, a evil to silence the reality of original sin and suppress it under 
the banner of ‘common aim’, that is creating a blissful and pleasurable  humanity.
Living in a democracy in Hungary, Török’s modest and humble but bold 
observations are still valid in 2015. Although, we do live in a democracy, but the 
correct, self-critical voices are lacking in the Reformed faith in Hungary which 
would pose the same question today: where the boundary of the service of the 
church is. To what degree can the Church work or collaborate with a State which 
openly propagates nationalistic aims and its Christian or non-Christian leaders 
see themselves as a true defenders of Chrisitan culture which is not necessarily 
the same as breaking down  evil in the lives of human beings with Christ’s salvific 
message. Is it not a false statement to speak of mission, service of the Reformed 
church which reaches out to the marginalised, socially deprived and disabled 
people with the money received from a secular state whose tax payers are vastly 
secular? Should not our service be financed from our own pockets and by our 
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local congregations? Do we preach the good news,  redemption from sin through 
the salvific death and and atonement of Christ and at the same time give our lives 
as a service of sacrifice with gratitude to our fellow strangers as the Heidelberg 
Catechism teaches? Or do  we do social work with a Christian garb where the 
message of Christ’s call for the repentance of sin is completely missing?
In the Central European region, Hungary and I believe, the ‘national churches’ 
of its neighbouring countries such as Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Croatia 
and others also encounter these issues. Irresponsible alliances, marriages of 
convenience may result in distorted theologies, and the wrong social and 
historical interpretation of their past as well as the failure to  raise a critical and 
prophetic voice may reduce the gospel, and true theology into a well-disguised 
ecclesiastical ideology such as “service of the church”.
Ahn Byung-Mu’s Christology, its Social and 
Theological Implications
South Korea experienced right wing military dictatorship while Hungary was 
under left wing totalitarianism. Korean Christians in the southern part of peninsula 
were not seen as arch-enemies of materialistic atheism, the chief ideology of the 
Communist state. Therefore the state did not seek to uproot them fromtheir 
Christian faith unlike in Hungary. However, if Christians engaged in social actions 
and dared to criticize the state for its misdeeds, then they did experience 
persecution. Faith and social action went hand in hand for some Christians 
who heard God’s voice to stand for and by the oppressed, the marginalised and 
exploited masses. They were not criticising the military regime politically but 
bravely raised their prophetic voices agains social and economic injustice. Ahn 
Byung-Mu’s life and work bears testiminary to this.35
Ahn Byung-Mu (1922-1996) was born in North Korea and like so many Koreans 
during the Japanese occupation period, moved with his family to Manchuria. Ahn’s 
father was a scholar of Confucian classics as well as an Oriental herbal medicine 
doctor and taught Ahn the Confucian classics at a very young age. Ahn moved to 
a nearby town and lived with relatives in order to continue his schooling and it was 
there that he first encountered Christians and started attending church. When Ahn 
was in the sixth grade his mother and he and his brother left his father due to his 
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heavy drinking and his having a concubine. He continued his education in Christian 
schools and eventually moved to Seoul where he studied sociology at Seoul National 
University. Following his graduation he went to Germany to study theology where 
he remained for ten years before receiving his doctorate in New Testament from 
Heidelberg University in 1966. While in Germany he was influenced by the thought 
of Bultmann and became concerned with the question of the historical Jesus.
Upon his return to Korea Ahn joined the theology faculty of Hanshin 
University until he was forced to resign in 1975 because of his participation in 
the democratic movement. A turning point in his life came with the suicide of a 
young factory worker and union organizer in 1970. Ahn “interpreted the death 
as a self-transcending action.”36 From that time on he sought to develop a new 
way of doing theology and he became one of the founders of the minjung 
theology movement. In 1976 he was put in prison and was later released because 
he suffered from heart problems. Following Park Chung-Hee’s assassination in 
1979 he was reinstated to his professorship at Hanshin University only to be 
forced to resign six months later by the Chun Doo-Hwan government. In later 
years he founded a research center, Korea theological Study Institute and Mission 
Education Center that focused on theology, culture, and society and was active 
in the theological world until his death.37
Ahn Byung-Mu was one of the leading theologians of twentienth century 
Korea. He studied in Germany between 1965-1974 for nine years under the 
supervision of Günther Bornkamm at Heidelberg University. He was influenced 
by Bultmann.38 Daniel J. Adams in his book entitled “Korean theology in historical 
perspective” wrote: “Minjung theology is a conscious attempt to carry out the 
theological task from the Korean cultural and historical perspective. It took the 
indigenous theology debate into the social context of Korea during the period of 
the military regimes and Korea’s rapid industrialization. Because of this, minjung 
theology is known, not as a form of indigenous theology, but rather, a form of 
contextual theology. Whereas indigenous theology sought to make Christian 
theology relevant to the cultural environment of Korea, contextual theology 
moved a step further and sought to develop a Christian theology making use of 
the resources found within the Korean context. Minjung theology is truly a Korean 
theology.”39 Küster emphasises that minjung is a political theology interpreted 
into a Korean context and Ahn gave a unique biblical foundation to the emerging 
minjung theology.40 It is obvious for us to see that the conceptualisation of what 
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minjung theology is articulated differently. However, Ahn’s contribution calls for 
attention for a number of reasons.
Before investigating his theology which stood against the dictatorship in 
Korea during the 1970s and 1980s, we try to understand to whom he addresses 
his theology. It was the people, the marginalised, exploited factory workers, 
or peasants in agricultural communities whom he cared for. “The key to 
understanding minjung theology is found in the meaning of the term minjung 
in which min refers to ‘people’ and jung refers to ‘the masses.”This is a Korean 
word for which there is no precise or exact translation but minjung is usually 
loosely translated as “the people,” “the masses,” or “the masses of people.” The 
significance of this term during the period of Korea’s military regimes and rapid 
industrialization is that the masses of people were oppressed politically and 
exploited economically. Official government economic policy during these years 
was built upon producing goods which could be exported abroad at competitive 
prices. This meant that workers were paid low wages, employees worked long 
hours often under dangerous conditions, all forms of union activity and collective 
bargaining were forbidden, and there was no way for the masses of people to 
participate in the political process.”41 
As a member of the student Christian movement Ahn went into factories and 
to the countryside where he lived and worked with the workers and farmers. 
Therefore he obtained first-hand information about the lives of people and was 
not pursuing theology from an armchair as many Western theologians did.42 
Adams pointed out that South Korea “was, quite literally, controlled by three 
groups of people — politicians, the military, and business leaders. Members of 
these three groups intermarried and after retiring from one group took positions 
in the other two groups. Thus a military general would become a politician, and 
after retiring from government service, take a position on the board of directors 
of a business group. While it is true that this alliance was initially responsible 
for Korea’s economic growth, it is also true that the minjung —the masses of 
people —were completely denied any role in deciding their own fate. Korea in 
those days was a very different country than it is today. Minjung theology had its 
origins through various Christian organizations that were engaged in ministries 
with the workers.”43
After returning from Germany, Ahn developed a theology that moved 
beyond Bultmann’s existentialism. His deep belief was that “in the suffering of 
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the minjung we encountered the suffering of Christ”.44 There were several stories 
that had impacted his life. He encountered the han of the minjung, Kwon Jin-
kwan has articulated excellently that “Han is an accumulated feeling of long –
time sufferings” and retold the story of Kim Jin Sook.45 There are a lot of deeply 
moving stories of factory workers who were exploited by the ruling classes.  Ahn 
emphasised the lay element in the church and decided to minister to the family 
members of political prisoners and victims of the military dictatorship.46 His 
theology shows a special Christological interpretation that may be perplexing 
for conventional theologians. Ahn suggested that Christ died with the people 
rather than for the people.47 
During the summer of 1980 some eighty-seven professors were dismissed 
from their university teaching positions.48 Included among those dismissed were 
the minjung theologians Ahn Byung-Mu  professor of New Testament at Hankuk 
Theological Seminary (now Hanshin University), Suh Nam-Dong professor of 
systematic theology at Yonsei University, Suh Kwang-Sun dean of the College 
of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Ewha Women’s University, and Kim Yong-Bock 
a lecturer in theology at Ewha Women’s University and later a professor at 
the Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary. Some in this group were 
imprisoned on multiple occasions and at least one suffered severe torture at the 
hands of his interrogators. During the period of their dismissal all were forbidden 
to engage in any form of employment or to receive contributions from abroad. 
They supported their families as best they could through engaging in translation 
and writing projects. Friends, family members, and sympathetic foreign visitors 
helped whenever possible, but the professors soon learned what it was like to 
be a member of the minjung. They became powerless, their economic resources 
were limited, and they were targeted by those in power as ‘trouble makers.’
One unintended result of this forced period of inactivity was that these 
theologians had time to write and organize their reflections into a coherent 
theological movement. Although public meetings were banned, minjung 
theologians found ways together for discussions secretly  and to share information. 
During these years there was a great outpouring of minjung theology in journals, 
books, and unpublished manuscripts that were privately circulated. One of the 
most comprehensive collections of essays on minjung theology –  and still one 
of the best introductions available on the subject – was a book entitled Minjung 
Theology: People as the Subjects of History, published in 1981. Originally edited by 
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Kim Yong-Bock the book was immediately banned in Korea.  It was later reissued 
for international distribution with a Preface by James F. I. Cone but without Kim 
being listed as the editor, no doubt to afford him at least minimal protection 
from the authorities.49 The outpouring of minjung theological literature during 
the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s was immense although most of it has never 
appeared in English translation.50
As the minjung theologians reflected upon the socio-political situation in 
Korean society at the time, they felt the need to develop a theology that was 
deeply rooted in the Korean historical, cultural, and religious context. At least 
seven roots or sources of minjung theology can be identified. These are (1) human 
experience, (2) revitalization movements, (3) cultural renewal movements, (4) 
revelation, (5) scripture, (6) dialectical thought, and (7) unique events in the 
historical process. Each of these was in some way relevant to the experience of 
the masses of people. Although most of the minjung theologians wrote on all of 
the above topics as they were interrelated in the culture, each also wrote with a 
specific topic as a subject of one or more essays.” 51
Three theologians stand out in terms of a minjung perspective on biblical 
studies. Ahn Byung-Mu is a first generation minjung theologian and one of the 
founders of the movement. Moon Hee- Suk, while not a minjung theologian 
per se, did write on the topic and supported the minjung movement. Yim Tae-
Soo, a second generation minjung theologian, has been an advocate of minjung 
theology for many years and continues to teach and publish minjung theology. 
All three have made it clear that Scripture is of vital importance to minjung 
theologians and serves as one of the major roots or sources of minjung theology.
Ahn’s theology is centered upon the person of Jesus. He criticised the 
existentialist approach of Bultmann’s school. In his opinion his picture of Jesus 
led to a dead end. Küster pointed out that Ahn had “castigated the convergence 
of radical criticism and the Lutheran doctrine of justification – which becomes 
apparent in Bultmann’s theology – for conservatism. Bultmann simply replaced 
Luther’s ‘gospel’ with ‘kerygma’ thereby suspending the question of the historical 
Jesus.”52 In contrast to liberal theology’s Jesus-research in the nineteenth century, 
Ahn is interested in the “historical” Jesus, in the sense that he is present in our 
history time and again. Thus, he criticizes Bultmann’s kerygmatic theology, but 
agrees with him as far as his hermeneutic attitude is concerned that a pure 
historical reconstruction of Jesus does not make sense. “And he was also correct 
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in thinking: Why do we ask for the historical Jesus? [...] A Jewish young man, what 
does it mean if we could reconstruct precisely who he was?”53
As he wrote in 1992, “The quest forJesus was my life long task. It was not 
just my religious belief but a task that cannot be separated from my life itself. 
An interpreter is not an observer, but a participant.”54 In Adams’ interpretation 
Ahn’s theology is an interplay between Christology and the minjung.55 When 
Ahn began to study the life of Jesus within the context of his involvement with 
the social struggles of the minjung of Korea, he discovered that the objective 
historical-critical method of the West was inadequate. Küster rightly pointed out 
the following: “In contrast to Bultmann’s attempt, Ahn wanted to “differentiate 
fundamentally between the eschatological kerygma of the institutionalized 
Church and the Jesus-event of minjung theology.”56 With such a theological 
interpretation was challenged Bultmann’s dictum that the gospels are the 
expanded kerygma. Rather, Ahn underlined that “in the beginning there was the 
event, not the Kerygma”.57 In the same article Ahn explicated it further claiming 
that the kerygma “was primarily concerned with the meaning and not with the 
description of the Jesus-event”.58
As he stated to a group of German theologians who were interested in 
minjung theology: ”Value judgments always play a part; objectivity is not the 
goal....For us, value judgments are always implied.”59 Once freed from the western 
conception of objective truth to which all theology had to be held accountable, 
Ahn felt ready to embark on a different theological path. In his study of the 
Gospels Ahn noted that Mark used a different word for the people than did the 
other Gospel writers. Mark used the term ochlos some thirty-six different times. 
The word means ‘people’ or ‘the masses.’ Küster wrote: “He postulates a radical 
change of positions—whoever wishes to be first, shall become the servant of 
all others. The Gospel of Mark is a scripture with a hierarchy-critical tendency, 
which displays a short period of Jesus’ human life before he was put on trial as 
the “biography of the exemplary suffering righteous one.”
18 
He proclaims the 
kingdom of God to the ochlos, whose magnificence is experienced by these 
people in the short period of his public actions in his unconditional commitment 
to them. The Jesus-movement appears as a counter community (Mark 10:42-45), 
which is characterized by inner solidarity and a willingness to endure conflicts 
with its surroundings. Ahn postulates an analogy between the relationship of 
Jesus with the Markan ochlos and the presence of Jesus Christ among the Korean 
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min-jung. The ochlos is a group of reference, which shows God’s “option for” the 
minjung.”60
Ahn favours to speak of the ochlos as the crowds which followed Jesus. In the 
gospels theywere a specific people, people from the peripheries of society such 
as the sinners, the tax collectors, and the sick. They were situated not only on the 
margins but also regarded by the majority as the outcasts of society. Nonetheless 
these were the people for whom Jesus had compassion, whom Jesus likened 
to his family, and whom Jesus taught. Küster states rightly “They were, in Ahn’s 
view, the minjung of Jesus’ day.
Ahn also observed that the life and ministry of Jesus was carried out in 
reference to the ochlos. To put it differently, Jesus was who he was in part 
because of his constant interrelationship with the ochlos. This made Ahn ask 
the question anew concerning the so-called historical Jesus with which he was 
indoctrinated by German theology. He became far more interested in such issues 
as who Jesus really was in his interrelationship with the crowds of people who 
pressed up against him, who came to him for deliverance and healing, and who 
listened to his teachings.
For Ahn the answer to these questions was found in the suffering of Jesus 
and his identification with the suffering of the ochlos. He contemplated deeply 
what true Christology was in his own context. This was expressed as described 
below: “In fact Jesus suffered in the same condition as “us.” He tasted the same 
suffering “we” are undergoing. This understanding made his followers feel that 
his suffering and death were “for us.” Therefore, in the darkness where no deity 
was intervening, the people understood the meaning of his suffering and death. 
That is, he suffered “for our sake.” This understanding enabled them to overcome 
their despair.”61
The unifying element between the ochlos and Jesus was the experience of 
suffering and “this understanding made Jesus the messiah and led eventually 
to Christology.”62 Ahn, as a minjung theologian, linked the ochlos of Jesus’ day 
and the minjung of his day. However, the pressing question still was at hand 
regarding the true nature of Christology. According to Adams’ interpretation 
was pondered whether the suffering of Jesus with the minjung of his day was 
a one-time event never to be repeated? The breakthrough for Ahn came in his 
meeting with the mother of a student who burned himself to death as part of 
a protest demonstration. It is remarkable as …. drew attention to the fact that 
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in minjung theology the concept of ‘event’ occupied a very crucial place.63 She 
told him, “One thing I get from every meeting is that wherever young students 
are, I feel the spirit of my lost son. I see Jin among them. I have met my lost 
son and my Lord Jesus during demonstrations, on campuses, and especially at 
the last memorial ceremony of the April 19th student revolution.”64 Following 
this encounter Ahn wrote, ”After decades of biblical study, I could not find the 
historical Jesus; however, the mother of a sufferer made everything clear.”65
Adams observed that Ahn made a dramatic shift in his Christological thinking 
from the doctrine of the ‘once for all’ Christ event to the idea of ‘here and always’ 
Christ event.66 In his critique of Bultmann Ahn stated: “In the beginning there 
was the event, not the kerygma.”67 Here there is a parallel to the development 
of a theology which is a theology of “possessive’, a theology of something. If 
one remembers István Török’s warning, it is discernible just like Hungarian 
theologians e.g. Bereczky tried to please the Communist state which had a 
false anthropology, Ahn also made a compromise at the expense of the core of 
Christology. Neither the Hungarian nor the Korean liberal theologians realised 
that an improper theological anthropology which does not take original sin, 
that is, the corruptibility of human nature seriously, creates a new ideology 
which should not be called as theology. It is in fact a ‘replacement theology’ 
that substitutes itself for true and biblical theology (most notable replacing a 
correct Christology and anthropology). Then the ideology (in the Hungarian 
case the Marxism, in the Korean case the social sensitivity (whether one stands 
on the political right or left wing) was traded in, of course with good intentions 
though probably unconsciously, and tarnished  the true meaning of the gospel. 
True Christology resides in the realisation of the wickedness of human nature, 
and cries for spiritual salvation which immediately and imminently begins to 
shine, and throw light on social structures, challenges atheism, capitalism, and 
self-deification of Korean dictators or totalitarian Hungarian Communist party 
leaders.
Needless to say, it is admirable to see Christians fight for social justice but it 
cannot replace the struggle of each individual with evil every day within him or 
herself, and surrendering oneself to Christ’s saving act to became a new being 
in Christ. According to Adams Ahn discovered in the suffering of the minjung, 
that Christ is suffering once again on our behalf. However, he concluded that 
the incarnation is not a one time event. Jesus’ life, death and resurrection are 
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the events in which God revealed himself to the world. For Ahn the theological 
concept of event manifests the historicity, the concreteness and factual tangibility 
of Christian faith.68 Ahn explained what he meant as follows: “The core of the 
Christ event is his crucifixion and resurrection. However, if it happened once for 
all, what does it mean for us? If we regard it as having happened once 2,000 years 
ago, we confine the Jesus event to a limited time (A.D. 30) and to the limited 
space of Golgotha. Then, what does it mean to us...? We do believe Jesus was 
the incarnate God. However, if the incarnation happens only once, how are we 
able to see the incarnated Jesus?”69 The incarnation of Jesus is repeated time 
and time again in and through the suffering of the minjung.70 Ahn’s study of the 
New Testament and his experience with the minjung led him to conclude that 
Christology and the minjung are intertwined and cannot be separated one from 
the other. In a sense it is the minjung who made –and who continue to make – 
Jesus the Messiah.71 Ahn does not seem to realise that Incarnation with a capital 
‘I’ may refer rightly to Christ’s once for all action. This is a really core message 
of the gospel which must stand firmly, However, he may speak of the incarnate 
God revealing himself to us, and in a special way/meaning he ‘incarnates’ himself 
in us. Nonetheless it would be far better to develop a sophisticated distinction 
between the Incarnation of Logos, Christ and the act of Christ working in his 
followers that might be seen as allowing the incarnate God to work within us as 
fallible human beings. Ahn’s Christology has its own strengths but really lacks 
serious systematic theological reflection. One must move beyond the necessary 
task of exegesis, and the imperative call to have a prophetic voice in society to 
measure all things, deeds and motivation of heart on the scales of the Word of 
God.
Conclusion
Török lived in a totalitarian Communist state that was controlled by a cruel, 
godless, and merciless far left wing Marxism whereas Ahn Byung-Mu’s social 
and political context was a right wing dictatorship. They both dared to raise 
a prophetic voice in society in the 1970s and 1980s. Although living far apart 
in terms of space the very fact that Christians are called to stand for the truth 
Jesus proclaimed became manifest in their lives, existence and theology. One 
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directed his challenge against the leadership of the collaborating church while 
the other addressed the social injustice of the state, thereby evoking its fury. Both 
theologians experienced persecution, and are fine exemples of Christians who 
stood for their faith in times of despair, distress and persecution. Their courageous 
theology and Christian actions must be known to the West. It is notable that 
Bonhoeffer is well-known, but that second world theologians like Török or Ahn 
have a much lower level of recognition. However, the difference is that Török 
did not succumb to any temptation of a ‘possessive’ form of theology but tried 
to remain a theologian of the Word like a Barthian scholar, or even Calvin or 
Augustine. Ahn, although he really sincerely fought against the social, economic 
and political evil of his time, does not seem to address the core issue of the utter 
corruptibility of human nature, a universal teaching of Christianity. Therefore 
he was exposed to the influence of an ideology (be it what later research may 
identify) creeping into his theology without even noticing it. The social, political 
and national aspects also call for more research, and I believe that through 
contemplative discussion, and comparisons, there is much food in the life and 
theological contribution of both scholars that may allow for some correctives to 
the narrative and description of Western European theological discource.
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Yoon-Jae Chang 
The history of humankind is rife with warfare. During the past 3500 years of 
human history on record, only 300 years were free of war; during the other 3200 
years, humans ceaselessly slayed each other.1 Therefore, in truth, humankind 
does not abide in peace, but only temporarily experiences moments of peace in 
the midst of endless war. 
The history of Korea is no exception. From ancient times, Korea has been invaded 
975 times by foreign powers. And the history of modern Korea also began with foreign 
invasion, colonization, brute violence and war. This time, Korea became the victim of 
modern Japanese imperial wars in Asia and the Pacific. The Korean peninsula served 
as a battlefield for the Sino-Japanese war (1894) and the Russo-Japanese war (1904). 
From 1910, Korea suffered under Japanese colonial rule for 36 years. 
In this paper, however, I will not talk about the war itself, but the people who 
were dragged into war, i.e., the victims of war, particularly women victims. We 
have talked enough about the war from men’s perspectives and soldiers’ point of 
view; and yet, we have not paid much attention to war’s ‘womanly face.’2 Healing 
begins with listening – listening to the stories of those many women whose body 
was raped, whose dignity was destroyed, and whose heart was broken. I’d like to 
share with you their stories in this paper – the stories of “Halmonis” (grandmas) 
who became Japanese military sexual slavery, i.e., ‘comfort women.’ Let me 
introduce to you the story of Jeong Seo-Woon Halmoni, who was forcefully taken 
away from her hometown to a Japanese ‘comfort station.’ She died in 2004 and 
this special video clip was produced with actual voice of her.3 
War, Nation-State,  
and Women:  
A Religious Interpolation
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The so called ‘comfort women’ system was the planned, organized, systemic 
human trafficking and sexual enslavement of hundreds of thousands of young 
women all over Asia – primarily from 11 Japanese colonies – by the Japanese 
Imperial Army from 1932 to 1945.4 The ‘comfort women’ system was the 
industrial-scale factory farming of rape; the wholesale, organized, rationalized 
procurement, imprisonment, torture, brutalization, sexual enslavement, and 
terrorization of women on a scale unseen in modern history. 
After the war, this history of barbarity was whitewashed out of the record as 
policy, politics, and prejudice conspired to facilitate amnesia. Comfort women 
who had survived the torture, beatings, mutilations and daily rapes – up to 50 
times a day – were often shot or fragged to conceal evidence of war crimes by 
retreating Japanese soldiers. Another 40% were estimated to have committed 
suicide during their enslavement. In all, historians estimate that only one out of 
four women enslaved would survive, a death rate higher than that of frontline 
combat soldiers or African slaves during the middle passage at the height of 
transatlantic slave trade. This makes the ‘comfort women’ issue one of the largest, 
unacknowledged atrocities of the twentieth century. 
While it is unclear how many women were actually kidnapped, conscripted, 
tricked, and sold into sexual slavery – because most records were destroyed by 
administrators afraid of retribution – numbers generally range into the hundreds 
of thousands. What is irrefutable, however, is that the comfort women system 
was systematically organized, planned, and administered by the Japanese 
government. Women had to be issued passports and visas issued by military 
authorities to travel to far off colonies; comfort women were transported by 
military ships and convoys; the ‘comfort stations’ were usually managed and 
run by the military (or subcontracted to the military), often inside or adjacent 
to military bases; and army medics ‘inspected’ the women, and also used them 
for human experimentation: How many times can a woman be raped? How can 
STDs (Sexually Transmitted Diseases) be transmitted or prevented?
For seventy years, the Japanese government (aided and abetted by the 
US) denied the existence of the system of comfort women. The small number 
of women who survived retreated into the shadows, wracked with illness, 
nightmares, debilitating pain and shame. The majority of them were sterile from 
the extreme sexual violence, and many carried the secrets of their broken bodies 
to their graves. Then in 1991, a single Korean woman came out and broke the 
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silence. Once one poet said: “What would happen if one woman were to tell the 
truth of her life? The world would split open.” Kim Hak-Sun Halmoni was that 
woman, and when she came out with her story, she split wide open the closed 
world of Korean-Japanese history: she gave courage to others to share their 
stories, and slowly, hesitantly, they came out to denounce the Japanese, voices 
trembling from a half-century’s burden of shamed silence and outrage. Here is 
the story of her ‘coming-out.’5
The courageous woman, Kim Hak-Sun Halmoni, who first broke the silence 
and split wide open the closed world of lie and hypocrisy, died in 1997 at the 
age of 73. In fact, many Halmonis are leaving us one by one even before the 
resolution of this issue. Many of these Halmonis are artistically gifted and they 
showed their amazing talent of painting pictures. Kang Duk-Kyung, Kim Bok-
Dong, and Kim Soon-Duk Halmonis painted their own experiences, nightmares, 
and hopes to achieve recognition of the ‘comfort women’ issue as a war crime, 
thereby preventing the reoccurrence of such crimes. I’d like you to appreciate 
their masterpieces.6
After all, Korea was liberated from Japanese colonialism in 1945 following 
the end of the World War II. Two nuclear bombs were dropped in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, thus making Japanese people world’s first nuclear victims. 
However, not many people know the fact that one-tenth of these nuclear 
victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were Koreans who were drafted there by 
force during the Japanese occupation, thus making Korean people world’s first 
nuclear victim as well.7 This year President Obama made a visit to Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial Museum. He said that the memory of Hiroshima must never 
fade, but did not apologize for the US attack. Does he ever know, however, that 
a monument was built within a stone’s throw in memory of the Korean nuclear 
victims? 
In 1945, Korea was liberated from Japan, but the Korean Peninsula was divided 
immediately into two by the superpowers of USA and USSR. The division brought 
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, but we could feel the agony and conflict 
of division even before the War. For example, the Jeju April 3 incident was 
indeed the tragedy of national division. The isolated Jeju was a massive prison 
of massacre by the government soldiers and ultra-rightists. It was a state terror 
against people under the cloak of a “Red Hunt.” The remains found in Darangshi 
Cave in early 1992 became the symbol of the Jeju uprising from the moment of 
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their discovery.8 The remains were vivid evidence government forces’ merciless 
scorched-earth operation against the victims. 
In the 1950-1953 Korean War, the quantity of bombs dropped on Korea 
exceeded the amount dropped on the entire European region during World War 
II. The death toll from the disastrous was exceeded six million, including soldiers 
from the South and the North, the USA, the UN and China; and South North 
civilians. In addition, the war yielded three million refugees and more than 10 
million separated families, whose aged members are now dying of old age, still 
lonely and missing their loved ones. The past 60 some years under the unstable 
condition of armistice has been a time of anxiety and fear, as war can break out 
again at any time. Let me show you a video clip regarding a short reunion of the 
separated families.9
As you have seen, they met for 3 days only after 50 year of separation. After 
3 days of reunion, however, they had to be separated again, this time probably, 
for good. That’s why they looked sadder when they had to say good bye after 3 
days of their temporary reunion. Can you imagine such a pain, such a bitterness, 
such an absurd situation? Indeed, the generation of separated families is rapidly 
passing. Tragically, however, Korea is still divided, and families and communities 
still separated. Who can comfort them and console their pains?
The Bible says: “Comfort, comfort my people, says your God.” (Isaiah 40:1) 
“Shout for joy, O heavens; rejoice, O earth; burst into song, O mountains! For 
the LORD comforts his people and will have compassion on his afflicted ones. 
But Zion said, ‘The LORD has forsaken me, the Lord has forgotten me.’ ‘Can a 
mother forget the baby at her breast and have no compassion on the child she 
has borne? Though she may forget, I will not forget you! See, I have engraved 
you on the palms of my hands; your walls are ever before me.’” (Isaiah 49:13-16) 
“How beautiful on the mountains are the feet of those who bring good news, 
who proclaim peace, who bring good tidings, who proclaim salvation, who say 
to Zion, ‘Your God reigns!’ Listen! Your watchmen lift up their voices; together 
they shout for joy. When the LORD returns to Zion, they will see it with their own 
eyes. Burst into songs of joy together, you ruins of Jerusalem, for the LORD has 
comforted his people, he has redeemed Jerusalem. The LORD will lay bare his 
holy arm in the sight of all the nations, and all the ends of the earth will see the 
salvation of our God.” (Isaiah 52:7-10)
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The Korean Armistice of 1953, which called for a peace process and the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Korean peninsula, may have temporarily 
stopped the hot war in Korea. Six decades later, however, no peace treaty or 
agreement has replaced the Armistice Agreement. In 1994, as President Clinton 
then was contemplating a first strike against North Korea over its nuclear 
program, the US Department of Defense estimated that an outbreak of war on 
the Korean peninsula would result in 1.5 million casualties within the first 24 
hours and 6 million casualties within the first week.10 Moreover, the division is 
costly. Currently North Korea and South Korea spend $4 billion and $34 billion, 
respectively, on their annual military budgets.11 Outsized military spending 
diverts critical resources that should be prioritized for domestic human needs. 
What is worse, the national division and unresolved Korean War is the major 
source of tension in Korea and Northeast Asia. It is an excuse for massive military 
buildup by South and North Korea, as well as Japan and China. The threat of war 
gives North Korea justification to continue its Military First policy and to develop 
nuclear weapons for deterrence. South Korea also uses the threat of war to wield 
its National Security Law to silence political dissidents. Annually, the United States 
holds massive joint military exercises with South Korea that include simulated 
nuclear strikes against North Korea. We also impose heavy sanctions on North 
Korea that harm the people, not the leadership, of that country. 
Let me introduce to you another short video clip of a speech by the South 
Korean representative to UN. When the UN Security Council was voting to impose 
economic sanctions against North Korea for its human rights issues, Mr. Oh Jun, 
the South Korean Ambassador to UN, spoke this before the Security Council.12
“For South Koreans, people in North Korea are not just anybodies,” said 
Ambassador Oh Jun.  For those outsiders who think rationally and reasonably, 
North Korea could only be a pain in their neck. However, they are not just 
“anybodies” but “somebodies” for us South Koreans.  Millions of South Koreans 
still have their families in North. So, when you impose sanctions against them, we 
feel like that you impose it against on us. You may say that we are “emotional”; yes, 
but you have to understand that the division of this country is first and foremost 
very “emotional” issue, for we are human beings who have flesh and soul.
We the Korean churches, as people of faith, have confessed that we are called 
by the Gospel to seek the peace of Christ rather than that of the world, for as Jesus 
himself said “Peace I leave with you; my peace I give to you. Let not your hearts 
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be troubled, neither let them be afraid.”(John 14:27) We Korean Christians believe 
that the division of the Korean Peninsula and its human costs does contradict 
God’s will for the fullness of life. It is a sin against God and humanity. Therefore 
we believe that churches are called to transform themselves and to engage in 
healing and reconciliation of Jesus Christ. We long for peace, for Christ is peace. 
As the Church, therefore, we should heal the wounds of the people who suffer 
from war, longing for genuine peace.
As I mentioned, Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945, but we are not fully 
liberated. Peace and reunification is real liberation for Korean people. This is 
same to our Halmonis, or grandmas, who were drafted to the ‘comfort women’ 
system. After the end of the tragic war, only a small number of women who 
survived came back home with illness, nightmares, debilitating pain and shame. 
And yet, not all of them finally arrived at home because their journey back home 
is blocked by the division of this country. Let me lastly introduce to you the story 
of Gil Won-Ok Halmoni, whose hometown is in Pyongyang, which is the North 
Korean capital city. She came back to Korea but she has been waiting for another 
70 years to fully come back home in Pyongyang. “Mom, I want to come home.” 
Here is the letter of Gil Won-Ok Halmoni.13
Indeed, 75 years have passed since she left home. And 70 years have passed 
since the end of that war. But Halmoni’s road to home is still so far. However, on 
March 8, 2012, International Women’s Day, Gil Won-Ok Halmoni and Kim Bok-Dong 
Halmoni made a pledge. They promised to donate their entire legal reparations 
from the Japanese government once they receive them to ease other wartime 
sexual violence victims’ pain. This is how the “Butterfly Fund” came to life.14 The 
first place that the “Butterfly Fund” has flown to was Democratic Republic of 
Congo. In Congo, due to its civil wars, many people have died, and many women 
have become sexual violence victims. The Halmonis have reached out their small 
hands to them. These butterflies flew vigorously towards sexual violence victims 
of South Korean army during the Vietnam-U.S. War. Today, survivors are not just 
staying as victims but actively acting in hope for the recovery of full humanity and 
dignity. As human rights and women’s rights activists, they are now spreading 
words that there should not be any more victims like themselves. 
Halmonis’ Butterfly Activism reminds us of the new mission statement 
of CWME of the WCC, Together Towards Life, where it says: “Mission has been 
understood as a movement taking place from the center to the periphery, 
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and from the privileged to the marginalized of society. Now people at the 
margins are claiming their key role as agents of mission and affirming mission 
as transformation. This reversal of roles in the envisioning of mission has strong 
biblical foundations because God chose the poor, the foolish, and the powerless 
(1 Cor. 1:18-31) to further God’s mission of justice and peace so that life may 
flourish. If there is a shift of the mission concept from “mission to the margins” 
to “mission from the margins,” what then is the distinctive contribution of the 
people from the margins? And why are their experiences and visions crucial for 
re-imagining mission and evangelism today?”15
Halmonis’ hope in action to heal other wartime sexual violence victims’ pain 
is the concrete hope and the very exemplar of the “mission from the margins.” 
The Words of God strongly affirms this: “Is not this the kind of fasting I have 
chosen: to loose the chains of injustice and untie the cords of the yoke, to set 
the oppressed free and break every yoke? Is it not to share your food with the 
hungry and to provide the poor wanderer with shelter-- when you see the naked, 
to clothe him, and not to turn away from your own flesh and blood? Then your 
light will break forth like the dawn, and your healing will quickly appear; then 
your righteousness will go before you, and the glory of the LORD will be your rear 
guard.” (Isaiah 58:6-8)
I’d like to conclude my presentation by quoting a moving statement by the 
Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan: “At 
the battlefields where human dignities were ignored, torn apart and shattered, 
and couldn’t even choose their own death, we must remember the Halmonis’ 
lives. We can’t fully understand their deep sorrow. Even one millionth of pain 
they had suffered. How agonizing it would’ve been for them to come out and 
share their stories. But, we can hold their hands that the Halmonis have reached 
out to us. Their dearest wish to have a sincere apology, their request to join the 
Butterflies, we can fly with them. When the seeds of peace that the Halmonis 
have sowed sprout into hopes, Halmonis’ dignities and honors will be finally 
recovered. Then war and suffering of women in war, one day will be a story of 
the past.”16
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Once Constantine the Great had won his famous battle against Maxentius at the 
Bridge of Milvia (Pons Milvius) in 312, thus becoming the Augustus of the Western 
Roman Empire, the tetrarchy once established by Diocletian came to an end. 
Moreover, in agreement with Licinius, the eastern Augustus and his later rival, 
Constantine issued the Edict of Milan (Edictum Mediolanense), which officially 
terminated the institutionalised persecution of Christians throughout the empire. 
It is mostly due to this act that Constantine became labelled as ‘the Great’.
The gesture of the new western Augustus towards Christendom has been 
interpreted in a widely varying fashion throughout European historiography. The 
analyses are indeed diverse and range from praising the piety of the Emperor 
to blaming him for having corrupted Christianity through secular power. These 
assessments were nonetheless influenced by the analysts’ personal attitude 
towards the entire problem. Within the limits of the present paper we can neither 
venture to provide even a partial assessment of the so-called Constantinian shift,1 
nor to analyse its effects in any significant detail. Nonetheless, as the historical 
record testifies, the son of Constantius Chlorus, who had been proclaimed 
Caesar in Britain by the legions at the recommendation of his dying father,2 was 
in possession of enough previous experiences in order to approach the Christian 
community with honesty and openness – albeit not without interest. The non-
negligible aspect, of course, is that the emperor who becomes a Christian still 
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remains an emperor, since the idea of the bond between the altar and the 
throne had accompanied the history of human society from the very beginning. 
The constant endeavour of all-time empires to ensure a common religion or 
a replacement for it (that is, an ideology or quasi-religion) for their subjects is 
more or less a historical commonplace. To identify only two modern imperial 
ideologies substituting religious convictions it is enough to mention the Soviet 
Communism and the so-called ‘American dream’. 
In keeping an equal distance from all extremist interpretations of the 
Constantinian shift we need to observe that the goal of Constantine the Great 
was neither a totally selfless support of the Christian Church, nor her ultimate 
corruption. Since both his life and actions as an emperor amply demonstrated that 
even a Christian emperor will not cease to be an emperor, it becomes evident that 
the new ruler was seeking primarily for a new unifying force to reorganise and 
strengthen an empire, which had been weakened by Diocletian’s persecution of 
Christians and by the ensuing struggles for power. This force, or, to exaggerate 
a little, this yeast he thought to have found in the Christian community, which, 
despite having been persecuted rhapsodically and outlawed on a continuous 
basis, became stronger and stronger, and by the time of Constantine became such 
a complex factor within the empire that it could not be disregarded even merely 
from the viewpoint of Realpolitik. This aspect obviously played an important role 
in the decision which ultimately led to the proclamation of the Edict of Milan.
Although both the favourable and unfavourable political decisions may cause 
difficult temptations for the Church, the all-time rulers and political leaders 
should not be unilaterally blamed for these temptations. As Jesus clearly taught, 
‘give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and to God what belongs to God’ (Mark 
12: 17). This can also mean that if Caesar demands something from you, which 
belongs only to God, then you have a decision to make. The Christian confessors 
of the first three centuries also had to make their choices, but they did not blame 
the emperors for the situation.3
When the Christian Church accepted the emperor’s offer of peace at the 
beginning of the fourth century, she did not commit a fatal mistake. Nonetheless, 
the Christians had to acknowledge the fact that such a development were to 
cause certain side-effects. Ecumenical councils would be convened by secular 
rulers (albeit following an ecclesiastical request); the gatherings were to be 
attended or even presided over by the emperors or their delegates;4  furthermore, 
           [ 185 ]Emperor Constantine I and the Principles of Property Restoration
the emperors may well attempt to influence conciliar decisions to serve imperial 
interests. The all-time leaders of the Christian Church should watch over the 
undefiled preservation of the Good News and the purity of the visible church with 
the meekness of doves and the wisdom of serpents (Matthew 10: 16) throughout 
this tough game. To my mind the very numbering of the ecumenical councils 
bears a significant message. Traditionally, we label the Nicene Council held in 
325 under Constantine as ‘the first ecumenical council’, yet in fact, we should 
refer to the gathering of the apostles described in Acts 15 as being the very first 
and indeed ecumenical council (that is, representing the entire inhabited world).
The history of Early Christian doctrine provides us with abundant examples 
of steadfastness in faith, which often resulted in a bold resistance towards 
secular power.5 Nevertheless, the sad mementoes of servile compliance were 
also present. The work of the Holy Spirit within the Church can be observed also 
in the fact that the ancient Creeds managed to preserve the most important 
teachings inherited from the apostles despite the resistance or forced agenda of 
certain emperors. 
The fact that a Christian emperor still remains an emperor is demonstrated 
by the very example of Constantine the Great. He was the one who had to 
experience a few years after the publication of the Edict of Milan that by accepting 
Christendom into the realm of secular power – a movement he had hoped to 
be the bonding spiritual force within his empire – he may well have created a 
bigger trouble for himself, since the whole Christian Church became engulfed in 
the turmoil of the Arian controversy and was facing one of its strongest internal 
crises within a decade after the issuing of the Mediolanense. And Constantine 
did not cease to be an emperor: a few years after the Council of Nicea he did not 
only reduced his support of the term ὁμοούσιος (= of the same essence), which 
he had so eloquently defended in 325, but – in accordance with the unbending 
rule of numbers – he began to favour the continuously growing Arian faction. 
He was baptised on his deathbed by the very leader of the Arians, Eusebius of 
Nicomedia. It was certainly not Constantine’s fault that not the Arians carried the 
day in the fourth century. It was partly due to these ecclesiastical power struggles 
that the young emperor, Julian the Apostate (361–363) became disillusioned with 
Christianity and attempted to revive the cult of the ancient gods.
Returning to our central theme we can observe that the Edict of Milan in 313 
was not entirely without precedent, since Galerius, one of the main persecutors 
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of Christians, had published in 311, together with Constantine himself and with 
Licinius a decree of tolerance in Nicomedia, which meant an essential lessening 
of the burden which had been pressing Christian believers.6 Nonetheless, 
the Edict of Milan of 313 is not merely a reiteration of the document issued in 
Nicomedia a couple of years earlier. On the one hand, in the previous document, 
Galerius, being aware of his imminent death, finally agrees to what Constantine 
and Licinius had prepared,7 that is not to disturb the followers of Christian faith, a 
faith still incomprehensible to him, to leave in peace those whom he considered 
as ‘having relinquished the sect/religion of their forefathers’ (parentum suorum 
reliquerant sectam),8 and to let them rebuild their places of gathering. On the other 
hand, the Edict of Milan provides us with a far more detailed and peculiarly exact 
formulation, including the legal status of Christians. It is therefore worthwhile 
taking a brief glance upon the text of the so-called edict of Galerius:  
The two texts differ from each other in a few minor points, yet in view of our 
present goal it is sufficient to provide a common English translation. We have put 
the most important differences in square brackets:
The Latin text of Galerius’ edict
Inter cetera quae pro rei publicae 
semper commodis atque utilitate 
disponimus, nos quidem volueramus 
antehac iuxta leges veteres et 
publicam disciplinam Romanorum 
cuncta corrigere atque id providere, 
ut etiam Christiani, qui parentum 
suorum reliquerant sectam, ad 
bonas mentes redirent, siquidem 
quadam ratione tanta eosdem 
Christianos voluntas invasisset et 
tanta stulti tia occupasset, ut non illa 
veterum instituta sequerentur, quae 
forsitan primum parentas eorundem 
constituerant, sed pro arbitrio suo 
Its Greek translation by Eusebius
Μεταξὺ τῶν λοιπῶν, ἅπερ ὑπὲρ τοῦ 
χρησίμου καὶ λυσιτελοῦς τοῖς δημοσίοις 
διατυπούμεθα, ἡμεῖς μὲν βεβουλήμεθα 
πρότερον κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους νόμους 
καὶ τὴν δημοσίαν ἐπιστήμην τὴν τῶν 
Ρωμαίων ἅπαντα ἐπανορθώσασθαι καὶ 
τούτου πρόνοιαν ποιήσασθαι ἵνα καὶ 
οἱ Χριστιανοί, οἵτινες τῶν γονέων τῶν 
ἑαυτῶν καταλελοίπασιν τὴν αἵρεσιν, 
εἰς ἀγαθὴν πρόθεσιν ἐπανέλθοιεν. 
ἐπείπερ τινὶ λογισμῷ τοσαύτη αὐτοὺς 
πλεονεξία κατειλήφει ὡς μὴ ἕπεσθαι 
τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν πάλαι καταδειχθεῖσιν, 
ἅπερ ἴσως πρότερον καὶ οἱ γονεῖς 
αὐτῶν ἦσαν καταστήσαντες, ἀλλὰ 
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atque ut isdem erat libitum, ita sibimet 
leges facerent quas observarent, et per 
diversa varios populos congregarent. 
Denique cum eiusmodi nostra iussio 
extitisset, ut ad veterum se instituta 
conferrent, multi periculo subiugati, 
multi etiam deturbati sunt. Atque cum 
plurimi in proposito perseverarent 
ac videremus nec diis eosdem 
cultum ac religionem debitam 
exhibere nec Christianorum deum 
observare, contemplatione mitissimae 
nostrae clementiae intuentes et 
consuetudinem sempiternam, 
qua solemus cunctis hominibus 
veniam indulgere, promptissimam 
in his quoque indulgentiam nostram 
credidimus porrigendam. Ut denuo 
sint Christiani et conventicula sua 
componant, ita ut ne quid contra 
disciplinam agant. [Per] aliam autem 
epistolam iudicibus significaturi 
sumus quid debeant observare. Unde 
iuxta hanc indulgentiam nostram 
debebunt deum suum orare pro 
salute nostra et rei publicae ac sua, ut 
undique versum res publica praestetur 
incolumis et securi vivere in sedibus 
suis possint.9 
κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν πρόθεσιν καὶ ὡς 
ἕκαστος ἐβούλετο, οὕτως ἑαυτοῖς 
καὶ νόμους ποιῆσαι καὶ τούτους 
παραφυλάσσειν καὶ ἐν διαφόροις 
διάφορα πλήθη συνάγειν. τοιγαροῦν 
τοιούτου ὑφ΄ ἡμῶν προστάγματος 
παρακολουθήσαντος ὥστε ἐπὶ τὰ ὑπὸ 
τῶν ἀρχαίων κατασταθέντα ἑαυτοὺς 
μεταστήσαιεν, πλεῖστοι μὲν κινδύνῳ 
ὑποβληθέντες, πλεῖστοι δὲ ταραχθέντες 
παντοίους θανάτους ὑπέφερον· καὶ 
ἐπειδὴ τῶν πολλῶν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπονοίᾳ 
διαμενόντων ἑωρῶμεν μήτε τοῖς θεοῖς 
τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις τὴν ὀφειλομένην 
θρῃσκείαν προσάγειν αὐτοὺς μήτε τῷ 
τῶν Χριστιανῶν προσέχειν, ἀφορῶντες 
εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ 
τὴν διηνεκῆ συνήθειαν δι’ ἧς εἰώθαμεν 
ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις συγγνώμην 
ἀπονέμειν, προθυμότατα καὶ ἐν 
τούτῳ τὴν συγχώρησιν τὴν ἡμετέραν 
ἐπεκτεῖναι δεῖν ἐνομίσαμεν, ἵνα αὖθις 
ὦσιν Χριστιανοὶ καὶ τοὺς οἴκους ἐν 
οἷς συνήγοντο συνθῶσιν οὕτως ὥστε 
μηδὲν ὑπεναντίον τῆς ἐπιστήμης 
αὐτοὺς πράττειν. δι’ ἑτέρας δὲ 
ἐπιστολῆς τοῖς δικασταῖς δηλώσομεν 
τί αὐτοὺς παραφυλάξασθαι δεήσει· 
ὅθεν κατὰ ταύτην τὴν συγχώρησιν 
τὴν ἡμετέραν ὀφείλουσιν τὸν ἑαυτῶν 
θεὸν ἱκετεύειν περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς 
ἡμετέρας καὶ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ τῆς 
ἑαυτῶν, ἵνα κατὰ πάντα τρόπον καὶ τὰ 
δημόσια παρασχεθῇ ὑγιῆ καὶ ἀμέριμνοι 
ζῆν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἑστίᾳ δυνηθῶσι.10
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Amongst our other regulations for the permanent advantage of the commonweal, 
we have hitherto studied to reduce all things to a conformity with the ancient laws 
and public discipline of the Romans. It has been our aim in a special manner, that 
the Christians also, who had abandoned the religion of their forefathers, should 
return to right opinions. For such wilfulness and folly had, we know not how, taken 
possession of them, that instead of observing those ancient institutions, which 
possibly their own forefathers had established, they, through caprice, made laws 
to themselves, and drew together into different societies many men of widely 
different persuasions. After the publication of our edict, ordaining the Christians 
to betake themselves to the observance of the ancient institutions, many of them 
were subdued through the fear of danger, and moreover many of them were 
exposed to jeopardy [and endured all kinds of death].11 Nevertheless, because 
great numbers still persist in their opinions, and because we have perceived that at 
present they neither pay reverence and due adoration to the gods, nor yet worship 
their own God, therefore we, from our wonted clemency in bestowing pardon on 
all, have judged it fit to extend our indulgence to those men, and to permit them 
again to be Christians [and to reconstruct the places of their assemblies];12 yet so as 
that they offend not against good order. By another mandate we purpose to signify 
unto magistrates how they ought herein to demean themselves.13 Wherefore it 
will be the duty of the Christians, in consequence of this our toleration, to pray 
to their God for our welfare, and for that of the public, and for their own; that the 
commonweal may continue safe in every quarter, and that they themselves may 
live securely in their habitations.14
This edict of tolerance may indeed be considered as a milestone in the 
history of the Christian Church, yet we cannot say that the Edict of Milan was 
merely a tautology, which changed nothing essentially in regard to the fate of 
Christians. To be more exact: the document issued in Nicomedia put merely 
an end to persecution by not considering Christians as enemies of the state 
and of humankind anymore; the ‘outlawed’ status is somewhat changed into 
a ‘tolerated’ one, but there is no mention about their individual and collective 
legal standing – even less about an eventual restoration and/or compensation. 
These aspects, however, are indispensable for a proper answer to the Christians’ 
disadvantageous situation. 
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From the viewpoint of our analysis it is also important to observe that the 
promised mandate or decree informing the magistrates about their modus 
operandi, was never issued. This can only partially be attributed to Galerius’ 
death. Instead of any further speculation we can ascertain that exactly the Edict 
of Milan contains those guidelines, which were to be followed by the magistrates 
in regard to the ascertainment and adaptation of legal as well as property rights. 
The very form and style of the edict betrays that it was primarily addressed to the 
governor of the province in order to inform him not only about the law itself, but 
also with its explanation and methods of application. 
Several sections of the Edict of Milan issued in 313 would deserve our attention. 
At present we shall discuss only the passage below – mostly because of its 
actuality in a modern, and self-declared open and free European society. We 
shall provide again a bilingual text, that is, the original Latin version of Lactantius 
and the contemporary Greek translation of Eusebius:
Et quoniam idem Christiani non [in] 
ea loca tantum ad quae convenire 
consuerunt, sed alia etiam habuisse 
noscuntur ad ius corporis eorum id est 
ecclesiarum, non hominum singulorum, 
pertinentia, ea omnia lege quam superius 
comprehendimus, citra ullam prorsus 
ambiguitatem vel controversiam isdem 
Christianis id est corpori et conventiculis 
eorum reddi iubebis, supra dicta 
scilicet ratione servata, ut ii qui eadem 
sine pretio sicut diximus restituant, 
indemnitatem de nostra benivolentia 
sperent. In quibus omnibus supra dicto 
corpori Christianorum intercessionem 
tuam efficacissimam exhibere debebis, 
ut praeceptum nostrum quantocius 
compleatur, quo etiam in hoc per 
clementiam nostram quieti publicae 
consulatur.15 
Καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ αὐτοὶ Χριστιανοὶ οὐ μόνον 
ἐκείνους εἰς οὓς συνέρχεσθαι ἔθος εἶχον, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρους τόπους ἐσχηκέναι 
γινώσκονται διαφέροντας οὐ πρὸς 
ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον 
τοῦ αὐτῶν σώματος, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τῶν 
Χριστιανῶν, ταῦτα πάντα ἐπὶ τῷ νόμῳ 
ὃν προειρήκαμεν, δίχα παντελῶς τινος 
ἀμφισβητήσεως τοῖς αὐτοῖς Χριστιανοῖς, 
τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τῷ σώματι [αὐτῶν] καὶ τῇ 
συνόδῳ [ἑκάστῳ] αὐτῶν ἀποκαταστῆναι 
κελεύσεις, τοῦ προειρημένου λογισμοῦ 
δηλαδὴ φυλαχθέντος, ὅπως αὐτοὶ 
οἵτινες τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄνευ τιμῆς, καθὼς 
προειρήκαμεν, ἀποκαθιστῶσι, τὸ 
ἀζήμιον τὸ ἑαυτῶν παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας 
καλοκἀγαθίας ἐλπίζοιεν. ἐν οἷς πᾶσιν τῷ 
προειρημένῳ σώματι τῶν Χριστιανῶν 
τὴν σπουδὴν δυνατώτατα παρασχεῖν 
ὀφείλεις, ὅπως τὸ ἡμέτερον κέλευσμα 
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τὴν ταχίστην παραπληρωθῇ, ὅπως καὶ 
ἐν τούτῳ διὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας χρηστότητος 
πρόνοια γένηται τῆς κοινῆς καὶ δημοσίας 
ἡσυχίας.16 
For the sake of easier understanding we shall provide a common English 
translation of both texts, offering particular explanations of certain differences 
during the course of the analysis:
And because it appears that, besides the places appropriated to religious worship, 
the Christians did possess other places, which belonged not to individuals, but 
to their society in general, that is, to their churches, we comprehend all such 
within the regulation aforesaid, and we will that you cause them all to be restored 
to their society or churches, and that without ambivalence or controversy. The 
aforementioned statement remains, of course, valid, that those who restore these 
without a price, as we have declared, may hope to receive indemnification from 
our benevolence. In furthering all these for the benefit of the Christians, you are 
to use your utmost diligence, to the end that our orders be speedily obeyed, and 
our gracious purpose in securing the common and public tranquillity promoted.17
The key expressions and phrases are worth noting: the text makes it clear that the 
places of assembly, which had been used according to the custom (consuetudo, 
ἔθος) of the Christians belong to them. Besides, they are known to have possessed 
other places, yet not merely as individuals (non hominum singulorum, οὐ πρὸς 
ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), but rather by law (ad ius, πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον), that is, as a society or 
community (corporis eorum id est ecclesiarum, τοῦ αὐτῶν σώματος). The Latin 
text speaks unequivocally about the previously confiscated properties during 
persecution as the rightful possessions of ‘the churches’, that is, of local Christian 
communities and congregations.
Thus, the imperial edict acknowledges not only the private, but also the 
collective or communal property as being entirely legitimate, even in the case 
when the community was not regarded as having any official standing, even less 
as being legally constituted in the eyes of the Roman state and law at the time 
of confiscation. This principle is remarkable in itself already, since still during our 
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time there are endless debates with regard to the legitimacy of even using the 
terms of ‘communal rights’ or ‘collective rights’ besides the category of ‘individual 
rights’. In addition, at present there is no discernible political agreement within 
e.g. the countries of the EU concerning the question whether the very same laws 
governing the restoration of confiscated properties of individual persons should 
be applicable to the confiscated communal possessions of previously disbanded, 
outlawed and, by consequence, persecuted communities. 
Emperor Constantine’s firm adherence to the inviolability of both private and 
communal properties may well embarrass some of the younger member states 
of the European Union of the 21st century, or even the Union itself, which is very 
reticent in its reactions, whenever a question concerning the recognition and 
respect within the EU of the communal rights of national, ethnic and/or religious 
communities having many centuries old historic traditions is raised. The list of the 
application of double standards during the past decades (including those on EU 
level) is so long, that the enumeration of various examples is simply superfluous. 
The text of the Edict of Milan is far more explicit and concrete than the 
overcomplicated and ultra-politicised, and consequently disproportionate and 
unbalanced solutions of our present: Constantine and Licinius make it abundantly 
clear, that these usurped possessions must be restored to the general society and 
particular congregations of Christians (corpori et conventiculis eorum, τῷ σώματι 
[αὐτῶν] καὶ τῇ συνόδῳ [ἑκάστῳ] αὐτῶν). This, of course, means that the general 
rule should be applied fully everywhere and in respect to every community 
in an unaltered fashion, irrespective, for example, of the number of its local 
survivors subsequent to the persecution. In short, the mere fact that as a result 
of the oppression and maltreatment some local communities were decimated, 
this reduced number of survivors cannot serve by any means as an excuse to 
promote further injustice by a reduction of compensations during the so-called 
‘process of restoration’. 
Such a renewed and now ‘legalised’ expropriation or recurrent ransacking often 
takes the following form: the restitution of properties happens ‘proportionally’ 
with the actual number of survivors at the time of ‘indemnification’, violating 
the principle of ‘restitutio in integrum’ (complete restitution), albeit this principle 
concerning one’s possessions and properties is regarded as being sacrosanct 
and unchallengeable even in the eyes of the most secularized societies. This 
‘compensatory solution’ based on the actual census, concocted with the shrewd 
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logic of majority power does not only disregard the principle of the inviolability 
concerning one’s property, but implicitly seeks to legitimise retroactively the 
violent practices of past regimes, which had been primarily responsible for the 
decrease in number of the community in question. The past two and a half 
decades in Transylvania (Romania) have furnished us with abundant examples 
of such solutions and attempts, which nonetheless represent the repeated 
expropriation and plundering of various autochthonous communities, aiming 
towards the restoration of a totalitarian system of power.  
The manner or mode of restoration described in the Edict of Milan should also 
be appreciated: the repossession (reddi, ἀποκαταστῆναι) of properties should 
be accomplished without any objection, ambiguity or controversy (citra ullam 
prorsus ambiguitatem vel controversiam, δίχα παντελῶς τινος ἀμφισβητήσεως), 
furthermore, in the shortest time possible (quantocius, ταχίστην). The Latin 
expression – „quantocius / quantotius” = „i quanto ocius” – means: as soon as 
possible, right away. The edict does not only stipulate that the application of the 
general principle of restoration is mandatory for the magistrates, but at the same 
time it does not tolerate any delay regarding its implementation. Perhaps it is not 
too far-fetched if we interpret the term ἀποκατάστασις in the Greek version – a 
term used by Origen to describe the restoration of the whole creation at the end 
of time into its original state, befitting its intended purpose by the Creator18 – as 
an eloquent lesson for our time. 
The restoration (ἀποκατάστασις) should therefore happen at once. Instead, 
the present rhythm of restorations is anything but fast. Moreover, one can 
witness a whole series of artificially created controversies surrounding the very 
legitimacy of a community’s claim over its one-time legal possession – horribile 
dictu: even in cases, where the abusive expropriation was recorded in detail by 
legal documents of the time, naming unequivocally the entity from which the 
property was confiscated. Amidst such detestable ‘polemics’ one even forgets 
to wonder whether beyond the property’s immediate restoration to its previous 
owner, in what way should the owner be compensated further for the fact that his/
her legal possession was being usurped and abused by someone else (including 
the totalitarian state itself) for a period of several decades? Instead, some of the 
new Romanian laws on restitution, for example, often defend the interests of 
usurpers and abusers.19 And since we talk about compensation, Constantine’s 
above quoted edict provides a clear instruction also in this sense: 
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The aforementioned statement remains, of course, valid, that those who restore 
these without a price (sine pretio, ἄνευ τιμῆς), as we have declared, may hope to 
receive indemnification (indemnitatem, τὸ ἀζήμιον) from our benevolence.
Who is, then, eligible for compensation? Not the previous legal owner, who has to 
regain his/her property immediately – irrespective of the quantity and quality of 
the investment(s) effectuated by the usurper or his/her beneficiaries subsequent 
to its confiscation! –, but rather the person or entity, who/which restores it to the 
rightful owner without delay, and whose incurring loss will be compensated by 
the benevolence (καλοκἀγαθία, benivolentia) of the emperor. Consequently, the 
previous rightful owner deserves compensation in the case when, for example, 
his/her one-time property was destroyed. The compensation for those restoring 
these possessions to their rightful owners is not automatic, but they may hope 
(sperent, ἐλπίζοιεν) to receive it from the emperor. All these measures are 
largely considered as being matters of course within Europe’s most secularised 
states, provided that we speak of confiscated possessions of individual persons. 
Nonetheless, in the case of communal or collective properties certain objections 
and ‘concerns’ regularly appear, just as if the very number of rightful owners 
could alter in the slightest possible manner the principle of property inviolability. 
Just for the sake of example: if a confiscated family home is inherited by ten 
siblings, yet at the time of its restoration only five of them are still alive, they are 
nonetheless entitled to the whole house, not to half of it or anything less than 
100%. 
In contrast to the above principles, some of the Romanian laws and legal 
measures concerning restoration and compensation seek to burden the former 
owner (for example, the local church congregation) to provide ‘compensations’ 
for the usurper. Such practices include measures that after the legal eviction of the 
intruder from the property, the owner (who has just regained his/her property) 
and not the state itself (!) is being expected to provide alternate living possibilities 
for the former occupant. Obviously, there are numerous examples when, after 
the regime change, the state authorities have sold illegally and rapidly a number 
of properties, which were certainly due to be restored to their rightful owners, 
in order for the state – which in this manner became the accessory after the fact 
of a lot of usurped properties – to escape direct litigation with the previous legal 
owners. 
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In assessing the Edict of Milan more than seventeen centuries after its 
promulgation it is our duty to emphasise that Constantine did not make 
Christianity the state religion of the Roman Empire. This was carried out partly 
by the edict of Theodosius the Great published in 380 in Thessalonica entitled 
Cunctos populos. Constantine ‘merely’ applied the very principles of Roman 
property law, this time in the case of the Christians. The final aim of all these 
measures is that the emperor wishes to secure and promote ‘the common and 
public tranquillity’ (quieti publicae consulatur, γένηται τῆς κοινῆς καὶ δημοσίας 
ἡσυχίας). This is in fact the often quoted and praised ‘salus rei publicae’. If we 
were to translate the whole series of Constantine’s procedures onto our time 
and circumstances, then the message of principle of this seventeen centuries 
old edict would be the following: social tensions can and should be dissolved 
with the immediate restoration of property relations and with a firmly consistent 
respect of property rights. To put it in simplest terms: the law should apply to all. 
Instead of the application of the above principle, which is both straightforward 
and morally justified, modern societies tend to provide such advantages for their 
own privileged groups (e.g. for political classes), which were unheard of even 
in some ancient despotic systems of government. To quote a biblical example: 
according to the testimony of Daniel 6, king Darius, the almighty ruler of his 
vast empire, could not override the very letter of his own decree, which in that 
particular situation compelled him to throw his favourite, Daniel, into the lions’ 
den. By contrast, modern European politicians (and not only Eastern European 
politicians), based on the so-called ‘parliamentary immunity’ may be relieved 
from under the effect of the very law that they themselves had promoted, 
although based on moral grounds, as well as on the teaching capability of the 
example, the law should apply in the same, or even stricter sense to the lawgiver. 
As a sadly typical example of modern attitude towards the law, we consider it 
important to quote in Romanian original and in English translation the relevant 
passage from the House Rules of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies concerning 
parliamentary immunity, a legal measure which is still in force in the Romanian 
Parliament:
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§ 194. – (1) În caz de infracțiune 
flagrantă, deputații pot fi reținuți și 
supuși percheziției. Situația va fi adusă 
de îndată la cunoștință ministrului 
justiției. Ministrul justiției îl va 
informa neîntârziat pe președintele 
Camerei Deputaților asupra reținerii 
și a percheziției. În cazul în care 
Camera constată că nu există temei 
pentru reținere, va dispune imediat 
revocarea acestei măsuri. (2) Dispoziția 
de revocare a reținerii se execută de 
îndată prin ministrul justiției.20
§ 194. – (1) In the case of a flagrant 
criminal offence the deputies can 
be detained and subjected to 
perquisition. The minister of justice 
shall be informed at once about the 
situation. The minister of justice shall 
inform the chairman of the Chamber 
of Deputies about the detainment 
and perquisition without delay. If the 
Chamber determines that there is 
no ground for detainment, it enacts 
immediately the revocation of this 
measure. (2) The enactment to revoke 
the detainment is executed at once by 
the minister of justice.
One simply cannot ignore the particular care by which the lawgiver sought to insert 
the expressions ‘at once’, ‘without delay’ and ‘immediately’ into each sentence, 
thus emphasising the duty of various political players to act as quickly as possible, 
in order that the MP in question may be exempted from the legal consequences 
of his/her own actions in the shortest time imaginable. The text, which is still a 
valid legal measure in force in Romania, is worrying not only from a moral, but also 
from a juridical viewpoint, since it creates the possibility for an MP to be relieved 
from under any criminal proceedings which could be taken against him/her even 
if there is plenty of evidence that proves his/her guilt beyond reasonable doubt: 
in order to achieve this, only the majority ruling of the Chamber of Deputies is 
needed. Here the text clearly refers to that Chamber of Deputies, whose members 
obviously participated neither in the examination of the circumstances of the MP’s 
‘flagrant criminal offence’, nor in the subsequent investigation, nor in the work of 
gathering and presenting the evidence pertaining to the case. The question here 
is not whether such a political entity would or would not abuse of this privilege, 
or how often and in which cases could such an abuse happen. The most troubling 
fact is that the very letter of the law presents a clear possibility for individuals as 
well as political formations to carry out such an abuse – any time they are pleased 
to do it, provided that they can control 50% + 1 of the House votes.
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One of the lessons clearly is that the laws are often bad because they do not 
apply to the lawgivers themselves. Or at least not in the same manner. If these 
laws were equally applicable to all, our politicians would most likely work much 
harder on their improvement. The above piece of legislature – presented here 
as an illustration – does not serve the public good or the salus rei publicae in any 
conceivable manner, but rather exemplifies the legalised immoral arrogance of 
modern democracy. In this sense it hardly differs from the one-time dictatorship 
of the proletariat and of its ‘people’s democracy’, which created all those laws and 
legal measures by which the expropriations, evictions and a whole series of other 
disfranchisements and outlawry could be carried out. It is the legal enactment of 
George Orwell’s famous irony in his Animal Farm: ‘all animals are equal, but some 
animals are more equal than others’.21
Apart from all these observations based on Constantine’s restoration 
principles, we should not provide useful guidelines exclusively for secular 
authorities, but – as responsible Christians – we ought to sweep in our own 
back yard. John Wycliffe (1320–1384), who is often remembered as the rising star 
of the Reformation, in his Tract on secular authority (Tractatus de civili dominio) 
written in 1376 presents the following argument: every possession belongs to 
God; the owner is merely its steward. Further, the wealth has always a particular 
destination. The very objective of ecclesiastical property and wealth is for it to be 
used for the glory of God and the benefit of the poor. At the end of this reasoning, 
Wycliffe concludes that if the servants of the church do not fulfil their duties to 
use the wealth of the church according to its divinely intended destination, then 
the secular authority is entitled to confiscate it.22
The Communist and other totalitarian regimes obviously did not follow 
Wycliffe’s pre-Reformation principles when they deprived the Christian churches 
and communities of their properties. Nevertheless, this seven centuries old 
warning is truly evangelical and should not be ignored: the Christian churches 
must analyse immediately and thoroughly whether they serve indeed God’s 
glory, the welfare of His children, i.e. of the whole humankind with all their existent 
or regained possessions or not. We are not entitled to formulate prescriptions 
in this respect, but keeping abreast of the times and remaining observant of 
their signs we need to emphasise the importance of the secular power’s right 
of supervision over the profits generated by ecclesiastical properties as well as 
their usage in the proper sense of the Gospel for commendable and charitable 
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purposes. This principle remains valid provided that the secular power applies 
the same standards to all, and resists the ever-recurring temptation to sustain the 
Orwellian differentiation between ‘equals and more equals’. 
The Latin and Greek versions of the Edict of Milan, the recognition of communal 
or collective property rights, the manner of its formulation as well as its emphases 
constitute a useful lesson: this is a veritable restitutio ad institutionem, i.e. a 
restoration not only for the institution (ad institutum), but at least in the same 
measure a teaching for our instruction (ad institutionem nostram). Moreover, it is 
also a correction. A healthy and somewhat balanced state–church relationship of 
the future may be achieved if on the one hand the contemporary secular power 
begins to take the Constantinian principles of restitution seriously, and on the 
other hand, the Christian Church continues to remember John Wycliffe’s warning 
about the destination of ecclesiastical properties: after all, it is the non-negligible 
duty of the Church to serve God’s glory with everything she possesses23. Soli Deo 
gloria!
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